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denying the defendant's motion to change his restitution payment schedule based on a lack of changed circumstances
Summary of this case from U.S. v. BlankenshipOpinion
Case No. 2:00-CR-050.
January 25, 2008
OPINION ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jay Taniguchi's Motion to Adjust the Payment Schedule of his restitution obligation. A jury convicted Taniguchi on several counts of armed robbery. The Court sentenced him to forty-two years of imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. The Court also ordered Taniguchi to pay $166,907.75 in restitution. Taniguchi urges the Court to either waive this debt or to adjust his payment schedule. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES this motion.
Taniguchi first asks the Court to waive his restitution obligation on account of his indigence. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act ("MVRA") requires Defendants convicted of crimes of violence to pay restitution to their victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(A)(c)(1)(A)(i); see United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 2005). This includes Taniguchi's crime of robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 16. Because restitution ordered pursuant to § 3663(a) is mandatory, Taniguchi must pay it irrespective of his economic circumstances. See United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1) and 3664(f)(1)(a)); McDaniel, 398 F.3d at 554. Accordingly, the Court will not waive Taniguchi's debt.
In the alternative, Taniguchi asks the Court to adjust his payment schedule. The Court has the discretion to adjust Taniguchi's payment schedule because of a material change in his economic circumstances "as the interests of justice require." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3572(d)(3); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (directing courts, after determining the amount of restitution, to take into account a defendant's financial condition in preparing the defendant's schedule of payments); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) (requiring defendant to notify court of changes in financial condition so that the restitution payment schedule may be adjusted or a demand for immediate payment in full can be made); McDaniel, 398 F.3d at 554. But the Court is mindful that repaying one's debt to society was never meant to be easy. As such, indigence at the time of sentencing or as a result of incarceration is not grounds for modification of a restitution order. United States v. Wolfe, 10 Fed. App'x. 249, 250 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Court ordered Taniguchi to make restitution payments through his participation in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP"). The Bureau of Prisons enacted the IFRP to assist inmates in meeting their legitimate financial obligations. 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. Under this program, Taniguchi must contribute 50% of his monthly income from his job with the Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) towards restitution. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b)(2).
Taniguchi petitions the Court to adjust his payment schedule because of a purported change in his financial circumstances. Taniguchi's parents recently retired. He argues that without their financial support, he does not have enough money to call them. As a result, he concludes that the Court should lower his monthly payments. This argument is without merit because Taniguchi earns enough money to maintain contact with his family without his parents' support. Pursuant to the IFRP, $75.00 of Taniguchi's monthly income is excluded from his payment schedule "to allow the inmate the opportunity to better maintain telephone communication [with family and friends] under the Inmate Telephone System." 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b). After that, only 50% of his income goes to his restitution obligation. Taniguchi is free to apply the balance to telephone calls.
Second, Taniguchi bears the burden of showing a change in his financial status. United States v. Hill, 205 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1999) (denying a petition for adjustment "because [Defendant] did not meet the evidentiary burden of showing that his financial needs required a deferment of restitution"); Hinton v. United States, No. 01-1508, 2003 WL 21854935, *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2003) (petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that his circumstances have sufficiently changed to warrant modification of the restitution order); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3644(e). Other than mere assertions, Taniguchi has proffered no evidence that his or his parents' financial situation has changed. In Hinton v. United States, the court dismissed an almost identical petition for the inmate's failure to proffer evidence that his ex-wife's changing financial circumstances justified modification of his payment schedule. 2003 WL 21854935 at *5.
Ultimately, Taniguchi's parents' financial situation is immaterial to his petition. He earns sufficient income to make phone calls, and his desire to make more is not grounds to excuse or delay his obligation to repay the victims of his crimes. Nor is Taniguchi's indigence, presumably as a result of his incarceration, grounds for modification of a restitution order. Wolfe, 10 Fed. App'x. at 250. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Taniguchi's Motion to Adjust the Payment Schedule.