"An officer may seize evidence that is in plain view despite the failure to obtain a search warrant if two elements are satisfied: (1) lawful access to the object seized, and, (2) the incriminating nature of the object seized is immediately apparent." United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685, 690 n.11 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308); and see United States v. Folk, 754 F.3d 905, 911 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Susini, 261 Fed. Appx. 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[I]t is well-settled that 'objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence.'") (quoting Harris v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 992, 993 (1968)); United States v. Simpson, 259 Fed. Appx. 164, 165-68 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding plain view seizure of a backpack containing marijuana when officers were inside the residence conducting consent search to look specifically for weapons and injured persons). "The incriminating nature of an item is 'immediately apparent' if the officers have 'probable cause' to believe that the item is either evidence of a crime or contraband."

"An officer may seize evidence that is in plain view despite the failure to obtain a search warrant if two elements are satisfied: (1) lawful access to the object seized, and, (2) the incriminating nature of the object seized is immediately apparent." United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685, 690 n.11 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2308); and see United States v. Folk, 754 F.3d 905, 911 (11th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Susini, 261 Fed. Appx. 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[I]t is well-settled that 'objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence.'") (quoting Harris v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 992, 993 (1968)); United States v. Simpson, 259 Fed. Appx. 164, 165-68 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding plain view seizure of a backpack containing marijuana when officers were inside the residence conducting consent search to look specifically for weapons and injured persons). "The incriminating nature of an item is 'immediately apparent' if the officers have 'probable cause' to believe that the item is either evidence of a crime or contraband."

Once Buendia-Santos granted permission to search the vehicle for paperwork with his address, that permission extends to "any compartment or container therein that might reasonably contain the objects of the search." United States v. Martinez, 949 F.2d 1117, 1120 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Susini, 261 F. App'x 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008)); Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251 ("We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs."). In addition, "it is well-settled that 'objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence.'"

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v. Susini, 2008 WL 80702, *3 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). However, searches done pursuant to consent have been held to be reasonable.

. See United States v. Susini, 261 Fed.Appx. 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is well-settled that ‘objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and

See United States v. Susini, 261 Fed.Appx. 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is well-settled that ‘

Consensual searches are limited to the terms of their authorization. United States v. Susini, 261 F. App'x 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 1984)). "When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless."

A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required." United States v. Susini, 261 F. App'x 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing officers finding blank credit cards in plain sight in the defendant's residence) (citations, quotations and alterations omitted).

"For an item's incriminating character to be 'immediately apparent,' the police merely need probable cause to believe that the item is contraband" or evidence of a crime. United States v. Susini, 261 F. App'x 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008); see UnitedStates v. Lisbon, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2011). Probable cause "merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief . . . that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).

As to a validly authorized search conducted pursuant to consent, the only constraint is "that the scope of the search be limited to the terms of its authorization"; if consent is general, then it includes permission to search any area that might reasonably contain objects of the search. United States v. Susini, 261 F. App'x 270, 273 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Here, rather than assert that Palmer entered an area for which consent was not given, Defendant argues that the scope of Palmer's questioning should have been narrower.