ANALYSIS A district court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, United States v. Henthorn , 864 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2017), and we review the district court's ruling for abuse of discretion, United States v. Tan , 254 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001). "Under this standard, we will not disturb a trial court's decision unless we ‘ha[ve] a definite and firm conviction that the [trial] court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.’ "

(quoting United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir. 1993)). As is described in greater detail below, the Court reaches these conclusions as a matter of analyzing the evidence as intrinsic evidence, but the Court would reach essentially the same conclusions if the matter is treated as one of rule 404(b) extrinsic evidence, because, while the evidence serves permissible rule 404(b) purposes, it nevertheless is too prejudicial under rule 403 to tell the jury that Beckner has a prior securities fraud conviction. See United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001)(“[I]f the other act evidence is relevant and tends to prove a material fact other than the defendant's criminal disposition, it is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) and may be excluded only under Rule 403.”)

Id. (citing United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001)). [Courts] consider a four-part test when determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b): "(1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the trial court must make a Rule 403 determination of whether the probative value of the similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 105, the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that evidence of similar acts is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted."

United States v. Myers , 550 F.2d at 1045. In United States v. Tan , 254 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2001), the Honorable LeRoy C. Hansen, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, excluded, in a second-degree murder case, evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated. See 254 F.3d at 1206–07.

See United States v. Gutierrez, 696 F.2d 753, 755 (10th Cir.1982).In United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir.2001), the Honorable LeRoy C. Hansen, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, excluded, in a second-degree murder case, evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated. See 254 F.3d at 1206–07.

See United States v. Gutierrez, 696 F.2d 753, 755 (10th Cir. 1982). In United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2001), the Honorable LeRoy C. Hansen, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, excluded, in a second-degree murder case, evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated. See 254 F.3d at 1206-07.

Id. R. 403. I have "considerable discretion in performing the Rule 403 balancing test." U.S. v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, my Rule 401 and 403 determinations receive deference and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

In United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2001), the Honorable LeRoy C. Hansen, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, excluded, in a second-degree murder case, evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated. See 254 F.3d at 1206-07.

In United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2001), the Honorable LeRoy C. Hansen, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, excluded, in a second-degree murder case, evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated. See 254 F.3d at 1206-07.

In United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2001), the Honorable LeRoy C. Hansen, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, excluded, in a second-degree murder case, evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated. See 254 F.3d at 1206-07.