Perillo’s waiver applies to the "right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case on any ground," as long as she received a sentence within the guideline range, and restitution is a part of a sentence. See United States v. Worden , 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Because restitution is a part of a criminal sentence, and Worden agreed not to challenge his sentence, he may not appeal the restitution order."), citing United States v. Behrman , 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that an "agreement waiving appeal from ‘any sentence within the maximum provided in Title 18’ or similar language" would waive right to appeal restitution order).

"[R]estitution is part of a sentence," United States v. Perillo , 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted), so the waiver language includes Johnson’s challenge to that figure. See United States v. Worden , 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Because restitution is part of a criminal sentence, and [the defendant] agreed not to challenge the sentence, he may not appeal the restitution order.") (citation omitted). Johnson argues his circumstances fall into a due process exception to the appeal waiver.

But because the waiver applied to "all provisions of the ... sentence imposed," we held: "[t]he fact that other specific terms of the sentence were mentioned and restitution was not does not take restitution out from under the ‘all provisions’ umbrella." Id. (citing United States v. Worden , 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2011) ). The waiver provision in Bolin’s plea agreement similarly referred to "all provisions" of his sentence.

The recognized limitations on appeal waivers are narrow and few: Waivers will not be construed to foreclose an appellate claim that a sentence exceeds a statutory maximum or rests on a constitutionally impermissible factor like race, or that defense counsel was ineffective in negotiating the plea agreement containing the waiver. See United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2014); Dowell v. United States, 694 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005). None of these limitations applies to Jones.

To the contrary, the waiver refers to "all components of my sentence or the manner in which . my sentence was determined or imposed." As the government points out, this language does not differ meaningfully from that in the appeal waiver considered in United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2011). The court there also confirmed that "restitution is a part of a criminal sentence," and so when a defendant "agree[s] not to challenge his sentence, he may not appeal the restitution order."

Neither issue presented by these appeals falls within that narrow exception, which, typically, would constrain our review. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 502–04 (7th Cir.2011). But the Government's brief is silent about Mr. Kieffer's appeal waiver, so the Government has waived reliance on that waiver. United States v. Adigun, 703 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir.2012).

United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir.2006) (no waiver because plea agreement indicated “sentence” referred to imprisonment only); United States v. Sistrunk, 432 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir.2006) (no waiver under plea agreement stating: “the defendant hereby waives all rights conferred by [18 U.S.C. § 3742] to appeal his sentence, unless the Court sentences the defendant above offense level 10”); United States v. Zink, 107 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir.1997) (plea agreement indicated reference to “any sentence” was to sentence calculated under Sentencing Guidelines). In one of the cases cited by the government, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that, while it found the waiver in that case included restitution, its “analysis [was] guided foremost by the facts before [it].” United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir.2011). Similarly, we are guided by the facts before us.

We enforce appellate waivers when the “terms are express and unambiguous, and the record shows that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement.” United States v. Aslan, 644 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir.2011); see United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir.2011); United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir.2010). Kilcrease does not contend that he misunderstood the appellate waiver.

And that brings us to another question: Do the defendants' appellate waivers waive the issues raised in this appeal? “We may not address the merits of [a defendant's] argument ... if we conclude that he waived the right to appeal the restitution order.” United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir.2011). Waivers in plea agreements are generally valid if they are knowingly and voluntarily made, though we enforce a waiver only if the disputed appeal comes within the ambit of the waiver.

Kelly's waiver is thus enforceable if the terms are “clear and unambiguous” and the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily” entered into the agreement. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Blinn, 490 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2007)).