Such subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited. United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 927-29 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moreno-Chaparro, 180 F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1123 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless other circumstances established a reasonable basis for suspicion that Broomfield was the robber.

An officer may make a Terry stop `when [he] has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.'" United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1993). The officer "may not, however, rest only upon his intuition; the officer must provide `specific' and `objective' facts justifying the stop."

We have held that the district court "may discharge its duty to make factual findings by adopting the findings of the presentence report." See Vargas, 16 F.3d at 159; United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1993). However, we have declined to accept such blanket statements where the evidence indicates that the court has neglected to make the required factual findings.

A district court satisfies the requirement that a sentencing court make factual findings by adopting the facts contained in the presentence report. United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1993). The district court's judgment in this case specifically adopted "the factual findings and guideline application in the presentence report."

United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). The statement in United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1993), that "the police department was a reliable source," must be understood in context (the police department was a reliable source in the circumstances of that case), rather than as a quixotic effort to overrule the Supreme Court. That cannot be the end of our analysis, however.

This court has indeed held that a district court "may discharge its duty to make factual findings by adopting the findings contained in a presentence report." United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, 900 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2350, 124 L.Ed.2d 259 (1993). In both Troka and Kaufmann, however, the district courts had adopted the findings of the presentence report on a particular issue (namely, obstruction of justice) and by reference to a discrete portion of the report.

andoval-Espana, 459 F. Supp. 2d 121, 131 (D.R.I. 2006) (explaining that courts assess reliability based on a "sliding scale" with less corroboration required for known sources than anonymous ones). Courts routinely find that tips provided by one law enforcement officer or agency to another are reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Benoit, 730 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that Coast Guard officers reasonably relied on tip from foreign law enforcement agency where that agency was known to officers and repeat player in drug trafficking prevention); United States v. Winters, 491 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that "significantly corroborated" tip from law enforcement officer to state narcotics agents was sufficiently reliable and including it in reasonable suspicion calculus); United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 371 (6th Cir. 2006) (incorporating tip from one DEA office to another in group of "factors to be aggregated" in making reasonable suspicion determination); United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding reasonable suspicion based in part on tip from sister police department since that "police department was a reliable source and because later information provided further corroboration for the tip"). Although the First Circuit does not appear to have used the traditional tip framework to analyze the reliability of information passed between law enforcement officers, the Court discerns no precedent indicating that courts cannot do so.

An officer conducting such a stop "must be able to point to 'specific and articulable facts' that suggest criminality so that he is not basing his actions on a mere hunch." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21); see also United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The officer 'may not, however, rest only upon his intuition; the officer must provide specific and objective facts justifying the stop.") (quoting United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Ultimately, a court's determination of reasonable suspicion 'must be based on common-sensical judgments and inferences about human behavior,'" United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)), and a court must examine foregoing, and thus the reasonableness of a stop, "based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop."

However, the district court is entitled to rely on a PSR for this purpose. See United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that reasonable estimates of drug amounts based on the PSR are permissible); see also United States v. Troka, 987 F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that "a court may discharge its duty to make factual findings by adopting the findings contained in a presentence report"). Moreover, as the court of appeals discussed, there was plenty of evidence in the record to support the determination.