U.S. v. Wright

29 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Tucker

    137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998)   Cited 82 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the defendant's "sufficient showing of a McDonough claim . . . entitle[d] him to a hearing"

    " Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 1988). Cf. United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 636 (8th Cir. 1997) (McDonough analysis ends once court concludes there was no showing of dishonesty). However, Tucker has briefed his case under the McDonough plurality's standard, and does not ask us to decide whether he could receive a new trial without a showing of dishonesty.

  2. United States v. Goodale

    738 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2013)   Cited 65 times
    Holding warrant not required for authorities to view child pornography websites on defendant's laptop computer when victim's mother had brought laptop to police station and showed officers websites in viewing history

    ” United States v. Clay, 618 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir.2010). “Credibility determinations are uniquely within the province of the trier of fact, and ‘are entitled to special deference.’ ” Sullivan v. Minnesota, 818 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1987), quoting United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir.1986). “[A] victim's testimony alone is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir.2001) (upholding a conviction for abusive sexual contact based on the testimony of the teenage victim), citing United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 633–34 (8th Cir.1997). See also United States v. Seibel, 712 F.3d 1229, 1237 (8th Cir.2013) (“Even in the face of inconsistent evidence, a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.

  3. U.S. v. Kenyon

    397 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 57 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict"

    Kenyon first argues that no rational jury could have convicted him because A.L.'s testimony was simply incredible. He points to evidence that none of the children sharing a bedroom with A.L. saw or heard any assault by Kenyon, that witnesses reported normal behavior by A.L. during the period of alleged abuse, and that the government presented no evidence of physical injury to A.L. It is well-established, however, that credibility is the province of the jury, and the jury was free to determine what weight should be given to A.L.'s testimony in light of the evidence cited by Kenyon. United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997). Even in the face of inconsistent evidence, a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.

  4. United States v. Seibel

    712 F.3d 1229 (8th Cir. 2013)   Cited 21 times

    The district court thus did not err in denying the motion for acquittal based upon the credibility of S.S.'s and P.S.'s testimony at trial. See id.;United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 633–34 (8th Cir.1997); see also United States v. McKinney, 88 F.3d 551, 555 (8th Cir.1996) (“It is not necessary for a jury to reach consistent verdicts on two counts of an indictment.”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715 (8th Cir.2004).

  5. U.S. v. Decoteau

    630 F.3d 1091 (8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 28 times
    Rejecting defendant's argument that “§ 3553's parsimony provision must be followed even if there is a statutory mandatory minimum unless the statute under consideration contains an ‘except as otherwise specifically provided by law’ clause”

    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict as we must, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to prove digital penetration of S.S. by DeCoteau. First, we note that a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to prove aggravated sexual abuse. United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997). S.S. testified at trial that "Kyle" touched her with his bare hand "under" her clothes, and that he touched her on the "inside," not the "outside," of "those parts" she had circled on the anatomical drawing.

  6. U.S. v. Santos-Garcia

    313 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2002)   Cited 82 times
    Holding confession was not coerced when investigator told defendant his "children would be driving by the time he was released from prison" because statement was an "accurate representation of [defendant's] predicament"

    The district court did not err. Although Sanchez argues that there was insufficient evidence because Santos's testimony was incredible, "[i]t is well-established that `it is the sole province of the jury to weigh the credibility of a witness.'" Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997)). Nor did the district court err in denying his motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence.

  7. U.S. v. Kirkie

    261 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2001)   Cited 67 times
    Holding that any evidentiary error was harmless when a defendant had an opportunity "to challenge the victim's credibility and argue ... that she made false allegations out of jealousy and anger"

    Even if the jury relied only on the testimony of the victim herself, there would be sufficient evidence to support the convictions. See United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that testimony of child abuse victim could be credited by jury and constitute sufficient evidence for conviction). For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Motion for New Trial

  8. U.S. v. Tucker

    243 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 2001)   Cited 36 times
    Rejecting the defendant's allegations that a juror was presumptively biased against him because the defendant, who had previously been governor of Arkansas, had denied clemency to the juror's husband, a prison inmate

    Compare Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding, after counting votes in the various opinions in McDonough, "It would thus appear that a juror's dishonesty is not a predicate to obtaining a new trial. The focus is on bias.") with United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 636 (8th Cir. 1997) (after court concludes juror answered question truthfully, McDonough inquiry is over); and United States v. Williams, 77 F.3d 1098, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1996) (without misleading answer, new trial not warranted). Cf. Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 516 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The advent of the [ McDonough] test did not eliminate a litigant's broader historic right to prove actual or implied juror bias."), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811, 120 S.Ct. 44, 145 L.Ed.2d 39 (1999); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362-64 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding Sixth Amendment claim can rest on bias alone, but reserving question of whether McDonough plurality allows grant of new trial for inaccurate answer, concealing bias, regardless of dishonesty); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 979 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("Because we conclude that Freeland lied, we need not decide whether dishonesty is a necessary predicate to a finding of juror bias.") However, this case does not require us to settle the

  9. United States v. Gabe

    237 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2001)   Cited 135 times
    Holding that "a victim's testimony alone is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"

    However, a victim's testimony alone is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 633-34 (8th Cir. 1997). Gabe further argues there is no evidence he used force in committing this offense.

  10. Loeblein v. Dormire

    229 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2000)   Cited 66 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an indictment charging separate counts for each sexual assault was not multiplicitous because each occurrence was a separate act

    We cannot say that no rational trier of fact would have believed E.M., and the state trial court in this case apparently did believe her. A victim's testimony is, by itself, normally sufficient to sustain a conviction. See United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997). We therefore find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Mr. Loeblein's conviction and, consequently, that the decision of the state courts was neither contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of federal law.