" Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 1988). Cf. United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 636 (8th Cir. 1997) (McDonough analysis ends once court concludes there was no showing of dishonesty). However, Tucker has briefed his case under the McDonough plurality's standard, and does not ask us to decide whether he could receive a new trial without a showing of dishonesty.
” United States v. Clay, 618 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir.2010). “Credibility determinations are uniquely within the province of the trier of fact, and ‘are entitled to special deference.’ ” Sullivan v. Minnesota, 818 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1987), quoting United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir.1986). “[A] victim's testimony alone is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir.2001) (upholding a conviction for abusive sexual contact based on the testimony of the teenage victim), citing United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 633–34 (8th Cir.1997). See also United States v. Seibel, 712 F.3d 1229, 1237 (8th Cir.2013) (“Even in the face of inconsistent evidence, a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.
Kenyon first argues that no rational jury could have convicted him because A.L.'s testimony was simply incredible. He points to evidence that none of the children sharing a bedroom with A.L. saw or heard any assault by Kenyon, that witnesses reported normal behavior by A.L. during the period of alleged abuse, and that the government presented no evidence of physical injury to A.L. It is well-established, however, that credibility is the province of the jury, and the jury was free to determine what weight should be given to A.L.'s testimony in light of the evidence cited by Kenyon. United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997). Even in the face of inconsistent evidence, a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.
The district court thus did not err in denying the motion for acquittal based upon the credibility of S.S.'s and P.S.'s testimony at trial. See id.;United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 633–34 (8th Cir.1997); see also United States v. McKinney, 88 F.3d 551, 555 (8th Cir.1996) (“It is not necessary for a jury to reach consistent verdicts on two counts of an indictment.”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715 (8th Cir.2004).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict as we must, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to prove digital penetration of S.S. by DeCoteau. First, we note that a victim's testimony alone can be sufficient to prove aggravated sexual abuse. United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 768 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997). S.S. testified at trial that "Kyle" touched her with his bare hand "under" her clothes, and that he touched her on the "inside," not the "outside," of "those parts" she had circled on the anatomical drawing.
The district court did not err. Although Sanchez argues that there was insufficient evidence because Santos's testimony was incredible, "[i]t is well-established that `it is the sole province of the jury to weigh the credibility of a witness.'" Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997)). Nor did the district court err in denying his motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
Even if the jury relied only on the testimony of the victim herself, there would be sufficient evidence to support the convictions. See United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that testimony of child abuse victim could be credited by jury and constitute sufficient evidence for conviction). For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Motion for New Trial
Compare Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding, after counting votes in the various opinions in McDonough, "It would thus appear that a juror's dishonesty is not a predicate to obtaining a new trial. The focus is on bias.") with United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 636 (8th Cir. 1997) (after court concludes juror answered question truthfully, McDonough inquiry is over); and United States v. Williams, 77 F.3d 1098, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1996) (without misleading answer, new trial not warranted). Cf. Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 516 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The advent of the [ McDonough] test did not eliminate a litigant's broader historic right to prove actual or implied juror bias."), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811, 120 S.Ct. 44, 145 L.Ed.2d 39 (1999); Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362-64 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding Sixth Amendment claim can rest on bias alone, but reserving question of whether McDonough plurality allows grant of new trial for inaccurate answer, concealing bias, regardless of dishonesty); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 979 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("Because we conclude that Freeland lied, we need not decide whether dishonesty is a necessary predicate to a finding of juror bias.") However, this case does not require us to settle the
However, a victim's testimony alone is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 633-34 (8th Cir. 1997). Gabe further argues there is no evidence he used force in committing this offense.
We cannot say that no rational trier of fact would have believed E.M., and the state trial court in this case apparently did believe her. A victim's testimony is, by itself, normally sufficient to sustain a conviction. See United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630, 634 (8th Cir. 1997). We therefore find that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Mr. Loeblein's conviction and, consequently, that the decision of the state courts was neither contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of federal law.