Opinion
2:14-cr-00684-CAS-7
01-29-2021
USA v. Jackson et al
Attorneys for Defendants: MARK KASSABIAN
Attorneys for Defendants: MARK KASSABIAN
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
CRIMINAL MINUTES - GENERAL
Proceedings: TELEPHONE HEARING RE: DEFENDANT JESUS DORAN'S MOTION TO SEVER (Dkt. 2085, filed December 9, 2020)
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 2014, a grand jury returned a 45-count indictment against 38 defendants alleged to be members and associates of Big Hazard, a criminal street gang alleged to have close ties to the Mexican Mafia ("Hazard"). Dkt. 1 ("Indictment"). The indictment charges defendant Jesus Doran in Count 1 with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and in Count 4 with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Id. Doran was arrested on those charges on February 3, 2015 and has been detained pending trial since his arrest. See Dkt. 415.
On December 7, 2020, Doran filed the instant motion seeking severance from his codefendants and a separate trial. Dkt. 2085 ("Mot."). On December 14, 2020, the government filed an opposition. Dkt. 2088 ("Opp'n"). Doran filed a reply on January 11, 2021. Dkt. 2099 ("Reply").
Having carefully considered the parties' arguments, the Court finds and concludes as follows.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The indictment charges Doran with two types of conspiracies in support of Hazard: RICO conspiracy (Count I) and drug trafficking conspiracy (Count 4). The indictment alleges 208 overt acts in association with both purported conspiracies and 18 additional overt acts in association with the purported drug trafficking conspiracy. Five of the alleged overt acts relate to Doran. Specifically, the indictment alleges that Doran: (1) arranged to meet “with a CI to discuss future drug transactions and “tax” payments” on November 18, 2011; (2) met with the CI on November 11, 2018 to collect a $300 “tax” payment “on behalf of Hazard, ” share information regarding “tax” cooperation by various neighborhoods, and direct the CI to collect “taxes” from the CI's neighborhood; (3) was the subject of codefendant discussions on August 25, 2012, suggesting that Doran and a codefendant had committed a prison assault and that “Doran wanted someone in Hazard territory to be assaulted for using Doran's name”; (4) was the subject of codefendant discussions on August 26, 2012, suggesting that Doran planned to assault a Hazard associate suspected of cooperating with law enforcement; and (5) on February 28, 2013 himself stated to a codefendant he would “assault those who cooperated with law enforcement” and discussed other Hazard activity, including “heroin available for smuggling into prison.” See Indictment at ¶¶ C.59, 60, 104, 106, and 179.
The parties estimate that the trial in this matter will last approximately four weeks. Dkt. 2088. Of the 38 defendants charged in the indictment, seven are currently awaiting trial, including Doran. Id.
Trial in this case has been repeatedly continued. Following Doran's arrest on February 3, 2015, the first trial date was March 31, 2015. Dkt. 424. Doran subsequently joined ten stipulations to continue the trial. See dkts. 435; 664; 911; 1111; 1212; 1299; 1333; 1479; 1785; 1898. Doran most recently stipulated to continue trial to July 7, 2020. Dkt. 1898. On June 3, 2020, the government filed an eleventh stipulation to continue the trial from July 7, 2020 until March 16, 2021. Dkt. 1981. Doran declined to join the stipulation, which all six of his then-remaining codefendants signed. Id. In granting the stipulation to continue trial to March 16, 2021, the Court found that “the requested continuance is a reasonable period of delay for the defendants who did not join in the stipulation, for whom time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been made or granted.” Dkt. 1986.
On December 8, 2020, one day after Doran filed his December 7, 2020 motion for severance, the government filed an ex parte application to continue trial from March 16, 2021 to October 19, 2021, citing concerns relating to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the Court's General Oder No. 20-02, which suspends jury selection and jury trials due to COVID-19. Dkt. 2086. Doran's six codefendants each did not oppose the proposed continuance. Dkt. 2086 at 8. Doran, however, informed the government through his counsel that he “objects to the proposed continuance and intends to seek severance.” Id. at 8-9. On December 9, 2020, the Court granted the government's ex parte application and continued trial to October 19, 2021, finding that due to COVID-19, the “ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant[s] in a speedy trial” and therefore finding excludable time pursuant to the speedy trial act for all defendants, including Doran. Dkt. 2088. The Court further ordered that the instant “Motion for Trial Severance [] filed December 7, 2020 shall remain on calendar for January 25, 2021.” Id. at 6. Accordingly, trial is currently set for October 19, 2021.
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the closure of courts in the Central District of California, including this Court. Beginning in March, the Central District issued a series of general orders related to COVID-19. The first such order was issued on March 13, 2020 and suspended jury selection and jury trials, among other things. C.D. Cal. General Order No. 20-02, In Re: Coronavirus Public Emergency, Order Concerning Jury Trials and Other Proceedings (Mar. 13, 2020). This order was imposed based on both the California Governor's declaration of a public health emergency in response to the spread of COVID-19, as well as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's advice regarding reducing the possibility of spreading the virus and slowing the spread of the disease. See General Order 20-02 at 1. The combined effect of these general orders has been to keep courtrooms in the Central District closed to jury trials from March 13, 2020, through to the date of this order and until further notice. See C.D. Cal. General Order No. 20-09, In Re: Coronavirus Public Emergency, Order Concerning Phased Reopening of the Court (Aug. 6, 2020); C.D. Cal. General Order No. 20-08, In re: Coronavirus Public Emergency Order Concerning Phased Reopening of the Court (May 27, 2020).
Doran requests that the Court sever the case against him, rather than try him alongside his “more culpable codefendants, ” and grant him a separate trial. Mot. at 1.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 provides that an indictment may charge two or more defendants “if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). When defendants are indicted together, there is a preference in the federal system for joint trials. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993); see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (recognizing that joint trials “conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial”). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, a joint trial of multiple defendants may be severed if joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). “Rule 14 leaves the determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy that may be necessary to the sound discretion of the district courts.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541. “[A] district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Id. at 539.
IV. DISCUSSION
As Doran concedes, see Reply at 2, the indictment properly joins Doran with his codefendants for trial pursuant to Rule 8(b). That is because Doran and his codefendants are each alleged as co-conspirators who have acted in furtherance of the same RICO and drug trafficking conspiracies. The Ninth Circuit has long “held that a conspiracy count will provide the necessary link to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(b).” United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir.1978); see United States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir.1982) (“We have repeatedly held that a conspiracy count may provide the necessary link to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(b).”).
As such, the sole issue before the Court is whether the joinder of Doran and his remaining codefendants is so prejudicial as to warrant severance under Rule 14. Doran argues that a severance is justified here, arguing both that “undue prejudice” stemming from an alleged imbalance of charges and proof between Doran and his codefendants, and that a joint trial, in light of the Court's most recent continuances, will violate his right to as speedy trial pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h), and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Mot. at 8-9. The government opposes Doran's motion for severance on both grounds. See Opp'n.
a. Doran Has Not Shown that Severance is Justified by Prejudice
Doran has not shown that joinder of the codefendants is so prejudicial as to warrant severance pursuant to Rule 14. “Generally, defendants who are indicted together in federal court should be jointly tried.” United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir.1991). “Joinder is favored in federal criminal cases largely for reasons of judicial economy and efficiency, despite some degree of bias inherent in joint trials.” Id. On a Rule 14 motion, “[t]he burden of demonstrating prejudice rests on the [defendant], and is a heavy one.” Adams, 581 F.2d at 198. The defendant “must show that ‘joinder was so manifestly prejudicial that it outweigh[s] the dominant concern with judicial economy.'” United States v. Garcia, 506 Fed.Appx. 593, 595 (9th Cir.2013) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir.1986)). This burden is especially heavy when a conspiracy is charged. See United States v. Cruz, 127 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir.1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jiminez Recio, 537 U.S. 270 (2003) (“A joint trial was particularly appropriate here because the defendants were charged with conspiracy.”). This is so because where a conspiracy is charged, much of the evidence admitted against one defendant would be admissible against the other-even in a separate trial-as proof of the conspiracy. See id.
Doran contends that he would be prejudiced by a joint trial because “there is an overwhelming imbalance of charges and proof between Mr. Doran and his co-defendants, ” several of whom are charged with substantive drug and firearms counts, in addition to the conspiracy counts. Mot. at 8. In support of that position, Doran notes that he is charged with only five of the 226 overt acts alleged in the conspiracy and argues that those charged acts- which include collection of a “tax” payment from a CI and discussions regarding drug transactions and plans to assault Hazard associates who cooperated with law enforcement-are “extremely limited” because Doran “is not charged in any substantive firearm or drug counts.” Id. Doran does not identify the particular evidence that he contends would unduly prejudice him. See Id. The government responds that much of the evidence that would be admissible against Doran's codefendants related to overt acts with which Doran has not been charged would also be admissible against Doran to demonstrate “that there was a criminal enterprise involving Hazard members and its associates” and the existence of a conspiracy. Opp'n at 7. As such, because evidence demonstrating the existence of the RICO enterprise as to Doran would “necessarily include” evidence reaching beyond Doran's own acts, the government argues that “the evidence [Doran] claims is prejudicial is actually evidence that would be part of the case against [Doran]” even if a severance were granted, and is therefore not unduly prejudicial. Id. at 7-8.
The Court finds that Doran has not met his heavy burden of showing the type of prejudice that would justify severing his trial from that of his codefendants, who are alleged coconspirators and members of the charged Hazard criminal enterprise. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Fernandez, upon which the government relies, is instructive. See 388 F.3d 1199, 1242 (9th Cir. 2004), modified, 425 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2005). In Fernandez, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of motions for severance brought by eleven codefendants charged in several “different conspiracies with different goals” as well as with RICO and violence in aid of a racketeering enterprise (“VICAR”) charges. Id. at 1242-43. The Ninth Circuit explained that despite the “multiplicity” of different counts facing the different defendants, a joint trial was “particularly appropriate” due to the underlying conspiracy charges “because the concern for judicial efficiency is less likely to be outweighed by possible prejudice to the defendants when much of the same evidence would be admissible against them in separate trials.” Id. (quoting United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843 (2d Cir.1992) (“Proof of RICO elements may well entail numerous criminal acts by a variety of persons, and each defendant in a RICO case may reasonably claim no direct participation in some of those acts. Nevertheless, evidence of those acts is relevant to the RICO charges against each defendant, and the claim that separate trials would eliminate so-called spillover prejudice is at least overstated if not entirely meritless.”) (internal alterations omitted). Here, as in Fernandez, Doran and his codefendants face charges related to overlapping conspiracy and racketeering counts, and much of the same evidence that will be admissible to demonstrate acts in furtherance of those enterprises is likely also admissible to prove the underlying RICO and conspiracy charges. See Id.; see also United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 771 (9th Cir. 1995), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 98 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 1996) (no abuse of discretion where district court refused to sever defendants “charged with conspiring to commit and committing violent acts in furtherance of drug enterprises having similar memberships and objectives, ” despite introduction of evidence involving three homicides and a marijuana enterprise with which defendant was not involved.).
Moreover, to the extent that any evidence that is admissible against Doran's codefendants would not be admissible against Doran in a separate trial, “[t]he prejudicial effect of evidence relating to the guilt of co-defendants is generally held to be neutralized by careful instruction by the trial judge.” United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that where a “district court uses great diligence in instructing the jury to separate the evidence, severance is unnecessary because the prejudicial effects of the evidence of codefendants are neutralized”); Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1243 (“We have repeatedly held that a district court's careful and frequent limiting instructions to the jury, explaining how and against whom certain evidence may be considered, can reduce or eliminate any possibility of prejudice arising from a joint trial”).
Accordingly, the Court declines to sever Doran from the joint trial because he fails to demonstrate that he will be unduly prejudiced by evidence that is admissible against his codefendants.
b. Further Delay Does Not Violate the Speedy Trial Act
Doran has also not established that a joint trial commencing on October 19, 2021 would violate his rights pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. The Speedy Trial Act provides that a defendant's trial must “commence within 70 days of the later of the filing of an indictment or the defendant's first appearance before the court in which charges are pending, ” except that certain periods of time may be excluded from the 70-day calculation. United States v. Messer, 197 F.3d 330, 336 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c), (h) (West). As relevant here, the so-called “ends of justice” provision of the Speedy Trial Act excludes “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In addition, “[i]t is well established that an exclusion from the Speedy Trial clock for one defendant applies to all codefendants.” United States v. Messer, 197 F.3d 330, 336 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, in calculating the Speedy Trial clock for defendant, the court may exclude a “reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (emphasis added).
Here, Doran challenges the reasonableness of the delay from July 7, 2020, to October 19, 2021-approximately 15 months-as applied to him pursuant to the Court's June 3, 2020 and December 9, 2020 continuances. Dkts. 1986, 2088. Doran notes that he objected to each of those continuances and argues specifically that “such a long continuance is not justified by the current pandemic, for which a vaccine is currently being distributed.” Reply at 3. As explained in its December 9, 2020 order continuing the trial, the Court disagrees. See Dkt. 2088.
The Court notes that Doran stipulated to all continuances from February 3, 2015 through June 3, 2020.
The Court notes that federal, state, and local officials have cautioned that distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to the general public is likely to be a lengthy process, for which there is currently no firm timeline. For example, the Center for Disease Control's response to an FAQ addressing “When will COVID-19 vaccines be widely available in the United States?” explains: “[m]anufacturing large quantities of vaccine takes time. The goal is for everyone to be able to easily get a COVID-19 vaccine when large quantities are available for distribution, ” but provides no timeline for the distribution process. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Frequently Asked Questions about COVID-19 Vaccination, ” https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/faq.html (last visited January 19, 2021). Likewise, Los Angeles County's department of public health estimates that vaccination may begin for persons 16-49 years old without high-risk medical conditions as early as May or June 2021, but cautions “these timings are estimates and may change according to factors such as vaccine supply[.]” County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health, “COVID-19: Vaccine Distribution in Los Angeles County, ”
In granting the government's December 8, 2020 ex parte motion, the Court concluded that the continuance due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic furthered the ends of justice with respect to all remaining defendants, including Doran. Id. Specifically, the Court considered the factors enumerated by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B), including “the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, the complexity of the case, and the lack of opportunity of counsel to complete adequate trial preparations using due diligence” and concluded that “given the grave public health concerns [related to COVID-19] discussed in General Orders 20-02 through 20-09” a continuance to October 19, 2021 would serve the ends of justice and “outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial.” Dkt. 2088 at 5; see also United States v. Henry, No. 19-50080, 2021 WL 46204, at *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021) (ends of justice continuance must be “specifically limited in time” and “justified on the record with reference to the facts as of the time the delay is ordered.”) (internal alterations omitted). In so finding, the Court explained that the Central District has suspended jury selection and jury trials “based on (1) the California Governor's declaration of a public-health emergency in response to the spread of COVID-19, as well as (2) The Centers for Disease control's advice regarding reducing the possibility of exposure to the virus and slowing the spread of the disease.” Dkt. 2088 at 3-4. Due to those public health considerations, the Court found that a failure to grant a continuance in this case: (a) “would likely make a continuation of the proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice;” (b) “would also likely put parties, witnesses, jurors, counsel, and court personnel at unnecessary risk;” and (c) due to the complexity of this case and “current public-health concerns” would “likely [] deny all counsel reasonable time for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 5. The Court declines to reconsider its order continuing the trial and finding excludable time periods as to Doran here.
Moreover, even if the delay in Doran's case were based on a continuance granted to his codefendants, the Court would conclude that the delay necessary to effectuate a joint trial beginning on October 19, 2021 is not unreasonable under these circumstances. To determine the reasonableness of an exclusion of time for codefendants, “courts look particularly to whether the delay was necessary to [effectuate a joint trial] and to whether there was any actual prejudice suffered by” defendant. United States v. Hall, 181 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). However, Hall does not establish a simple, two-factor test. United States v. Messer, 197 F.3d 330, 338 (9th Cir. 1999) (“the proper test is whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a conclusion that the delay was unreasonable”).
Doran has pointed to some prejudice as a result of additional delay. Specifically, the Court acknowledges that Doran has been detained pending trial since 2015 and that his ongoing detention is an important factor in determining the reasonableness of further delay. See Messer, 197 F.3d at 338. However, Doran points to no specific risk that he will be prejudiced at trial due to the delay, such as by loss of evidence, and, as described above, the delay here is necessary to effectuate a jury trial for Doran and his codefendants given the ongoing public health crisis. Notably, it would be difficult or impossible to facilitate in-person court appearances by Doran and his codefendants, each of whom is alleged to be affiliated with the Mexican Mafia, given that a lockdown is in effect at the Metropolitan Detention Center, Los Angeles to control ongoing COVID-19 outbreaks. See e.g. Richard Winton, “As virus spreads among federal inmates in downtown L.A., court hearings and visitations are halted, ” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 23, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-23/covid-outbreak-la-prison (Last visited January 19, 2021). Under the totality of the circumstances, the prejudice to Doran does not appear to outweigh other considerations.
The decision whether to sever properly joined defendants under Rule 14 is “committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1978). As the Court found in its December 9, 2020 order, the ends of justice and judicial efficiency are best served by continuing the trial in this matter until October 19, 2019. In light of the totality of the circumstances present in this case, other considerations outweigh the risk of prejudice to Doran from further delay. Accordingly, Doran has not demonstrated that severance is necessary to protect one of Doran's “substantive rights.” Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).
c. Further Delay Does Not Violate Doran's Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial
Nor has Doran demonstrated that severance is necessary to protect his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Speedy Trial Act is ordinarily more demanding than the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 360 (9th Cir. 1982) (Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act “in part out of dissatisfaction with sixth amendment speedy trial jurisprudence, and to put more life into defendants' speedy trial rights”). However, the two are separate rights and inquiries. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” The Court applies a four-factor balancing test, set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine whether a defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated. The Court must balance: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted the right; and (4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (1972); McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003).
The Court first considers the length of the delay, which is a triggering mechanism for the remainder of the speedy trial right inquiry. “[O]nly if the delay is ‘presumptively prejudicial' is there a need to inquire into the other factors.” United States v. Tanh Huu Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 856 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). Ordinarily, a delay approaching one year is presumptively prejudicial. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 (1992). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that a shorter period may be presumptively prejudicial. United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1976) (six-month delay in forgery case is “borderline”). A “delay attributable to the defendant's own acts or to tactical decisions by defense counsel will not bolster defendant's speedy trial argument.” McNeely, 336 F.3d at 827.
In this case, Doran stipulated to each trial continuance from February 3, 2015 through July 7, 2020. Notably, Doran first objected to further delay when the Court continued trial from July 7, 2020 until March 16, 2021, when it was clear that the Court would be closed by reason of the pandemic. Accordingly, in light of the continuance granted December 9, 2020, the relevant delay is from July 7, 2020 through October 19, 2021. Even though a delay of fifteen months may be prejudicial, courts have approved similarly long delays in complex cases. See e.g. United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court and concluding that 22-month delay caused by government negligence did not violate Sixth Amendment because defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice); see also U.S.A. v. Pagan, No. CR14-684-CAS-18, 2016 WL 5508779, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2016) (finding 17-month delay for codefendant charged with Doran in the instant indictment did not violate Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, given the complexity of the case). In light of the complexity of this case, the preparation it requires, and the challenges faced by counsel due to COVID-19 restrictions, a 15-month delay is not necessarily a Sixth Amendment violation. The Court proceeds to evaluate the remaining three Barker factors.
As of June 3, 2020, the date on which Doran first objected to a trial continuance, see dkt. 1981, the Central District's Amended General Order No. 20-08 was in effect. See C.D. Cal. Amended General Order No. 20-08, In re: Coronavirus Public Emergency Order Concerning Phased Reopening of the Court (May 28, 2020). Amended General Order No. 20-08 incorporated the Court's Continuity of Operations Plan (“COOP”), which closed all Courthouses of the Central District of California in response to COVID-19 as of March 19, 2020. See C.D. Cal. Order of the Chief Judge, No. 20-042, In re: Coronavirus Public Emergency Activation of Continuity of Operations Plan (March 19, 2020). In addition, Amended General Order No. 20-08 adopted a “Plan for Phased Resumption of Operations” in the Central District to occur in three phases: Phase 1, return of certain staff to the courthouses to prepare for limited in court hearings, to be implemented no earlier than June 1, 2020; Phase 2, reopening courthouses for limited in court hearings, to be implemented “three weeks after Phase 1 and no earlier than June 22, 2020;” and Phase 3, resumption of jury trials, to occur on a date to be determined and for which no timeline was given. The Central District was in Phase 1 on June 3, 2020.
Regarding the reason for the delay, the prosecutor and courts have a constitutional duty to act in good faith and make a “diligent effort to bring [Doran] to trial quickly.” McNeely, 336 F.3d at 826. However, Doran does not argue that the delay has been caused by bad faith or a lack of due diligence. As explained at length supra, the reason for the present delay in this case is the ongoing COVID-19 public health emergency facing the Central District and the country as a whole, which renders it unsafe to gather members of different households, such as to empanel a jury. For example, Los Angeles County currently prohibits all indoor gatherings among persons who do not live in the same household-except to obtain, work at, or perform essential services- due to the risk of spreading COVID-19. County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health, Revised Temporary Targeted Safer at Home Health Officer Order for Control of COVID-19: Tier 1 Substantial Surge Updated Response, December 30, 2020, http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/media/Coronavirus/docs/HOO/HOOSaferatHomeSurgeResp onse.pdf. Due to the public health risk, the Central District has suspended all jury selection and jury trials until further notice. See C.D. Cal. General Order No. 20-09. In addition, this case is complex, involves voluminous discovery, and requires substantial preparation by the parties that may be hampered by COVID-19 restrictions, including restrictions on attorney visits with detained defendants. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily against finding a violation of the Sixth Amendment from additional delay.
Turning to the third factor, Doran has plainly asserted his Sixth Amendment rights via the instant motion. See Mot. at 1. It is unclear when Doran first asserted his Sixth Amendment rights, because the June 3, 2020 stipulation notes Doran's objection to the continuance but does not provide a basis for his objection. See dkt. 1981. However, even assuming arguendo that Doran asserted his Sixth Amendment rights on June 3, 2020, this factor is outweighed by the other Barker factors.
Finally, as addressed with respect to the Speedy Trial Act, the prejudice to Doran from further delay-that he is detained pending trial-weighs in favor of severance.
No Barker factor is necessarily dispositive. In balancing the Barker factors, “courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. “The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.” Id. at 522 (quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905)). The Court does not take lightly the fact that Doran is in custody awaiting trial. Nonetheless, the approximately 15-month delay from July 7, 2020, until October 19, 2021, is reasonable in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the complexity of the case. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a continuance to October 19, 2021 does not violate Doran's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for severance is DENIED and the Court's order continuing the trial for all remaining defendants until October 19, 2021, remains in effect.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/acd/ncorona2019/covidvaccinedistribution/ (last visited January 19, 2021).