The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals proposed that there were two possible interpretations regarding what Umanzor's motives were for pleading guilty: one, that Umanzor knew that he had been involved with the sale of more than 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine and intended to plead guilty to the full amount that he had been involved with; and, two, that Umanzor only knew of the four transactions appearing separately in the indictment. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060-61 (8th Cir. 2010). The Court indicated that this was a factual dispute that would keep it from ruling directly on Umanzor's claim of ineffective assistance.

The voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first raised on direct appeal. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060-61 (8th Cir.2010) (where defendant did not move to withdraw guilty plea in district court, he could not challenge voluntariness of plea for first time on direct appeal, and any claim that plea was involuntary needed to be addressed in § 2255 proceedings where factual record could be further developed). Here, Movant failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, and further failed to raise the voluntariness of his plea on direct appeal.

Upon careful review, we conclude that Jones is precluded from challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea in this appeal because he did not move to withdraw his plea below. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010). We also conclude that the ineffective-assistance claim is not ripe for review because the record is undeveloped.

Upon careful review, we conclude that Elliott is precluded from challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea in this appeal because he withdrew his pro se motion to withdraw the plea in the district court. See United States v. Gamboa, 701 F.3d 265, 267-68 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010). We enforce the appeal waiver as to the remaining challenge to his sentence.

As to Ruel's pro se argument that counsel was ineffective during the plea negotiations, Ruel did not move to withdraw his plea as involuntary, and we conclude that his challenge to counsel's performance would be better addressed on collateral review. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2006).

See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentences, appellate court first ensures no significant procedural error occurred, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) (sentence within Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable). We further conclude that Evans cannot challenge his plea on appeal, as he did not move to withdraw the plea below, see United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010), and that Evans cannot pursue an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, as the record is not fully developed, see United States v. Oliver, 950 F.3d 556, 566 (8th Cir. 2020) (appellate court normally defers ineffective-assistance claims to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings; review on direct appeal is appropriate only where record is fully developed on specific issue of ineffective assistance, where not to act would amount to plain miscarriage of justice, or where counsel's error is readily apparent).

Other circuits have invoked different standards, left the standard of review unspecified, or declined to entertain the challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Frye , 402 F.3d 1123, 1126–27 (11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing "[t]he voluntariness of a guilty plea ... de novo " (citation omitted)); United States v. Glinsey , 209 F.3d 386, 397 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant's plea knowing and voluntary based on the record without specifying the standard of review); United States v. Rodriguez-Morales , 647 F.3d 395, 398 (1st Cir. 2011) (electing "not [to] resolve" what standard of review applies to a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea since the defendant's "claim fails under any of the applicable standards"); United States v. Umanzor , 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to consider a challenge to the voluntariness of a plea made for the first time on direct appeal). Under plain error review, we have discretion to correct an error when the defendant establishes (1) the district court committed error, (2) the error is clear and obvious, and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.

See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of appeal waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (enforcing appeal waiver if appeal falls within scope of waiver, defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into plea agreement and waiver, and it would not result in miscarriage of justice). Pierce's challenge to the sentencing enhancements do not call into question the validity of his plea, see United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1998) (enforcing appeal waiver resulting from knowing and voluntary decision); and while he states that discovery was not shown to him before he pled guilty, he did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, see United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010) (deferring claim the plea was constitutionally flawed to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding when defendant did not move to withdraw guilty plea in district court).

See United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) (defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself to specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal). To the extent Lampe asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was involuntary, we decline to consider these arguments on direct appeal. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010) (if defendant did not move to withdraw plea in district court, he may not challenge voluntariness of plea for first time on direct appeal); United States v. McAdory, 501 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007) (this court ordinarily defers ineffective-assistance claims to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings). Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel's motion to withdraw.

Barberena's challenge to the validity of her guilty plea is not properly before the court, because she did not move to withdraw her guilty plea below. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 2010). In addition, we will enforce the appeal waiver as to her sentencing challenge, because our review of the record (which, among other things, confirms the presence of an interpreter at the plea and sentencing hearings) demonstrates that Barberena entered into the plea agreement and the appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily; the argument falls within the scope of the appeal waiver; and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver.