In 1989, we held that the Hobbs Act is constitutional as applied to crimes which have only a de minimis impact on interstate commerce. See United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 390 (3d Cir. 1989). Appellants argue that the holding in Traitz is no longer good law in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), with the import of those cases purportedly being that the Hobbs Act can only be constitutionally applied to crimes which have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Relying on this aspect of the Giordano, Chavez, and Donovan decisions, every circuit to consider the question has held that § 2518(10)(a)(ii) does not require suppression if the facial insufficiency of the wiretap order is no more than a technical defect. See United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 379 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821, 110 S.Ct. 78, 107 L.Ed.2d 44 (1989); United States v. Swann, 526 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975) (denying suppression for a "minor facial insufficiency"); United States v. Joseph, 519 F.2d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909, 96 S.Ct. 1103, 47 L.Ed.2d 312 (1976) ("this particular defect did not make an order facially insufficient"); United States v. Vigi, 515 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 215, 46 L.Ed.2d 140 (1975) (denying suppression for "minor facial insufficiency"); United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d 513, 517-19 (3d Cir. 1975) (same). See also a pre- Giordano decision, United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056, 95 S.Ct. 638, 42 L.Ed.2d 653 (1974) (denying suppression because "omission of a minimization directive was a `technical defect'").

Moreover, the Government's proposed evidence is relevant to the continuity element of the pattern of racketeering activity and the predicate racketeering acts of extortion and loansharking. See United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 267 (3d Cir.2011); United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 389 (3d Cir.1989). Specifically, the evidence that the Philadelphia LCN Family has existed over time and has been engaging in similar criminal activities, for the same purpose, is relevant to the threat of continuity posed by the enterprise.

Thus, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that the government proved the "obtaining of property" element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sekhar, 133 S. Ct. at 2725; United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 390 (3d Cir. 1989).

After a lengthy trial, all defendants were convicted and Judge Katz sentenced them to lengthy prison terms. In U.S. v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368 (3d Cir.1989), the Court affirmed the convictions, stating: “The meetings with the contractors were shown to be confrontational and intimidating in that the principals were often threatened and abused by union officials—typically the union business agents who were ex-amateur or ex-professional boxers.”

With respect to determining the validity of a wiretap order, the court first must determine whether the wiretap order is facially defective and if so, second, must determine whether the omissions which made the order facially defective are technical defects not requiring suppression. United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1989). Discussion

Based on the language of the statute, we can conclude that the judge's act of signing the Order is sufficient evidence that the judge made the findings required under § 2518(3) of the statute. United States v. Traitz , 871 F.2d 368, 376–77 (3d Cir. 1989).

In a RICO or other type of fraud case, evidence of unindicted acts similar to or in furtherance of those charged will often be admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove the defendant's motive, intent or absence of mistake. See United States v. Scop, 940 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1991) (In securities fraud action, evidence of unindicted acts of securities fraud may be properly be used to prove a defendant's "intent, opportunity, or plan to engage in the [securities fraud] or . . . relationship with another defendant."); United States v. Johnson, 893 F.2d 451, 453 (1st Cir. 1990) (unindicted acts of tax fraud admissible in tax fraud prosecution to show intent, absence of mistake); United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 389 (3d Cir.) (unindicted acts of violence admissible in RICO extortion case to show "shared tradition of violence," "symbiotic relationship" between defendants and "the background of the charges, the parties' familiarity with one another and their concert of action"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821, 110 S.Ct. 78, 107 L.Ed.2d 44 (1989); United States v. Rivera-Medina, 845 F.2d 12, 15-16 (1st Cir.) (evidence of extortion scheme identical to one charged in indictment, with close temporal proximity and same co-conspirators, was admissible to "prove absence of mistake, knowledge and intent"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 862, 109 S.Ct. 160, 102 L.Ed.2d 131 (1988); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 1978) (evidence of unindicted acts of racketeering admissible in RICO case to prove intent or motive), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836, 99 S.Ct. 119, 58 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). "Courts have long held that evidence of financial difficulties, [such as a personal bankruptcy filing or financial reports,] is

But because you relied on that legal advice in good faith, you did not willfully violate the law. United States v. Traitz , 871 F.2d 368, 382 (3d Cir. 1989). Advice of counsel is thus a species of good-faith defense.

The same problems infect reliance on the reference to an unnamed Deputy Assistant Attorney General. As noted, five officials in the Criminal Division hold that title. Indeed, other documents show that two different Deputy Assistant Attorneys General—Swartz and Blanco—authorized the Hudson and Johnson wiretap applications. A third Deputy, John C. Keeney, authorized the application for a wiretap on Savoy's phone. That there is more than one Deputy Assistant Attorney General distinguishes the instant case from United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 379 (3d Cir.1989), where the failure to name the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, who had pre-approved the application, did not render the order facially insufficient; because at any given time, there is only one Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, see 28 C.F.R. § 0.55 (referring to “the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division”), identifying that person by title is the functional equivalent of identifying the individual's name. Not so here.Finally, the government contends that “[a]t worst, the authorizing orders' typographical errors rendered them ‘imperfect’ ... but not facially insufficient.”