Valdez v. State

Full title: GASPAR VALDEZ III, et al. Plaintiff, v. STATE OF UTAH, et al. Defendant

Court: United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division

Date published: Apr 14, 2005

Case No. 2:04-CV-143 DAK (D. Utah Apr. 14, 2005)

Opinion

Case No. 2:04-CV-143 DAK.

April 14, 2005

ORDER

DALE KIMBALL, District Judge

Plaintiff, Gaspar Valdez III, filed a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint with the Court. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2005). Plaintiff names the following defendants: Schwab and Hardcastle, L.L.C.; State of Utah/Judge Roger S. Dutson; Ogden Standard Examiner; Scott Tingey, an employee of Ogden Standard Examiner; and Shirley Bowles Layton. Plaintiff's complaint alleges legal and medical malpractice as well as civil rights violations. The Court now screens Plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), "the court shall dismiss [a] case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." "Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend." Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10^th Cir. 1999). "A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of the plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10^th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 936 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10^th Cir. 1991). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, "the court should construe his pleadings liberally and hold the pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id.

II. Private Defendants

Plaintiff has filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (File Entry # 5.) This statute establishes that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . ." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2005). The Tenth Circuit has held that "`[t]he obvious purpose of . . . § 1983 was to provide a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights by a state official's abuse of his position while acting under the color of law.'" Haines v. Fisher, 82 F.3d 1503, 1508 (10^th Cir. 1996) (quoting D.T. by M.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1187 (10^th Cir. 1990). To state a valid claim based upon § 1983, "[Plaintiff] must allege that the claimed deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Id. "The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Id. (quotation omitted.)

As defendants in this case, Plaintiff has named, inter alia,: Schwab and Hardcastle, L.L.C., a Utah company; Ogden Standard Examiner, a Utah corporation; Scott Tingey, an employee of Defendant Ogden Standard Examiner; and Shirley Bowles Layton. (File Entry #5.) Plaintiff's claims center around settlements reached between Defendants Layton and Schwab and Hardcastle, and Defendant Standard Examiner. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' settlement decision resulted in violations of Plaintiff's civil rights.

Plaintiff has alleged no facts to support the requirement that Defendants' actions were performed "under the color of state law," or were "made possible only because [Defendants] were clothed with the authority of state law." Haines, 82 F.3d at 1508; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2005). Moreover, Plaintiff has not established that any of the above named Defendants' actions violated Plaintiff's rights protected by the Constitution, and are not merely "violations of duties of care arising out of tort law." 82 F.3d at 1508.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the above named Defendants are not proper under § 1983, as there is no evidence showing that they were state actors at the time of the alleged offending actions. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the above named Defendants.

III. State of Utah/State Court Judge

Plaintiff names The Honorable Roger S. Dutson, Second Judicial District, State of Utah, as a defendant. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held that judges are afforded immunity from "liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial discretion" so they will "be at liberty to exercise [their] functions with independence and without fear of consequences." The Tenth Circuit has held that "[j]udges are absolutely immune from civil liability for judicial acts, unless committed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10^th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A judge's actions are not performed in the clear absence of authority even if the action taken is "in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Id. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has held that "the Civil Rights Act does not impair the traditional common law immunity of judges from personal liability in damages for their official acts in matters within their jurisdiction." Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492, 493 (10^th Cir. 1961).

Judge Dutson's orders of February 8, 2000, and February 22, 2000, approving the settlement of Plaintiff's children's claims, were proper actions conducted under judicial authority. See UT. CONST. Art. 8, § 1 (1984). Judge Dutson is afforded judicial immunity for rulings entered in a proceeding under his jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted against a Utah State Court Judge. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim against Judge Dutson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed.

IV. Conspiracy Claim

In the printed form complaint, Plaintiff indicated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides jurisdiction for his claims. (File Entry #5.) Though this is a conspiracy statute, Plaintiff does not allege any concerted action or agreement, nor does he use the word "conspiracy" in the complaint. The relevant portion of the statute reads: "If two or more persons in any State . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured may have an action . . . against any of one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (3) (West 2003).

The United States Supreme Court has held that:

In order to prove a claim under § 1985(3), [Plaintiff] must show (1) a conspiracy; (2) to deprive [Plaintiff] of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury or deprivation resulting therefrom. The conspiracy not only must have as its purpose the deprivation of equal protection of the laws, but also must be motivated by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff has alleged no facts which support a conspiracy claim. There are no factual allegations that any of the named Defendants conspired to deprive any person, or group, of the equal protection of the law. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support the requirement that the alleged conspiracy was motivated by a racial or otherwise invidious animus. See Cole, 898 F. Supp. at 801. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's § 1985 claims.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not named a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judge Dutson is afforded immunity for judicial actions, and the remaining Defendants are private actors who are not within the scope of the statute. See Haines, 82 F.3d at 1508. Plaintiff has not provided support for a conspiracy claim based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because he has not alleged the required animus for such a claim. Even if Plaintiff could name a proper defendant, his claims would arise under state tort theory, not federal civil rights laws. As such, Plaintiff's claims are fatally flawed and the Court finds that it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West 2005).