” United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir.2009). “Where a defendant fails to clearly state the grounds for an objection in the district court, however, he waives the objection on appeal and we are limited to reviewing for plain error.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir.2003). Specifically, a defendant must “articulate the specific nature of his objection to a condition of supervised release so that the district court may reasonably have an opportunity to consider it.

Indeed, we have consistently reviewed special conditions for plain error when no objection was raised, and we are bound by our precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).

But if the defendant fails to properly state his objection in the district court, we conduct plain error review. See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003). III

We review the terms of a supervised release for abuse of discretion, but where the defendant fails to object at the district court, we reverse only for plain error. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003). We review constitutional issues de novo, but reverse only for plain error where the defendant fails to object at the district court.

However, in the context of supervised release, we have recognized that a district court may impose polygraph testing as a condition of supervised release. United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 2003).

Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Zinn, we held that although a prisoner's challenge to the imposition of a supervised release condition requiring him to submit to polygraph testing as part of his sex offender treatment was generally ripe for review, speculative arguments concerning the implementation of the condition were not. 321 F.3d 1084, 1088-89, 90-92 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting arguments against polygraph testing, in which defendant contended that he may be forced to answer an incriminating question or that the probation officer overseeing testing might abuse his authority, as hypothetical). A sentencing court need not discuss each § 3553(a) factor or even explicitly state that the § 3553(a) factors were considered as long as the record clearly implies that they were taken into account.

Even when the defendant raises a constitutional challenge, we review the imposition of a special condition of supervised release only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a First Amendment challenge to a special condition). Under that standard, we will reverse only "where the district court applies the wrong law, follows the wrong procedure, bases its decision on clearly erroneous facts, or commits a clear error in judgment."

"The district court may impose any condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in § 3553(a)." United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). "Similarly, the federal Sentencing Guidelines permit the sentencing court to impose any conditions of supervised release that are `reasonably related' to the § 3553(a) factors, so long as the conditions `involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a) and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.'"

The district court reasonably could have found Valdoquin's explanation suspicious and his acquisitions worrisome, and the district court could reasonably have determined that allowing Valdoquin greater contact with children other than his own would not afford adequate protection for them and was necessary to promote his rehabilitation. See United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1140 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1086-88 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003). Those concerns are sufficiently compelling to limit Valdoquin's access to minors other than his child.

A district court may impose any condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v.Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003). The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims.