Summary
noting the "limited" nature of the exception and declining to apply it
Summary of this case from Juhua Han v. Kuni's Corp.Opinion
06 Civ. 903 (DLC).
January 31, 2007
For Pro Se Plaintiff: Paulino Valenzuela, Bronx, NY.
For Defendant Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ:, Lyle D. Rowan, Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, New York, NY.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Paulino Valenzuela brings this pro se action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., to recover damages for discriminatory termination from his job as a porter at a Bronx building and for retaliation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Riverbay Corporation ("Riverbay") and the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ ("the Union") discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin and partial disability. The Union has moved to dismiss all claims against it under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the complaint and a letter of Dismissal and Notice of Rights addressed to Valenzuela from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") attached to it. The plaintiff, a native of the Dominican Republic, began working for Riverbay on November 7, 1994. He performed his duties without any problems until 1999, when new management took over and began to complain about his work. On April 6, 2002, the plaintiff was injured in an on-the-job accident, which resulted in visual and hearing impairments that do not preclude him from performing his job. Notwithstanding, Riverbay did not permit Valenzuela to return to work. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants discriminated against him as recently as February 19, 2005, but has not specified precisely what occurred on that date.
On December 13, 2005, the plaintiff filed a charge with the New York State Division of Human Rights regarding Riverbay's allegedly discriminatory conduct. He also reportedly filed a Charge of Discrimination ("Charge") with the EEOC against Riverbay that same day. On December 18, 2005, the EEOC issued a letter of Dismissal and Notice of Rights, closing its investigation on the ground that the EEOC was "unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes a violation of the statutes." The EEOC informed Valenzuela that he had the right to file a lawsuit against Riverbay within 90 days of receiving the letter.
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on February 6, 2006, naming only Riverbay as a defendant. On August 15, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding the Union as a defendant. On September 28, the Union moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposed this motion with an affidavit in opposition on October 19. The Union indicated in a November 28 letter that it would not reply to plaintiff's submission.
The Union seeks to dismiss all claims on the ground that (1) plaintiff did not file a timely EEOC charge or obtain a right-to-sue letter against the Union as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); (2) plaintiff's claims against the Union are time-barred because the amended complaint was not filed within 90 days of the receipt of the EEOC letter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); (3) a construction of the plaintiff's amended complaint as an alleged breach of the Union's duty of fair representation to the plaintiff is time-barred under the applicable six-month limitations period of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act; and (4) plaintiff's complaint fails to satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) because it fails to state a factual allegation against the Union.
DISCUSSION
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. The purpose of this requirement is to give fair notice of a claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that the opposing party may identify the nature of the case, respond to the complaint, and prepare for trial. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). Rule 8 is fashioned in the interest of fair and reasonable notice, not technicality, and therefore is "not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff." Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court "must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is only appropriate when "it appears beyond doubt, even when the complaint is liberally construed, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Id. (citation omitted). In addition, "[i]t is well-established that when [a] plaintiff proceeds pro se . . . a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations." Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court will deem the complaint to include "any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference." Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
Before a plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim in federal court, a plaintiff must exhaust available administrative remedies by filing a timely complaint with the EEOC or an authorized state agency. Fernandez v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 2006). This precondition is "an essential element of Title VII's statutory scheme, and one with which defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply." Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). "The charge serves to notify the charged party of the alleged violation and also brings the party before the EEOC, making possible effectuation of the Act's primary goal of securing voluntary compliance with its mandates." Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 619 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Because the ADA adopts the enforcement scheme of Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 12117, the same exhaustion requirement applies to claims brought under the ADA.
Once the plaintiff has filed a charge with the EEOC, he must then obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Where such a letter has been obtained, plaintiff's right to sue is limited to the respondent named in the charge. Vital, 168 F.3d at 619 (describing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) as "limiting aggrieved party's right to sue to the respondent named in the charge"). The plaintiff must file the lawsuit within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Under a limited exception to this rule, a Title VII action may "proceed against an unnamed party where there is a clear identity of interest between the unnamed defendant and the party named in the administrative charge." Vital, 168 F.3d at 619 (citation omitted).
Valenzuela did not name the Union in the Charge he filed with the EEOC. His failure to name the Union is not excusable under the "identity of interests" exception. As in Vital, id. at 620, the interests between the employer and union are sufficiently dissimilar as to require dismissal of all claims against the Union. Given this determination, it is unnecessary to reach the Union's other three arguments for dismissal. CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss by the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ is granted.
SO ORDERED: