Opinion
No. 18012/09.
2010-07-13
Cheryl D. UZAMERE, Plaintiff, v. Senator Ehigie Edobor UZAMERE, a/ka Godwin E. Uzamere, Allen E. Kaye, P.C., Allen E. Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro, Esq. Bernard J. Rostanski and Jack Gladstein, Esq., Defendants.
Cheryl Uzamere, Brooklyn, pro se. Matthew Kaufman, Esq., Brooklyn, attorney for Defendants, Allen Kaye, Allen Kaye, PC, Harvey Shapiro Esq and Jack Goldstein, Esq.
Cheryl Uzamere, Brooklyn, pro se. Matthew Kaufman, Esq., Brooklyn, attorney for Defendants, Allen Kaye, Allen Kaye, PC, Harvey Shapiro Esq and Jack Goldstein, Esq.
Bernard J. Rostanski, Esq., Brooklyn, Defendant, Pro Se.
ARTHUR M. SCHACK, J.
Pro se plaintiff CHERYL D. UZAMERE (UZAMERE) moves by order to show cause for: summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212; and, upon the failure of all defendants to answer, pursuant to CPLR § 3215, for a default judgment of $100,000,000.00 plus interest against defendants SENATOR EHIGIE EDOBOR UZAMERE a/k/a “GODWIN E. UZAMERE” (SENATOR UZAMERE), ALLEN E. KAYE, P.C., ALLEN E. KAYE, ESQ ., HARVEY SHAPIRO, ESQ. (SHAPIRO), BERNARD J. ROSTANSKI (ROSTANSKI), and JACK GLADSTEIN, ESQ. (GLADSTEIN), in an action arising from defendants' alleged misdeeds and misconduct related to plaintiff UZAMERE's 1979 marriage and subsequent abandonment by SENATOR UZAMERE. Defendants ALLEN E. KAYE, P.C. and ALLEN E. KAYE, ESQ. will be collectively referred to as “KAYE.”
Plaintiff UZAMERE, in her verified complaint, asserts that: defendant SENATOR UZAMERE retained KAYE in 1977 to apply for lawful permanent residence in the United States; defendants KAYE and SHAPIRO, an associate of defendant KAYE, suborned defendant SENATOR UZAMERE's perjury by having him swear to false personal information on an immigration form, notarized in December 1979 by defendant ROSTANSKI; and, in 2003, defendant GLADSTEIN, defendant SENATOR UZAMERE's divorce attorney, sent correspondence to plaintiff UZAMERE, using the alleged fraudulent name of “GODWIN UZAMERE,” duping plaintiff UZAMERE into commencing a divorce action against defendant SENATOR UZAMERE. Further, plaintiff UZAMERE alleges, among other things, that defendants' actions resulted in her: inability to obtain the use of her husband's proper name; becoming an unwitting participant in “an act of green card marriage fraud for permanent residence” [¶ 20 of verified complaint]; financial deprivation; and, a victim of defendants' fraudulent acts.
In three separate cross-motions, the first by defendants KAYE and SHAPIRO, the second by defendant GLADSTEIN, and the third by defendant ROSTANSKI, they all move to dismiss plaintiff UZAMERE's complaint, pursuant to various subsections of CPLR Rule 3211. Defendants claim that plaintiff UZAMERE's claims are barred: by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211(a)(5); by lack of personal jurisdiction because of improper service of the instant verified complaint, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211(a)(8); by failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211(a)(7); and, by the applicable statute of limitation, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211(a)(5).
This Court finds that plaintiff UZAMERE failed to properly serve defendants and obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants. More important, this is not the first time that she has brought an action against these defendants based upon the same series of transactions and occurrences. In 2008, plaintiff UZAMERE commenced a previous action in Kings County Supreme Court against defendants but failed to proceed. Moreover, plaintiff UZAMERE failed to prevail on the merits in 2008 and 2009 in two separate Untied States District Court actions against these and other defendants based upon the same transactions and occurrences. The 2009 federal court action was dismissed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. This was unanimously affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari.
Therefore, plaintiff UZAMERE's order to show cause for summary judgment and a default judgment against defendants is denied for plaintiff's failure to obtain personal jurisdiction and res judicata. Defendants' three cross-motions to dismiss the complaint are granted. Plaintiff's verified complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Further, plaintiff UZAMERE is enjoined from commencing future litigation in the New York State Unified Court System against defendants SENATOR UZAMERE, KAYE, SHAPIRO, ROSTANSKI and GLADSTEIN without prior approval of the appropriate Administrative Justice or Judge.
Background
Plaintiff UZAMERE claims that: on November 28, 1979, she signed an immigration sponsorship form to enable her husband, GODWIN UZAMERE, a Nigerian citizen, obtain lawful residence in the United States; in December 1979, defendants KAYE and SHAPIRO prepared GODWIN UZAMERE's immigration petition, which defendant ROSTANSKI notarized; in February 1980, after GODWIN UZAMERE abandoned her while she was pregnant, she filed a complaint about her “green-card-scam marriage” with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); subsequently, she was informed by INS that her husband was granted permanent resident status; and, on October 1, 2003, she received a letter from defendant GLADSTEIN in which he stated that he was GODWIN UZAMERE's divorce attorney and “asked for Plaintiff's cooperation to participate in an amicable divorce.” Defendant GLADSTEIN claims that on November 11, 2003, he sent another letter to plaintiff UZAMERE informing her that he no longer represented GODWIN UZAMERE.
Defendants KAYE, SHAPIRO and GLADSTEIN, in their memoranda of law note that since “[s]ince that time [November 2003], Plaintiff has engaged in a continuous barrage of complaints, attacking [defendants] ... in letters, complaints, litigation and postings on the internet. This case represents Plaintiff's latest salvo against [defendants].” Defendants KAYE AND SHAPIRO claim that their only involvement with plaintiff UZAMERE was “their brief preparation of an immigration form 30 years ago.” Defendant GLADSTEIN claims that his only involvement with plaintiff UZAMERE was “his brief representation of her husband in their potential matrimonial action six years ago.” Defendant ROSTANSKI claims that all he did was notarize plaintiff's signature, in late 1979, on a document in which plaintiff UZAMERE swore to tell the truth.
Plaintiff UZAMERE, on February 22, 2008, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Civil Action No. 08–CV–891, against numerous defendants, including then Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, then Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, the defendants in the instant action, various Federal, New York State and New York City agencies, and various internet media corporations. Plaintiff UZAMERE alleged that her husband, GODWIN UZAMERE, fictitiously created his name, social security number and birthday to prevent governmental agencies from determining that Godwin Uzamere and SENATOR UZAMERE is the same person and that all defendants conspired to commit fraud against plaintiff UZAMERE.
Eastern District Judge Nicholas Garaufis dismissed the complaint on April 8, 2008. Judge Garaufis, in his memorandum and order, concluded that:
Having liberally construed the Complaint, the court finds that Uzamere has no basis on which to proceed against any of the Defendants. Her factual allegations do not give rise to any cognizable cause of action. This is the second time Uzamere has sought relief in this court against her estranged husband. (See July 6 order (dismissing complaint against Ehigie Ebodor and other defendants for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction)). Uzamere is warned that her attempt to obtain federal jurisdiction by citing to inapplicable federal statutes or by naming improper federal defendants will not be tolerated. Uzamere is put on notice that the filing of more frivolous complaints will result in her being precluded from obtaining in forma pauperis status to file complaints without leave of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1651; see also In re Martin–Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 227–29 (2d Cir, 1993) (discussing various sanctions courts may impose upon vexatious litigants).
Then, plaintiff UZAMERE, on November 7, 2008, filed a summons and complaint against defendants in this Court, Index No. 30443/08. She never filed affidavits of service or continued the action.
Subsequently, on February 23, 2009, plaintiff UZAMERE commenced a new action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Civil Action No. 09–CV–3506, against numerous defendants, including SENATOR UZAMERE, KAYE, GLADSTEIN, ROSTANSKI, New York Attorney–General Andrew Cuomo, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Presiding Justice A. Gail Prudenti of the Second Department, Justice Abraham Gerges (then Administrative Justice for the Second Judicial District), Justice Jeffrey Sunshine of the Second Judicial District, the State of New York and the City of New York. Plaintiff UZAMERE alleged similar misdeeds and misconduct by all defendants related to her abandonment by her husband and subsequent related events.Southern District Judge Leonard Sand, on April 7, 2009, dismissed the complaint, based upon immunity for judges and government officials, failure to state a cause of action and lack of subject matter jurisdiction against private individuals. Judge Sand, in the final paragraph of his dismissal order, concluded:
Mindful of the duty to construe pro se actions liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1971) (per curiam), the Court has analyzed plaintiff's instant submission, filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and finds no deprivation of a federally secured right. As such, the complaint must be dismissed as it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), it fails to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(e)(2)(b)(ii), and seeks relief from defendants immune from such relief, see id. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii). Plaintiff is warned that should she continue to file complaints related to her husband, she may be barred from doing so in the future without seeking leave of court.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an order issued on June 24, 2009, denied plaintiff UZAMERE's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and held “the appeal is DISMISSED because it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 195(e); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (defining when an action is frivolous).”
Then, plaintiff UZAMERE filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The United State Supreme Court, on October 13, 2009, denied plaintiff UZAMERE a writ of certiorari.(130 S.Ct 408, 175 L.Ed 2d 302).
While her petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, plaintiff UZAMERE commenced the instant action by filing the instant summons and complaint on July 17, 2009. The instant complaint recites the same events and alleged misdeeds and misconduct of defendants, similar to the litany of events and alleged misdeeds and misconduct in the two U.S. District Court actions which were dismissed.
For reasons unknown to the Court, plaintiff UZAMERE served defendants SENATOR UZAMERE, KAYE, SHAPIRO and GLADSTEIN on July 31, 2009 by certified mail only, and defendant ROSTANSKI on August 3, 2009 by certified mail only. Plaintiff UZAMERE attached copies of the certified mail receipts as an exhibit to the instant order to show cause. The affidavit of service does not indicate that plaintiff made any attempt to serve the pleadings in person or by “leave and mail” or by “nail and mail.” No court orders were issued providing for service of process by any alternate method.
Then, on September 16, 2009, plaintiff UZAMERE, after not receiving an answer from any defendant, made the instant order to show cause for summary judgment and a default judgment against all defendants. Defendants KAYE and SHAPIRO in one cross-motion and defendant GLADSTEIN in another cross-motion, both on October 30, 2009, moved to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211. Then, defendant ROSTANSKI moved, on January 13, 2010, in a similar cross-motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211.
After various adjournments, the parties appeared for oral argument on the instant order to show cause and cross-motions on May 14, 2010. The Court reserved decision.
Plaintiff's failure to obtain personal jurisdiction of defendants
It is clear that plaintiff UZAMERE failed to obtain personal jurisdiction of the defendants. Serving defendants by certified mail only does not comply with the requirements of CPLR § 308 for “Personal service upon a natural person.” CPLR § 308 provides in: (1) for personal service; or in (2) for service “to a person of suitable age and discretion” and upon the person to be served by first class mail; or in (4) if service pursuant to (1) or (2) “cannot be made with due diligence,” by “nail and mail.” In addition, (5) provides for alternate service by Court order “if service is impracticable under paragraphs one, two or four of this section.” The affidavit of service presented by plaintiff UZAMERE, for service of the summons and complaint in the instant action, demonstrates on its face that plaintiff UZAMERE failed to comply with any of the CPLR § 308 methods of personal service.
Plaintiff UZAMERE, alludes in her papers to service by CPLR § 312–a, “Personal service by mail.” This reliance is misplaced. CPLR § 312–a service is voluntary and contingent upon plaintiff's compliance with the statute. It requires plaintiff to mail two copies of the statutory statement of service and an acknowledgment of receipt pursuant to the statutory form (CPLR § 312–a [d] ), with “a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender” (CPLR § 312–a [a] ), with defendants executing and returning the form. If the acknowledgment of receipt is not mailed or returned to the sender, the sender is required to effect personal service in another manner. The Court, in a recent decision, where defective service was similar to defective service in the instant matter (Klein v. Educational Loan Servicing, LLC, 71 AD3d 957 [2d Dept 2010] ), instructed, at 958, that:
the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment should have been denied and the complaint dismissed as against all defendants since the plaintiff failed to present proof of valid service of the summons and complaint as required by CPLR 312–a (a) and (b). The plaintiff submitted evidence that he served the defendants by certified mail, return receipt requested. However, he presented no evidence that copies of the summons and complaint were sent to the defendants, by first-class mail, together with, inter alia, two copies of a statement of service by mail and acknowledgment of receipt, and that the signed acknowledgment of receipts were mailed or delivered to the plaintiff ( seeCPLR 312–a [a], [b] ). In the absence of proper service, no personal jurisdiction was acquired over the defendants ( see Bennett v. Acosta, 68 A.D.2d 910 [3d Dept 2009]; Horseman Antiques, Inc. v. Huch, 50 AD3d 963, 964 [2d Dept 2008]; Dominguez v. Stimpson Mfg. Corp., 207 A.D.2d 375, 375 [2d Dept.1994] ).
Plaintiff's claims barred by res judicata
Plaintiff's UZAMERE'S claims in the instant action must be dismissed because of res judicata. (CPLR Rule 3211[5] ). Professor David Siegel in N.Y. Prac, 4th ed. § 442, explains that:
The doctrine of res judicata is designed to put an end to a matter once duly decided. It forbids relitigation of the matter as an unjustifiable duplication, an unwarranted burden on the courts as well as on opposing parties. Its main predicate is that the party against whom it is being invoked has already had a day in court, and, if it was not satisfactory, the proper course was to appeal the unsatisfactory result rather than ignore it and attempt its relitigation in a separate action.
Chief Judge Cardozo, for a unanimous Court of Appeals, in Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B & C Nieberg Realty Corp. (250 N.Y. 304, 306–307 [1929] ), instructed that “[a] judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one not only as to any matters actually litigated therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated, when the two causes of action have such a measure of identity that a different judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first.” Chief Judge Cooke, in O'Brien v. City of Syracuse (54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 1981), also writing for a unanimous Court of Appeals, noted that “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.” ( See Coliseum Towers Associates v. County of Nassau, 217 A.D.2d 387 [2d Dept 1996]; Yerg v. Board of Educ. of Nyack Union Free School District, 141 A.D.2d 537 [2d Dept 1988] ).
Both Judge Garaufis in the Eastern District and Judge Sand in the Southern District dismissed plaintiff UZAMERE'S claims on the merits. The claims in both federal actions were similar to the instant action, arising from the same facts and events presented in the instant action. Judge Garaufis, in his Eastern District dismissal of Uzamere v. Rice, et. al., held that “[h]aving liberally construed the Complaint, the court finds that Uzamere has no basis on which to proceed against any of the Defendants. Her factual allegations do not give rise to any cognizable cause of action [emphasis added ].” Judge Sand, in his Southern District dismissal of Uzamere v. Kaye, et. al. concluded that “the complaint must be dismissed as it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact [ emphasis added ],' ... it fails to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted.”
Involuntary dismissal of a federal action by the Court, as in Uzamere v. Rice, et. al., and Uzamere v. Kaye, et. al. are “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits.” (Federal Rules Civil Pro rule 41[b] ). Both Judge Garaufis and Judge Sand never stated that their dismissals were without prejudice. Therefore, with the claims of plaintiff UZAMERE having been twice dismissed on the merits by U.S. District Courts, and the dismissal of Uzamere v. Kaye, et. al. affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and a writ of certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, plaintiff UZAMERE has been twice afforded her day in court with respect to claims related to the alleged misdeeds and misconduct of defendants. The Court, in Komlosi v. City of New York (3 AD3d 343 [1d Dept 2004] ), could have been discussing the instant case. The Court held that:
[t]he claim plaintiff seeks to pursue in this state court action were, or could have been, raised and decided in the now concluded federal court action premised on the same underlying transactions. Accordingly, since plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his state claims in the federal action and the claims asserted in the federal action, including those dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, were adjudicated on the merits, defendants' motion to dismiss this action on res judicata grounds was properly granted.
( See Cramer v. Sabo, 31 AD3d 998, 999 [3d Dept 2006]; Tomasello v. Choice Care Long Island, 229 A.D.2d 527 [2d Dept 1996] ).
The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Flushing National Bank v. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. (148 A.D.2d 415, 416–417 [2d Dept 1989] ) clearly applied res judicata in barring relitigation of claims arising from the same series of transaction being raised in New York courts after their dismissal by a federal court. The Court instructed:
Contrary to the appellants' contentions we find that their claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 41(b) expressly provides that unless the Federal court explicitly denominates its dismissal as “without prejudice” it serves as an adjudication on the merits ( see, PRC Harris v. Boeing, 700 F.2d 894 cert denied464 U.S. 936). Such a prior Federal court determination is entitled to res judicata effect and will bar relitigation of the same claims arising out of the same series of transactions before a State court ( see, McLearn v. Cowen & Co., 48 N.Y.2d 696). In the situation at bar, the Federal court did not expressly denominate its determination of the appellants' State law usury claims to be without prejudice and thus this served as a final determination of those claims, on the merits, barring relitigation in the Supreme Court. We further note that under the doctrine set forth in Smith v. Russell Sage College (54 N.Y.2d 185), any related claims which could have been raised are deemed precluded. Thus, this Court must dismiss plaintiff's claims with prejudice based upon res judicata. The claims in the instant complaint arose from the same events and transactions litigated in the two federal actions dismissed on the merits.
With this Court dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and res judicata, there is no need for the Court to reach the claims of moving defendants that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action or that plaintiff violated the applicable statute of limitation.
Plaintiff precluded from relitigation of the same claims
The Court is concerned that plaintiff UZAMERE continues to use the scarce resources of the New York State Unified Court System to fruitlessly pursue the same claims. She is no stranger to litigation in Supreme Court, Kings County, Civil Term. She already has had not one, but two bites of the apple in federal court. Both actions were dismissed on the merits. This Court should not have to expend resources on the next action by Ms. Uzamere that will be a new variation on the same theme of defendants' alleged misdeeds and misconduct. Further, as a result of Ms. Uzamere's perception that defendants have committed misdeeds and misconduct against her, she has filed numerous complaints against defendants, wrote to various government officials and agencies about defendants, and attacked defendants on her website. The continued use of the New York State Unified Court System for Ms. Uzamere's scorched earth policy against defendants must cease.
Also, the Court is concerned that plaintiff UZAMERE may have committed perjury when she executed, on September 11, 2009, her Request for Judicial Intervention (RJI) in the instant action. Plaintiff UZAMERE signed the RJI below the statement “I AFFIRM UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT, TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, OTHER THAN AS NOTED ABOVE [she handwrote “NONE” where asked to specify Related Cases] THERE ARE AND HAVE BEEN NO RELATED ACTIONS.” Plaintiff UZAMERE made this false statement despite commencing at least three related actions:
Supreme Court, Kings County, Civil Term Index No.30443/08; dismissed Eastern District of New York Civil Action No. 08–CV–891; and, dismissed Souther District of New York Civil Action No. 09–CV–3506, in which her appeals to the Second Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court were denied.
Our courts have an interest in preventing the waste of judicial resources by a party who knows that his or lawsuit has no legitimate basis in law or fact and continues to attempt to relitigate resolved claims and issues. (Martin–Trigona v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 145 Misc.2d 405 [Sup Ct, New York County 1989]. The Court, in Sassower v. Signorelli (99 A.D.2d 358, 359 [2d Dept 1984] ), noted that “public policy mandates free access to the courts ... and, ordinarily, the doctrine of former adjudication will serve as an adequate remedy against repetitious suits.” Then, the Sassower Court observed, in the next paragraph, that: “[n]onetheless, a litigious plaintiff pressing a frivolous claim can be extremely costly to the defendant and can waste an inordinate amount of court time, time that this court and the trial courts can ill afford to lose (see Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114). Thus, when, as here, a litigant is abusing the judicial process by hagriding individuals solely out of ill will or spite, equity may enjoin such vexatious litigation [emphasis added ].” Pro se litigants whom abuse judicial process have had their access to the courts limited. In Spremo v. Babchik (155 Misc.2d 796 (Sup Ct, Queens County 1996] ), the Court, in enjoining a pro se litigant from instituting any further actions and proceedings in any court in the New York State Unified Court System, cited Sassower and Kane v. City of New York, 468 F.Supp 586 [SD N.Y.1979], affd614 F.2d 1288 [2d Cir1979] ). The Kane Court, at 592, held:
The fact that one appears pro se is not a license to abuse the process of the Court and to use it without restraint as a weapon of harassment and libelous bombardment. The injunction herein ordered is fully warranted to put an end to such activity ... Commencement of action upon action based on the same facts dressed in different garb, after thrice being rejected on the merits and having been repeatedly warned that the claims were barred by res judicata, can only be explained as malicious conduct.
In Muka v. New York State Bar Association (120 Misc.2d 897 [Sup Ct, Tompkins County 1983] ), a pro se plaintiff commenced a fourth unsuccessful lawsuit against the State Bar Association upon various conspiracy theories. The Court in dismissing the action, based upon res judicata, observed, at 903, that “all litigants have a right to impartial and considered justice. Insofar as any litigant unnecessarily consumes inordinate amounts of judicial time and energy, he or she deprives other litigants of their proper share of these resources. A balance must be kept.” Therefore, Ms. Uzamere, with her history of abusing the civil justice system by bringing continued actions devoid of merit against the same defendants, is precluded from relitigating the same claims and issues which waste court resources and is enjoined from bringing any future actions in the New York State Unified Court System against SENATOR EHIGIE EDOBOR UZAMERE a/k/a “GODWIN E. UZAMERE,” ALLEN E. KAYE, P.C., ALLEN E. KAYE, ESQ., HARVEY SHAPIRO, ESQ., BERNARD J. ROSTANSKI and JACK GLADSTEIN, ESQ. without the prior approval of the appropriate Administrative Justice or Judge. The Court instructed, in Vogelgesang v. Vogelgesang (71 AD3d 1132, 1134 [2d Dept 2010], that:
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in enjoining the appellant from filing any further actions or motions in the matrimonial action without prior written approval. Public policy generally mandates free access to the courts ( see Sassower v. Signorelli, 99 A.D.2d 358, 359 [1984] ). However, a party may forfeit that right if he or she abuses the judicial process by engaging in meritless litigation motivated by spite or ill will ( see Duffy v. Holt–Harris, 260 A.D.2d 595 [2d Dept 1999]; Shreve v. Shreve, 229 A.D.2d 1005 [2d Dept 1996] ). There is ample basis in this record to support the Supreme Court's determination to prevent the appellant from engaging in further vexatious litigation.
( See Capogrosso v. Kansas, 60 AD3d 522 [1d Dept 2009]; Simpson v. Ptaszynska, 41 AD3d 607 [2d Dept 2007]; Pignataro v.. Davis, 8 AD3d 487 [2d Dept 2004]; Cangro v. Cangro, 288 A.D.2d 417 [2d Dept 2001]; Mancini v. Mancini, 269 A.D.2d 366 [2d Dept 2000]; Braten v. Finkelstein, 235 A.D.2d 513 [2d Dept 1997] ).
Conclusion
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the order to show cause of plaintiff CHERYL UZAMERE, for summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3212, and upon the failure of all defendants to answer, pursuant to CPLR § 3215, for a default judgment of $100,000,000.00 plus interest against defendants SENATOR EHIGIE EDOBOR UZAMERE a/k/a “GODWIN E. UZAMERE,” ALLEN E. KAYE, P.C., ALLEN E. KAYE, ESQ., HARVEY SHAPIRO, ESQ., BERNARD J. ROSTANSKI and JACK GLADSTEIN, ESQ., is denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that the three cross-motions, one by defendants ALLEN E. KAYE, P.C, ALLEN E. KAYE, ESQ. and HARVEY SHAPIRO, ESQ., the second by defendant JACK GLADSTEIN, ESQ. and the third by defendant BERNARD J. ROSTANSKI, to dismiss plaintiff CHERYL UZAMERE's instant complaint, pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211, are granted because plaintiff CHERYL UZAMERE failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over all defendants (CPLR Rule 3211[8] ) and res judicata (CPLR Rule 3211[5] ); and it is further
ORDERED, that the instant complaint is dismissed with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiff CHERYL UZAMERE is hereby enjoined from commencing any future actions in the New York State Unified Court System against SENATOR EHIGIE EDOBOR UZAMERE a/k/a “GODWIN E. UZAMERE,” ALLEN E. KAYE, P.C., ALLEN E. KAYE, ESQ., HARVEY SHAPIRO, ESQ., BERNARD J. ROSTANSKI and JACK GLADSTEIN, ESQ., without the prior approval of the appropriate Administrative Justice or Judge; and it is further
ORDERED, that any violation of the above injunction by CHERYL UZAMERE will subject CHERYL UZAMERE to costs, sanctions and contempt proceedings.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.