Summary
holding that a trial court could find consent when a suspect gave an ambiguous oral response but had favorable body language
Summary of this case from Frost v. StateOpinion
No. 05-15-00907-CR
03-30-2016
JERETE MICHAEL VALDEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 199-81833-2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Stoddart
Following a bench trial, Jerete Michael Valdez was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to twenty-five years' confinement. Valdez filed a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial, which the trial court denied. In a single issue, Valdez asserts the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
Valdez was driving a Cadillac DeVille when he collided with a moped. While working at the scene of the accident, Officer Charles Wright of the Plano Police Department observed some suspicious items in Valdez's car. Wright saw a gas-powered pressure washer and several large tool boxes in the backseat. He testified: "And what made 'em [sic] suspicious was the way that they were hastily placed inside the backseat, and they were covered in dust and so forth and looked like they . . . had been picked up from . . . some sort of area that they wouldn't have been used on a regular basis." Wright also noted the tool boxes were stacked haphazardly. Valdez told Wright some of the tools belonged to him and the power washer belonged to his father. As they talked, however, Valdez's explanation about the tools changed and he told Wright the tools belonged to other people with whom he worked.
Wright sought consent to search the car. He testified:
Q. At some point did you ask the defendant if you could look inside his car to confirm that the items in the car were what he said they were?Wright also testified that although he did not remember the specific gestures, Valdez indicated with his hands and shoulders that Wright could search the car; "Just everything indicated to me that it was a positive response." Wright said Valdez "was compliant, cooperative. He gave no indication that he did not want me to look inside the car."
A. Yes.
Q. Or something to that effect.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you remember specifically what it was that you asked him?
A. I asked him if he minded if I looked inside his car in order to verify whether or not the items were his.
Q. And what was his response?
A. He - - he stated something along the lines of, "well, I mean, yeah;" which indicated to me that he was giving consent to look inside his vehicle.
Q. And where were you standing at that time?
A. Directly in front of him.
Q. Okay. And in relation to the defendant's car, where were the two of you located?
A. I believe we were towards the rear, like towards the trunk area on the passenger's side, in the grassy area next to the curb.
Within ten feet, probably, of the vehicle.
Q. Did you ultimately go and search the defendant's car?
A. I did.
Valdez did not object to Wright opening the car door and did not attempt to tell Wright that he had denied Wright's request to search the car. Valdez's body language did not change when Wright began the search; he remained compliant. After Wright searched the car, the police determined the tools were stolen.
The trial court watched the video from Wright's patrol car.
LAW & ANALYSIS
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court's factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, particularly when the trial court's fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We give the same deference to the trial court's conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor as well as purely legal questions de novo. Id. As a general rule, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When, as here, there are no written findings explaining the factual basis for the trial judge's decision, we imply findings of fact that support the ruling so long as the evidence supports those implied findings. Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
In a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant bears the initial burden of proof to demonstrate the search and seizure occurred without a warrant. Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Once the defendant demonstrates a warrantless search occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove a warrant existed or an exception justified the warrantless search given the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 822. A search conducted with voluntary consent is one such exception. Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
The validity of consent to search is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances and the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was valid. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard "deals with the quantity and quality of evidence to establish that a person did, in fact, consent to a search." Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 459 n.24. It does not concern the "separate, but not legally determinative, issue of 'how' a person consented—clearly, convincingly, positively, unequivocally, and so forth." Id. "A person's consent to search can be communicated to law enforcement in a variety of ways, including by words, action, or circumstantial evidence showing implied consent." Id. at 458. Even mere acquiescence may support a finding of consent. Id. at 463-64 (quoting State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 820-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
In the case before us, it is undisputed the police did not have a warrant to search Valdez's car. On appeal, the State asserts that although Valdez's answer to Wright's question about whether he minded if Wright searched the vehicle was ambiguous, the trial court could consider the totality of the circumstances, including Valdez's body language and behavior.
Wright testified he asked Valdez "if he minded if I looked inside his car," and Valdez replied "well, I mean, yeah." Valdez's response could mean he did mind if Wright searched the car, meaning he did not consent to the search, or it could mean he did not mind and was consenting to the search. Valdez's answer is not clear. However, Wright also testified Valdez indicated with his hands and shoulders that Wright could search the car, and Valdez's overall demeanor indicated Valdez consented to the search. Valdez was "compliant, cooperative. He gave no indication that he did not want me to look inside the car." Further, the trial court watched the video from the officer's car and heard the exchange between Valdez and Wright, allowing the trial court to consider Valdez's tone of voice and demeanor.
Finally, once Wright began the search, Valdez did not object to Wright opening the car door, did not attempt to tell Wright that he had denied Wright's request to search the car, and did not complain he had denied consent to search. Valdez's body language did not change when Wright began the search; he remained compliant.
Valdez's words, body language, and general demeanor suggest that he did not refuse the request to search his vehicle. In light of the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, we may properly imply a finding by the trial court that Valdez's oral response to Wright's question, combined with Valdez's demeanor and nonverbal gestures, constituted consent. See Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 461-65. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding Valdez consented to the search. We overrule Valdez's sole issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Craig Stoddart/
CRAIG STODDART
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
150907F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 199-81833-2014.
Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. Justices Fillmore and Schenck participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 30th day of March, 2016.