Opinion
1:21-cv-00137-SAB (PC)
05-17-2021
CHRISTOPHER G. VALENCIA, Plaintiff, v. KEN CLARK, et al., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 1)
Plaintiff Christopher G. Valencia is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's complaint, filed February 3, 2021.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
II. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
On November 6, 2020, Warden Clark and Celia Bell failed to ensure the safety of Plaintiff by forcing on numerous occasions inmates into Plaintiff's cell against his will. Those inmates were transferred from different facilities and were not medically cleared for double celling due to being quarantined for COVI-19 related issues. The inmates were on lockdown COVID-19 protocol due to their status of being positive or exposed to positive COVID-19 inmates. The inmates were forced into Plaintiff's cell by threats of reprisal. In the days that followed, Plaintiff became extremely sick, had difficulty breathing, and chest pain.
On August 17, 2020, Celia Bell and Oscar Galloway falsified medical documents to “diminish critical case factors that would give cred[e]nce to Plaintiff's validation for MAT reentry substance abuse disorder treatment.” (Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff contends Defendants Bella and Galloway used their state positions to fabricate false accounts in Plaintiff's medical history to exclude him from receiving treatment for his substance abuse disorder.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff's Health and Safety-Exposure to COVID-19
Prison officials must protect inmates from, and not be deliberately indifferent to, conditions of confinement that are “very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (impermissible for prison officials to be “deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease on the ground that the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms”). In determining whether a prison official's failure to protect prisoners from harm rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, the Court must consider two factors. The first factor is objective: the conditions of confinement must have put prisoners at “substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970). The second is subjective: the prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. Under a deliberate indifference analysis, courts inquire whether “the [prison official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Exposure to disease has been determined to present a serious harm. See, e.g., Helling, 509 U.S. at 33 (explaining that the reach of the Eighth Amendment includes “exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease”); Jeffries v. Block, 940 F.Supp. 1509, 1514 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (agreeing that “tuberculosis is a serious contagious disease, which presents a serious risk to inmate health”); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]orrectional officials have an affirmative obligation to protect inmates from infectious disease.”).
“[I]t is not enough to show [R]D] inmates are at risk of contracting COVID-19 or that [Defendants] were aware of that risk.” See Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F.Supp.3d 713, 728 (C.D. Cal. 2020). “A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Under this standard, “prison officials who actually kn[o]w of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they respond[ ] reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately [i]s not averted.” Id. at 844. To allege deliberate indifference, therefore, Plaintiff must include “factual content” from which the court might reasonably infer that each Defendant he seeks to sue had a subjective “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence, ” and more akin to criminal recklessness. Id. at 835, 839-40.
In the instant complaint, Plaintiff alleges generalized concerns that he may have been exposed to COVID-19 while housed at California State Prison, Corcoran. Plaintiff contends that two inmates were not quarantined which subjected him to exposure to COVID. However, there are insufficient facts to demonstrate that these inmates tested positive for COVID-19, that Defendants were aware of the positive finding, or that Plaintiff was in fact exposed to COVID-19. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment.
B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need
A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need' by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, '” and (2) “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard, ” Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz, 609 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.
Negligence or medical malpractice do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Additionally, a prisoner's mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
Further, a “difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner-or between medical professionals-concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d at 242, overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a serious medical need. Second, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are insufficient to give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference based on the alleged denial of medical treatment. The conclusory claim that Defendants Bell and Galloway fabricated documents to deny his medical treatment is insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.
C. Joinder of Claims
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows a plaintiff to add multiple claims to the lawsuit when they are against the same defendant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants to a lawsuit where the right to relief arises out of the same “transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” However, unrelated claims that involve different defendants must be brought in separate lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is not only intended to avoid confusion that arises out of bloated lawsuits, but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees for their lawsuits and prevent prisoners from circumventing the three strikes rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff's brings two separate claims for relief against different individuals, which are unrelated and improperly joined in a single action. Accordingly, Plaintiff is advised that his claims do not arise out of the same “transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions.” The incidents described do not involve common questions of fact or law. The facts necessary to prove these claims are unique. Plaintiff is not permitted to raise all his claims in a single action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) simply because all the incidents occurred in a federal prison.
The Court advises Plaintiff that each claim that is raised in his amended complaint must be permitted by either Rule 18 or Rule 20. Plaintiff may state a single claim against a single defendant. Plaintiff may then add any additional claims to his action that are against the same defendant under Rule 18. Plaintiff may also add any additional claims against other defendants if those claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions as his original claim. Any attempt to join claims that are not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will result in those claims being dismissed and/or severed as improperly joined.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and shall be granted leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in this order, if he believes he can do so in good faith. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), but it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).
Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiffs amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint;
3. Plaintiff s amended complaint shall not exceed twenty-five (25) pages in length; and
4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend to a district judge that this action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.