Summary
In Valle v. Bally Total Fitness, 01-Civ.-11614, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17093 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003), unlike in this case, plaintiff failed "to incorporate any factual allegations that would indicate how his race, gender, age, or national origin played a role in" the employer's decision to terminate his employment.
Summary of this case from Deshpande v. TJH Medical Services, P.C.Opinion
01 Civ. 11614 (RCC) (KNF)
September 29, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Israel Valle ("Plaintiff), pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, against Bally Total Fitness ("Bally"), the City of New York, and the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff, a part time aerobics instructor at Bally, alleges that he was wrongfully terminated from his employment because of his race, sex, national origin, and age. He also claims that Bally retaliated against him because he filed a complaint alleging Bally engaged in unlawful employment practices. Plaintiff further alleges that the City of New York and the NYPD conspired with Bally in violating Title VII and in having him terminated.
This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Kevin N. Fox for general pre-trial supervision and for a Report and Recommendation on any substantive motions. Thereafter, Bally filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiff failed to plead a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, and has therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Bally also moved to dismiss the complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. Similarly, the City of New York and the NYPD moved to dismiss the claims against them, asserting that Plaintiff: (1) failed to identify any wrongdoing by the City of New York or the NYPD; (2) failed to show that a municipal policy or custom caused any deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (3) wrongly sued the NYPD.
In a Report and Recommendation dated March 13, 2003 ("Report"), Magistrate Judge Fox recommended that Bally's, the City of New York's and the NYPD's motions to dismiss be granted. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. The Court has considered Plaintiffs objections. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions are GRANTED.
I. Background
On May 9, 2001, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Bally to teach sixteen sessions of a fitness course entitled "Papi Chulo Salsa Class." (Compl. ¶ 8.) The agreement included the fee for the course, and what Plaintiffs salary would be for teaching the course. Plaintiff alleges that on June 16, 2001, Bally informed him that it would not perform under the terms of the May 9, 2001 agreement. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Bally wrongfully terminated his employment on September 5, 2001, because of his race, sex, national origin, and age. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that Bally retaliated against him because he filed a complaint against it for unlawful employment practices. (Id.) After filing a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Plaintiff was issued a right to sue letter on July 31, 2001. (Id. ¶ 12.)
II. Discussion
As previously stated, Plaintiff objected to the Report's recommendation that Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants conspired to commit a violation of Title VII. (Dkt. No. 32: PL's Objections, at 2.) In addition, he claims that he was falsely arrested, assaulted, and battered by an NYPD officer, and that these actions were part of the conspiracy to have him terminated. (Id. at 2-3.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that Bally stole and misrepresented his proposal for the "Papi Chulo Salsa Class," and presented it as its own. (Id. at 3-4.) On whole, Plaintiffs objections to the Report appear to be reiterations of the arguments that he previously asserted before Judge Fox. The Court nonetheless has reviewed the entire Report de novo. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs objections are without merit.
A. Motions to Dismiss
A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief/' Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must take as true all the facts stated in the complaint and "draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor."Jackson Nat'l Life Ins, v. Merrill Lynch Co., 32 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1995). As such, "a complaint should not be dismissed simply because a plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits." Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1995).
B. The City of New York's and NYPD's Motions to Dismiss
1. Failure to State a Claim
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the claimant must allege that: "(1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States." Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Dwares v. City, of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1993)). Additionally, "a municipality may not be held liable under Section 1983 for the actions of its employees based on a theory of respondeat superior." Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Thus, in order for a claimant to recover against a municipality, he must show that the official policy constitutes "the moving force of the constitutional violation." Id. He must "prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom" and show that there was a "causal connection . . . between the policy and the deprivation of his constitutional rights."Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 1987) (citingVippolis v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985)).
As explained in the Report, Plaintiffs claims against the City of New York and the NYPD consist of conclusive allegations unsupported by factual assertions. Plaintiff also fails to allege that any municipal policy or custom was applicable in this particular case. Further, there is no proof that an official municipal policy or custom was the cause of any deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Plaintiffs complaint fails to articulate how he was injured by either the City of New York or the NYPD through a municipal policy or custom. The claims against both are therefore dismissed.
2. The NYPD Is Not a Suable Entity
Despite the fact that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the NYPD, the Court also notes that under the New York City Charter, the NYPD is not subject to suit. The New York City Charter states that, "all actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the City of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law." N.Y. City Charter Ch. 17 § 396. As explained in the Report, the NYPD is an agency of the City of New York, and therefore cannot be independently sued. For this reason, Plaintiffs claims against the NYPD are also dismissed.
C. Bally's Motion to Dismiss
When a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has been made by a defendant, the standard by which a complaint of discrimination is to be judged is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading must have "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief". Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The principal purpose of the pleading is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so that a defendant will not have to speculate about its basis. Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995).
In this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because it does not give Bally fair notice of the claim asserted against it and leaves Bally to speculate about the basis of the claims. Plaintiffs allegations state that he was wrongfully terminated without any legal right or justification; however, Plaintiff fails to incorporate any factual allegations that would indicate how his race, gender, age, or national origin played a role in Bally's decision to terminate his employment. As a result, Plaintiffs complaint against Bally does not meet the notice pleading requirement of Rule 8. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims against Bally are dismissed.
D. Res Judicata
Although Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants, the Court notes that Plaintiffs complaint is bared for a wholly independent reason: res judicata. As explained in the Report, Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed based upon the doctrine of res judicata. Under this doctrine, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)).
The City of New York and the NYPD assert that Plaintiff is reviving claims that this Court previously dismissed with prejudice in Israel Valle v. Bally Total Fitness and the New York City Police Department. See 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16285 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In that case, Plaintiff alleged that the NYPD violated his constitutional rights by defaming him. This claim was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the same statute that is being relied upon in this case. Because the section 1983 claim was adjudicated on its merits, and Plaintiffs current claims could have been raised in the previous action, it is appropriate to dismiss Plaintiffs current claims made against the NYPD.
Similarly, Plaintiffs current claims against Bally is dismissed under res judicata. In the previous action, Plaintiff accused Bally of unjustly firing him and retaliating against him because of his age, race, and sex. These claims were also dismissed with prejudice after a finding that the allegations against Bally were baseless. As a result, Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the claims he had previously raised against Bally. In conclusion, even if Plaintiff could withstand Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion, the doctrine of res judicata would bar all of Plaintiff s current claims.
E. Future Actions
This decision now marks the second time that this Court has dismissed Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VEI and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act involving the same factual circumstances. Plaintiff is therefore warned that the filing of an additional complaint based upon the same allegations or against the same defendants might result in the issuance of an order barring the acceptance of any future complaints without Plaintiffs first obtaining leave of the Court. See Malley v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 1995 WL 434322, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1995). Plaintiff is also advised that despite his pro se status, he is not insulated from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Gluck, 2003 WL 1344953, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003); Malley v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 207 F. Supp.2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Commer v. Am. Fed'n of State, County Mun. Employees, 2002 WL 31016626, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2002). Should Plaintiff again file a complaint against Defendants involving the same allegations, sanctions would be appropriate.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, this Court adopts the Report in its entirety. Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is therefore directed to close the case.
So Ordered.