Opinion
Criminal No. 03-354-03 (JBS).
August 27, 2004
Christopher J. Christie, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, By: R. Stephen Stigall, Lee D. Rudy, United States Attorney's Office, Camden, New Jersey, Assistant United States Attorneys.
R. Louis Gallagher, II, Esquire, Hainesport, NJ, Counsel for defendant Reginald M. Wooten, a/k/a "Noble R. Asanti, Ali"
OPINION DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
On July 2, 2004, a unanimous jury found defendant Reginald M. Wooten, a/k/a "Noble R. Asanti, Ali," and four co-defendants, guilty of conspiracy to produce and pass, and of possessing or passing, false and fictitious money orders purporting to be authorized by the United States Department of Transportation and the United States Department of the Treasury in amounts which total more than ten-million dollars, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy Count 1) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 514(a)(2) and 2 (substantive Counts 2-24). Presently before the Court is the motion of defendant Wooten for a new trial because "the jury should have accepted the [good faith] defense and they did not." (Gallagher Cert. ¶ 3.)
The substantive counts against Defendant Wooten are contained in Counts 13, 14 and 15.
Defendant Wooten's sole defense to the charges at trial was the good faith defense. Because the substantive statute, 18 U.S.C. § 514(a), requires proof that the defendant possessed, passed, or attempted to pass the fraudulent financial instrument knowingly, willfully, and with the intent to defraud, defendant Wooten asserted that he had not violated the statute because he did not act with the requisite intent to defraud. Instead, he asserted, he acted with the good faith belief that he was entitled to pass the financial instruments because of his declaration of sovereignty in the Al Moroccan Empire, a position which, he asserted, gave him the right, pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code and certain other acts and treaties, to pass the money orders and recover funds that the United States owed his Moorish empire. It was undisputed that the legal authorities cited by Wooten did not give him authority to issue the fraudulent money orders, but his attorney argued that he, in good faith, believed that they did.
In the end, the jury did not credit the good faith defense, and instead convicted defendant Wooten on all charges. Defendant Wooten now seeks a new trial because the "jury verdict . . . was contrary to the good faith belief defense." (Gallagher Cert. ¶ 3.) For the reasons explained herein, the Court will deny this motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The lengthy history of this complex criminal case, including its twelve months of pretrial proceedings and its trial comprised of a guilt phase and two sentencing phases, has been detailed in several prior opinions of this Court. In essence, the case involves nine defendants, all American-born, but all alleged members of an organization called the Al Moroccan Empire, who were charged with conspiracy to produce and pass, and with producing and passing, false and fictitious money orders purporting to be authorized by the United States Department of Transportation and the United States Department of the Treasury in amounts which total more than ten-million dollars, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy Count 1) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 514(a)(2) and 2 (substantive Counts 2-25). On June 7, 2004, the trial commenced as to defendant Wooten and four other defendants, and on July 2, 2004, the jury found defendant Wooten and the other four defendants guilty on all counts. Counsel for defendant Wooten then filed the present motion for new trial, asserting that the jury should have accepted Wooten's good faith defense.
See, e.g. United States v. Harris, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2004 WL 1853920 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2004); United States v. Harris, Crim. No. 03-354(JBS), Opinion Regarding Recusal and Disqualification (D.N.J. May 24, 2004); United States v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 2d 542, Opinion Addressing Request of Defendant Outterbridge to Proceed Pro Se (D.N.J. 2004); United States v. Harris, Crim. No. 03-354(JBS), Opinion Regarding Severance (D.N.J. April 30, 2004); id., Opinion Finding Defendants William Oscar Harris, Reginald M. Wooten, Arthur T. Outterbridge, and Robert McCurdy in Civil Contempt of Court (D.N.J. April 22, 2004); id., Order Finding Defendant Reginald Wooten in Civil Contempt of Court (D.N.J. April 14, 2004); id., Opinion Regarding Restrictions on Filing and Other Communications (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2003); id., Opinion Regarding Jurisdiction (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2003); United States v. Harris, Crim. No. 03-354, 2003 WL 23602548 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2003) (regarding August 8, 2003 Faretta hearing and civil contempt of Harris, Reginald Wooten, and Outterbridge at hearing).
Pursuant to an Opinion and Order Regarding Severance issued on April 30, 2004, the Court severed the trial in this matter, such that the case against defendant Wooten and defendants William Oscar Harris, a/k/a "Oscaro El Hari, Bey," Reginald David Lundy, a/k/a "Noble R. Dauud Lundi El, Bey," Arthur T. Outterbridge, a/k/a "Arthor Tomas Ottobrice, Bey," and Robert McCurdy, a/k/a "Al Ruberto Moor Core, Dey," would commence on June 7, 2004, followed at a later date by a trial involving the case against the other four defendants, namely Patricia A. Crisp, a/k/a "Patria Ahna Cristos, Ali," Crystal V. Wooten, a/k/a "Kris'taal, Ali," "Kristin Young," Lisa A. Brown, a/k/a "El Iysah," and Cesi Aquia El Binyamiyn, Bey. United States v. Harris, Crim. No. 03-354(JBS), Opinion Regarding Severance (D.N.J. April 30, 2004).
II. DISCUSSION
With this motion, defendant Wooten seeks a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) which provides that "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Wooten asserts that a new trial is warranted here because "the jury should have accepted the [good faith] defense and they did not." (Gallagher Cert. ¶ 3.) The Court disagrees.
Whether to grant a new trial is a decision that is within the sole discretion of the district court. United States v. Skelton, 893 F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1990). Where the motion is based on the argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, as here, the motion is "not favored" and a new trial is "to be granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases."United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Government of Virgin Islands v. Derricks, 810 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1987)). The district court should only order a new trial "if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred — that is, that an innocent person has been convicted." Id. (quoting United States v. Santos, 20 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morales, 902 F.2d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 1990)).
This clearly is not the "exceptional case" which warrants a new trial. Though defendant Wooten asserts that the jury should have credited his good faith defense, he has pointed to no evidence in support of his argument. The Court has, however, considered the evidence and concludes that justice does not require a new trial here.
At trial, defendant Wooten did not dispute that he placed at least one order with a commercial printer for money orders or that he personally attempted to pass $184,100.00 worth of the fraudulent money orders. His sole defense, instead, was that he in good faith believed that his actions were lawful, meaning that he did not have the requisite "intent to defraud" as required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 514(a). Neither Wooten nor any of his co-defendants testified at trial, so there was no direct evidence from any defendant regarding intent. Counsel for defendant Wooten, though, asserted that his good faith could be inferred from his declaration of sovereignty in the Al Moroccan Empire, testified to by Barbara-Anne Gardenhire-Mills who attended his name-changing party in 1999, from the book entitled Redemption and Law, which he gave to Ms. Gardenhire-Mills as support for his use of the money orders, and from certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Moroccan Treaty of 1787, the Sundry Free Moors Act of 1790, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the Moors Fed. Financiers Act, and House Joint Resolution 192, citations to which he had printed in the top left corner of the money orders.
This book, Redemption and Law, includes an outline of the money order scheme, along with several disclaimers regarding the illegality of the scheme.
Counsel for Wooten asserted that Ms. Gardenhire-Mills' testimony supported the good faith belief because, if Wooten had intended to defraud her, he would not have told her to do outside research prior to accepting his offer to issue money orders on her behalf. This argument is not supported by the evidence, as the Court finds that the more reasonable interpretation of Wooten's actions was to more artfully convince Gardenhire-Mills, one of his well-educated colleagues, to participate in the scheme.
Regardless, the requisite intent to defraud was not limited to Gardenhire-Mills; here, the evidence clearly exhibited an intent to defraud the financial institutions. The defendants generally sent the money orders to pay outstanding loans and mortgages for themselves and others. Upon receipt of the fraudulent money order, the financial institution generally began the process of releasing its interest in the underlying property immediately, meaning that, by the time the money order was returned for insufficient funds, the institution could have released its interest in the property. For example, IndyMac Bank completed the process and cancelled two secured loans before the money orders totaling $89,000 were returned as worthless; it was unable to reinstate its lien because the underlying properties had, by then, been re-encumbered by other mortgages.
Wooten's attorney did not assert that these authorities provided Wooten with an objectively reasonable basis to believe in the lawfulness of his actions; indeed, after a hearing, the Court took judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201, Fed.R.Evid., that none of these asserted authorities provided justification for Wooten's actions. There was no argument that any of the authorities cited on these "Authorization Money Orders" even remotely could support a belief in the lawfulness of the defendant's actions. His attorney, though, asserted that Wooten in good faith believed that they did, which is all that is required to negate the requisite intent to defraud.
The jury was instructed, without objection, that "[t]he good faith of a defendant is a complete defense to each of the charges in the Indictment because good faith on the part of a defendant is simply inconsistent with the intent to defraud as alleged in the Indictment," and that "[a] person who acts, or causes another person to act, on a belief or an opinion honestly held is not punishable under this statute merely because the belief or opinion turns out to be inaccurate, incorrect, or wrong. Such a belief or opinion need not be objectively reasonable so long as it is honestly held." See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). After a day of deliberations, the jury did not credit Wooten's purported good faith defense, but instead found him guilty on all counts.
The Court, after a full review of the evidence finds that the jury's verdict was fully supported by the evidence. Contrary to Wooten's argument, the great weight of the evidence in this matter was inconsistent with his purported good faith belief defense. First, there was evidence that defendant Wooten and the other defendants learned almost immediately that the money orders were not being paid by the Department of Transportation. They continued to pass the money orders anyway, even after they were informed in writing from financial institutions that the money orders were considered fraudulent, and after they learned that another individual, using similar instruments, had been arrested as a result. It is clear that a defendant does not act in "good faith" if he justifies his actions by his disagreement with, or rejection of, the law that he knows exists. See, e.g. United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1986). Here, the evidence showed that defendant Wooten had ample notice that the instruments were not lawful, and yet continued to pass them.
Also, there was evidence that Wooten, knowing that several money orders had not been paid, still demanded a bank representative at North American Mortgage that the $152,000.00 money order sent to pay off Ms. Gardenhire-Mills' mortgage be accepted. Similarly, there was evidence that he and the other defendants gave different stories to different individuals about the legitimacy of the money orders. They told bank representatives that the money orders were "International Money Orders" and that any problem they may have with processing the money orders was the result of issues they were having with micro-encoding. The defendants, though, had supplied the micro-encoding numbers for the printer to include on the money orders, and had used outdated routing numbers for First Union Bank and PNC Bank even though they did not have authorization to use the numbers. (See Testimony of Hudson United Bank representative.)
The defendants told others, generally professionals, that they should accept the money orders as payment because they were printed by the government for use by American Indians who were owed reparations from the government. (See Testimony of Melvyn Cohen, C.P.A.) Still others, generally friends, were told that the money orders were legitimate instruments for use by those in the Al Moroccan Empire. (See Testimony of Barbara-Anne Gardenhire-Mills.) These differing accounts provided by the defendants clearly supported the Government's position that the defendants used whatever "sell" they could to pass the money orders and advance their scheme.
In sum, the evidence clearly supported the jury's determination that defendant Wooten did not act with a good faith belief that the money orders were lawful. Therefore, this Court will deny his motion for a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant Reginald M. Wooten, a/k/a "Noble R. Asanti, Ali," will be denied.
The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
This matter coming before the Court on the motion of Reginald M. Wooten, a/k/a "Noble R. Asanti, Ali," for a new trial, [Docket Item 292-1]; the Court having considered the positions of counsel; for good cause and the reasons expressed in an Opinion of today's date;
IT IS, this 27th day of August, 2004 hereby
ORDERED that the motion of defendant Reginald M. Wooten, a/k/a "Noble R. Asanti, Ali," for a new trial, [Docket Item 292-1], be, and hereby is, DENIED.