Several courts have held that a pending civil forfeiture action, rather than an independent Rule 41(g) motion, is the proper forum to address issues related to government seizure of property. See Rosevita Charter Constr. Corp., 787 F.Supp. at 43; De Almeida v. United States, 459 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2006); Hernandez, 911 F.2d at 983; United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Shaw v. United States, 891 F.2d 602, 603 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018, 1019 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1988). Some of those courts hold that once a civil forfeiture proceeding has begun, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1(a)(5)(B) ("Rule 1(a)(5)(B)"), formerly Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(b)(5), removes the basis for jurisdiction over an independent Rule 41(g) motion.

The aggregation of facts, each one insufficient standing alone, may suffice to meet the government's burden. United States v. U.S. Currency, $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1988). To determine whether the information is sufficient, a court must "weigh not the individual layers but the `laminated' total."

Cf. United States v. Sokolow, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ("a trip from Honolulu to Miami, standing alone, is not a cause for any sort of suspicion").Cf. United States v. United States Currency, $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding evidence of two prior convictions, in addition to a prior arrest, probative of probable cause). The government itself has in the past conceded certain of these reports to be "unreliable," see United States v. Portillo, 469 F.2d 907, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1972), and we have previously refused to find probable cause despite NADDIS information linking defendant to drug trafficking.

The reason courts allow Rule 41(g) motions to be fashioned into an equitable civil remedy in such circumstances is that when the government seizes property but thereafter declines to bring criminal charges, the owner of the seized property has no other adequate remedy to force the government to return the property. See United States v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1988).

Three circuits have held that where the government has brought a civil forfeiture action a claimant may not use Rule 41(e) to bypass the statutory procedure provided for. SeeUnited States v. United States Currency, 851 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.1988) (government's filing of civil forfeiture action required dismissal of owner's Rule 41(e) motion); In re Harper, 835 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir.1988) (even though Rule 41(e) motion filed before civil proceedings initiated, plaintiff not entitled to return of property where he failed to pursue administrative remedies); In re Seizure Warrant, 830 F.2d 372 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam) (where civil and not criminal proceeding is pending plaintiff may not invoke Rule 41(e)). Once the government initiated civil proceedings against her, she was required to follow the statutory procedures set out in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1608 and 1618.

The petitioner cannot bring her motion under Rule 41(e), however, because the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a Rule 41(e) motion does not survive the filing of a civil forfeiture complaint. SeeUnited States v. $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (9th Cir.1988). In $83,310.78, the court held that a Rule 41(e) motion must be dismissed once the civil forfeiture proceeding is filed, because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(b)(5) expressly provides that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to civil forfeitures.

See In re Harper, 835 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1988). See also United States v. U.S. Currency, $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1233-35 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Seizure Warrant, 830 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated as moot, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 299, 102 L.Ed.2d 319 (1988). Cf. United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 244, 106 S.Ct. 610, 612, 88 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986) ("After seizure of an article by the United States Customs Service, a claimant to it has essentially two options.

Even though it is a rule grounded in criminal law, the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 697-98, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1249, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965); United States v. U.S. Currency, $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988); Richardson v. $4,543 United States Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 225, 814 P.2d 952, 957 (Ct.App. 1991). Property which has been seized in violation of a claimant's constitutional rights may still be the subject of a forfeiture proceeding.

Mahone was carrying a substantial sum of cash. See United States v. $83,310.78 U.S. Currency, 851 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1988) (carrying a large sum of cash is "strong evidence" of a connection to illegal drug activity). Mahone does not deny that he gave conflicting statements regarding the amount of money he was carrying, the origin of the money, and his reasons for visiting Phoenix. He was unable to answer simple questions about his last job, the address of the person he claimed to be visiting, and the name or address of the dealership from which he intended to buy the Tahoe automobile.

This court has found probable cause for civil forfeiture of drug related moneys even with relatively little evidence so long as the evidence is sufficiently probative. See e.g., United States v. Roth, 912 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 1990) (accountant for alleged drug trafficker had series of unusual financial transactions); United States v. U.S. Currency, $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1988) (man previously convicted on drug charges stayed in bathroom with toilet running and kicked bag containing over $125,000 behind the door when leaving bathroom, and no one in house admitted to ownership of currency). In addition, this court has acceded to the expertise of officers with knowledge of the common attributes and techniques of persons involved in the drug trade.