"Determinations of relevance and materiality [in this context] are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 416, 121 L.Ed.2d 339 (1992); see United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 392, reh'g denied en banc, 1988 U.S.App. LEXIS 15,951 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1353, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989); United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1986). A defendant does not establish the materiality of a witness's testimony by a proffer which raises "only speculation concerning the possible testimony" of the witness.
Other courts have reached similar conclusions when faced with similarly situated defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Blosser, 440 F.2d 697, 698-99 (10th Cir. 1971) (rejecting argument that denial of continuance deprived defendant of right to counsel and a fair trial because, in part, “a prior continuance by defense counsel had been obtained several months previously for similar reasons”); United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance that would have afforded the defendant “more time to prepare his pro se defense”); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 587 (8th Cir. 2011) (denying third continuance motion, explaining that “[t]he right to self representation ‘does not exist . . . to be used as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process.' ” (quoting United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 807 (8th Cir. 2006)).
The trial court has broad discretion on the issue of continuances, United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir. 1989) ( citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)), and a court on appeal should not overturn a trial court's denial of a continuance unless the trial court clearly has abused its discretion. United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988). An abuse of discretion may only be found if the lower court's judgment was based upon clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal conclusions.
Ganter and his counsel had the discovery materials for over a year. Cf. United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1353, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989). Ganter did not explain why he had not assisted in trial preparation during that period and now needed "at least a few months" to prepare for a trial that would take less than two days to complete.
But Johnson chose to represent himself, and “a defendant who has elected to proceed pro se cannot later complain of his own ineffectiveness as a ground for reversal.” United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.1988). Furthermore, a review of the change-of-plea transcript belies Johnson's claims that he did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea.
Defendants have also challenged the impact of court rules or statutes on their right to counsel of choice. See, e.g., Caplin, 491 U.S. at 624 (claim that forfeiture laws infringed upon right); United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 390 (8th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). Moreover, equal protection principles require the State to assert a compelling reason to justify disparate treatment of indigents and non-indigents when, as here, that difference interferes only with the constitutional rights of indigents.
Continuances are not favored and should be granted only when a compelling reason has been shown. See United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1353, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989). Abuse of discretion is determined by looking at the particular circumstances of the case.
We will not overturn a trial court's denial of a continuance "unless the trial court clearly has abused its discretion," because "[c]ontinuances are not favored and should be granted only when a compelling reason has been shown." United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1353, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616-17, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)). The district court examined the factors we articulated in United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir. 1989), by looking at the time required and already permitted for trial preparation, Young's diligence, the conduct of the United States, the effect of the delay, and the reasons Young gave for needing the continuance.
Continuances are not favored and should be granted only when a compelling reason has been shown." United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1353, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989). Abuse of discretion is determined by looking at the particular circumstances of the case.
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990). Further, absent some indication of abuse of discretion, a trial court's limitations on the in-court conduct of standby counsel are not error. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989); United States v. Payne, 923 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830 (1991); Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1121. Having broad discretion to deny hybrid representation and to circumscribe counsel's role if hybrid representation is granted, a trial court necessarily has the discretion to place restrictions on standby counsel's in-court role in cases of pure self-representation.