the innocent meaning adopted." Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983); see also Van Deusen v.Baldwin, 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 419, 650 N.E.2d 963 (9th Dist.1994). "'It matters not that the defamatory meaning is the more obvious one.
{¶ 41} The “innocent construction rule” provides: “If allegedly defamatory words are susceptible to two meanings, one defamatory and one innocent, the defamatory meaning should be rejected, and the innocent meaning adopted.” Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983) ; see also Van Deusen v. Baldwin, 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 419, 650 N.E.2d 963 (9th Dist.1994). Thus, “[i]f a statement has more than one interpretation, it cannot be defamatory per se.” Murray v. Knight–Ridder, Inc., 7th Dist. Belmont No. 02 BE 45, 2004-Ohio-821, 2004 WL 333250, ¶ 31.
Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 453 N.E.2d 666, abrogated on other grounds by Welling v. Weinfeld, 133 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866 N.E.2d 1051. See, e.g., Sweitzer v. Outlet Communications, Inc. (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 102, 112-113, 726 N.E.2d 1084; Johnson v. Lakewood Hosp. (Sept. 4, 1997), 8th Dist. Nos. 70943 and 71257; Belinky, supra, at 507; Van Deusen v. Baldwin (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 419, 650 N.E.2d 963; Elwert v. Pilot Life Ins. Co. (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 529, 540-541, 602 N.E.2d 1219.{¶ 14} Under the innocent-construction rule, "if allegedly defamatory words are susceptible to two meanings, one defamatory and one innocent, the defamatory meaning should be rejected and the innocent meaning adopted."
" State ex rel. The V. Cos. v. Marshall (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469. Furthermore, "[p]ursuant to Civ.R. 61, `[a] final judgment may not be disturbed due to the exclusion of evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected.'" Van Deusen v. Baldwin (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 420, quoting State ex rel. Avellone v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 58, 62. "Thus, `[a]n appellate court will reverse the decision of a trial court that extinguishes a party's right to discovery if the trial court's decision is improvident and affects the discovering party's substantial rights.'" Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 592, quoting Rossman v. Rossman (1975), 47 Ohio App.2d 103, 110.
The "innocent construction rule" provides: "[I]f allegedly defamatory words are susceptible to two meanings, one defamatory and one innocent, the defamatory meaning should be rejected, and the innocent meaning adopted."Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669; see, also, Van Deusen v. Baldwin (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 419, 650 N.E.2d 963, 965. Thus, we reject the defamatory interpretation in favor of the innocent.
Appellate courts in Ohio have construed Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, as adopting the innocent construction rule. See, e.g., Van Deusen v. Baldwin (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 419; Robb v. Lincoln Publishing (Ohio), Inc. (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 595, 618; and Leal v. Holtvogt (1998), 123 Ohio App.3d 51, 81. This rule provides that, if an utterance is reasonably susceptible to both a defamatory and an innocent meaning, as a matter of law, the innocent meaning is to be adopted.
The "innocent construction" rule states that if a statement is "susceptible [of] two meanings, one defamatory and one innocent, the defamatory meaning should be rejected, and the innocent meaning adopted." Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 6 OBR 421, 423, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669; see, also, Van Deusen v. Baldwin (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 419, 650 N.E.2d 963, 965. Unfortunately, the Leals' briefs do not explain how Mrs. Leal's statements could be interpreted innocently.
Stow v. Coville (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 70, 72, 644 N.E.2d 673, 674-675. If statements are susceptible of two different meanings (one defamatory, the other not defamatory), they fall within the "innocent construction rule" and are not, as a matter of law, defamatory. See Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 6 OBR 421, 423-424, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669-670; Van Deusen v. Baldwin (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 416, 419, 650 N.E.2d 963, 965. The allegedly defamatory remark by Robinson consisted of Seitz's statement in his letter: