Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:71-CV-5281.
June 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Mumford Independent School District and Pete J. Bienski, Jr.'s Motion for Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Document No. 511) has been presented for consideration. In their motion, Defendants Mumford Independent School District and Pete J. Bienski, Jr. assert that the subject matter underlying the instant controversy is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of a different desegregation order in the Western District of Texas; and as such, the Court must dismiss the current civil action. Plaintiff United States' response argues that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter chiefly for two reasons: (1) the Court is not asked to rule on Hearne Independent School District's individual desegregation order, and (2) the Court's previous orders do not insulate districts in Texas that might have been directly ordered to desegregate in another case from the statewide relief in the instant case. Plaintiff-Intervenor Hearne responds that its previous desegregation order does not provide exclusive jurisdiction over all desegregation efforts pertaining to Hearne as a party. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss shall be DENIED.
In its' original Motion to Dismiss, Mumford also argued that the Court is the improper venue to hear the instant case because Hearne Independent School District is a defendant in a separate school desegregation lawsuit pending in the United States District Court in the Western District of Texas. However, Mumford has since withdrawn its claim of improper venue. Defs. Mumford and Bienski's Br. In Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss at 1, fn 1. Consequently, the Court will only consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this memorandum opinion and order.
Hereinafter, Mumford Independent School District will be referred to as "Mumford."
Hereinafter, Pete J. Bienski Jr. will be referred to as "Bienski."
Hereinafter, Hearne Independent School District will be referred to as "Hearne."
I. 5281 BACKGROUND
Since 1971, the Texas public education system has been governed according to the Court's 5281 Order designed to ensure that "no child will be effectively denied equal opportunity to educational opportunities on account of race, color or national origin." Amendments to Modified Order of July 13, 1971 at 1 (Aug. 9, 1973). The Court held "that the record in this case demonstrates that policies of TEA [Texas Education Agency] in administering the public school system in Texas have frequently — whether inadvertently or by design — encouraged or resulted in the continuation of vestiges of racially segregated public education within the State." United States v. State of Texas, 321 F.Supp. at 1057, aff'd and modified, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971). 5281 provides, inter alia, that the state of Texas, the Texas Education Agency, its officers, agents and employees
Hereinafter, the 1971 Court Order and the Amendments to the Modified Order will be referred to as simply "5281." The Court's Memorandum Opinion is published at United States v. Texas, 321 F.Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), but the text of 5281 is published at 447 F.2d. 441 (5th Cir. 1971).
Hereinafter, Texas Education Agency will be referred to as "TEA."
shall not permit, make arrangements for, approve, acquiesce in, or give support of any kind to student transfers, between school districts, when the cumulative effect, in either the sending or receiving school or school district, will be to reduce or impede desegregation, or to reinforce, renew or to encourage the continuation of acts and practices resulting in discriminatory treatment of students on the grounds of race, color, or national origin.
Ct. Order at 1, ¶ A(1). The only effective way to remedy this violation was to make the TEA and its officials, agents and employees responsible for revamping its programs and practices so that they no longer impeded the dismantling of the dual school system. Id. at 1058.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2004, the United States filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief Against Mumford and Bienski, maintaining that Mumford was interfering with the operation of 5281. See United States' Mot. for Inj. Against Mumford (April 9, 2004). Mumford is an agency of the State of Texas and is responsible under Texas law for general supervision and administration of the public schools within its geographic area. Mumford's Ans. to Compl. in Interv., at 3 ¶ 13 (Sept. 23, 2003). The Superintendent of Schools for Mumford is responsible for the general management of the public schools in that district, under the direction and supervision of the district's board of trustees and the State of Texas, its agents and officers. Mumford has received and continues to receive substantial state aid.
The complaint must state a cause of action created by federal law or it must assert a state law cause of action requiring the "resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). See also, Aquafaith Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 955, 113 S.Ct. 413, 121 L.Ed.2d 337 (1992). In this case, it is undisputed that the United States, as Plaintiff, filed a complaint which alleged a cause of action created by federal law. The only issue that remains for the Court is whether because Hearne, as Plaintiff-Intervenor, is subject to a separate desegregation order in another district court, it removes subject matter jurisdiction from the Court in the instant case.
As claimed within its Motion for Injunctive Relief, the United States alleges that (1) Mumford was interfering with 5281 and further interference ought to be enjoined under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); (2) Mumford has operated "in active concert or participation" with TEA in violating 5281, and 5281 should be enforced against Mumford; and (3) Mumford's continued acceptance of transfer students from Hearne has thwarted 5281 and therefore ought to be enjoined pursuant to the Court's inherent authority. See Id.
Hearne asserts that the Court has jurisdiction over the intervention of Hearne by virtue of its continuing jurisdiction over the matter entitled and numbered United States v. State of Texas, Civil Action No. 6:71-CV-528 (E.D. Tex 1970) and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which creates original jurisdiction for the Court over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
In challenging whether the Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction over the instant controversy, Mumford argues that because Hearne — as Plaintiff-Intervenor — is a party to another separate desegregation order in the Western District of Texas, the Court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to rule over the instant controversy, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Mumford points to a single sentence from the Court's original November 24, 1970, opinion to argue that the Court cannot hear the instant case because Hearne, as a district operation under its own desegregation order, is precluded from the controlling statewide remedial order.
"The Court should dismiss all claims against Mumford ISD and Bienski in this matter because all claims are based on the erroneous presumption that Order 5281 governs this case. This Court's opinion expressly states that Order 5281 applies to school districts `not already under court order to desegregate.' Hearne was already under a court order to segregate [sic] at the time Order 5281 was issued, and thus by the Court's own opinion, it does not govern the case. Indeed, this Court's carve out provision is both logical and necessary since court-ordered desegregation plans with significant procedural and factual histories existed when the Court issued Order 5281." Defs. Mumford and Pete Bienski's Br. in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss at 5.
The Court can conceive of no other effective way to give the plaintiffs the relief to which they are entitled under the evidence in this case than to enter a uniform state-wide plan for school desegregation, made applicable to each local county and city system not already under court order to desegregate and to require these defendants to implement it.United States v. Texas, 321 F.Supp. 1043, 1057 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd and modified, 447 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). Additionally, Mumford quotes a passage pertaining to jurisdiction from the Fifth Circuit 1970 opinion, "[n]othing herein shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of any other district court with respect to any presently pending or future school desegregation suits." United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir. 1971). These two passages, Mumford argues, make clear that 5281 was not designed to usurp the jurisdiction of other districts with pending school desegregation suits.
III. MOTION TO DISMISS AND FRCP 12(B)(1) STANDARD
A motion to dismiss an action under Federal Rule 12(b)(1) raises the fundamental question of whether the federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action before it. Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court's authority to hear types of cases; federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law, cases between citizens of different states and other more limited categories of cases. 5 WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1350 (2005). District courts have original jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law. U.S. CONST. ARTICLE III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331. If a case arises under federal law — as in the instant case — any federal district court will have subject matter jurisdiction over it. Id.
A motion under 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it appears certain the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Association of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Mississippi, 143 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 160 (5th Cir. 1996).
IV. BACKGROUND OF THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DESEGREGATION CASE
In 1970, the Honorable Jack Roberts, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, entered a court order which detailed a desegregation plan aimed at the desegregation of faculty, staff, facilities, transportation, curriculum, conveyances of real property by a school district, school activities and students in Hearne. Desegregation Order for Hearne Independent School District, A-70-CA-80 (Sept. 17, 1970). The order contained many essential desegregation provisions, including, inter alia,
1. Enjoining the District from discriminating on the basis of race or national origin against students attending Hearne Independent School District;
2. Creating attendance zones or districts for all elementary and junior high schools;
3. Providing for applications to the court for any changes in boundaries within the school district;
4. Prohibiting transfers from attendance zone to another attendance zone except under a written non-discriminatory policy;
5. Desegregating faculty and staff and provided for ratios of faculty members with ratios of students in the school district as a whole and further provided for non-discrimination in hiring, firing, and promoting;
6. Providing for non-discrimination in all activities, including curricular, extracurricular, transportation and use of facilities of the school district;
7. Creating a Bi-Racial desegregation committee;
8. Requiring reports to the court and to the Department of Justice by the school district and desegregation committee and spelled out required contents of such reports.Id. From 1971 until 1977, Hearne submitted annual status reports in compliance with this order. On February 10, 1989, after a long absence of reporting, the court entered an order requiring the parties to advise it of the status of the case, including whether continued court supervision was necessary. Order Requesting Status Report to the Court, A-70-CA-80 (W.D. Tex, Feb. 10, 1989). "Given that the Court has not received reports in the past eleven years, and that the Department of Justice has not commented on that omission until the fall of 1988, the Court finds it hard to characterize the Hearne Independent School District as being under continued judicial supervision." Id. at 2.
At this time, the case had been transferred to the Honorable James R. Nowlin, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas.
In response to the court's order, the parties filed a joint status report. Joint Status Report, A-70-CA 80 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 1989). After a site visit and analysis of data provided by Hearne, the United States reported that it was "satisfied that in the areas of student assignments, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities, the School District has substantially complied in all aspects." Id. at 2. Additionally, the United States looked at Hearne's inter-district transfer data and met with representatives of TEA to review their monitoring procedures and concluded that there was "no evidence of improper inter-district student transfers." Id. at 6. While the United States seemed satisfied with Hearne's compliance regarding inter-district transfers, transportation and student assignments, it requested additional time to review Hearne's compliance regarding faculty and staff recruitment, hiring, and assignment before a final determination could be made. Id. at 2, 6-7. Since that joint status report in 1989, there has been no further activity in the case.
Cf. Motion for Approval or Proposed Order of Dismissal Granted, A-70-CA-80-JN (W.D. Tex. June 30, 2000) (terminating jurisdiction and dismissing the case against Temple Independent School District).
V. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
Mumford alleges that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case because Hearne is a party to the separate desegregation order in the Western District of Texas. This position misstates the scope of jurisdiction of the two cases: none of the orders in either case provides for exclusive jurisdiction regarding desegregation disputes, and the conduct alleged in the current case is not the same conduct addressed in the Western District case. The Court has proper subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case and to order all appropriate relief.5281 was entered as a statewide Order used to encompass all Texas schools. As the plain meaning of the Court's 1970 Order makes clear, the Court ordered a statewide remedy to what it found was a statewide violation: TEA's actions in impeding desegregation of local school districts throughout Texas, The fact that some school districts in Texas might have also been directly ordered to desegregate in another case did not insulate those districts from the statewide relief granted in 5281. Indeed, the Court was well aware that individual lawsuits might be insufficient given TEA's misconduct, especially when inter-district transfers were involved.
In many manners involving segregated public schools, it is unnecessary to seek relief against a state agency, since local authorities ordinarily possess the requisite authority to climinate segregation which is confined within the boundaries of individual school districts . . . [B]ecause of the contribution to the continuation of vestiges of segregation made by TEA as exemplified by its support or of its acquiescence in both territorial and scholastic transfers, the relief in this case must also involve the general administration of public education by [TEA] and its use of its power to compel compliance with Federal law at all levels of the public educational system.United States v. Texas, 321 F.Supp 1043, 1058 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd and modified, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). The language that Mumford relies upon, that 5281 relief is available to every local system "not already under court order to desegregate," when read in its proper context, does not address jurisdiction. Id. at 1057. The Court's 1970 Modified Order 5281 Opinion was by no means an attempt to preclude subject matter jurisdiction in this lawsuit by carving out school districts under other pending desegregation orders. Rather, the Court contemplated systematic statewide relief applicable to all districts in the state.
Additionally, the Hearne court order does not preclude the Court's jurisdiction in this litigation; the Western District of Texas district court "retains all jurisdiction for all purposes, and especially for the purpose of entering any and all further orders which may become necessary for the purpose of enforcing or modifying this order." Desegregation Order for Hearne Independent School District, A-70-CA-80, at 8 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 1970). Mumford argues that "Hearne's desegregation order was calculated to address the very same issue this Court's Order was meant to address — whether inter-district transfers would be used as a segregative device." Defs. Mumford and Bienski Mot. to Dismiss, p. 2. Mumford misses a critical distinction. A reading of Judge Roberts' Hearne court order clearly shows that the order addresses situations where Hearne might be a defendant; in other words, if Hearne permits or allows transfers of students that impede desegregation. Hearne is not a defendant in the instant litigation. The current litigation is a complaint brought by the United States, and Hearne as Plaintiff-Intervenor, against Mumford and TEA for allegedly allowing students to transfer, in contravention to Hearne's wishes.
VI. THE ADSTENTION DOCTRINE
Mumford points to a Fifth Circuit decision, Ross v. Houston Independent School District, 559 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1977), to argue that the Fifth Circuit has previously enforced a jurisdictional limit on 5281. Mumford misrepresents the holding in its application to the instant case: the analysis of the Ross court favors a finding of proper subject matter jurisdiction in the instant litigation.
In Ross v. Houston Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit consolidated various appeals related to Houston Independent School District's existing desegregation plan and efforts by a group of citizens living within Houston to create an independent school district designated the Westheimer Independent School District. Ross involved the Westheimer neighborhood's attempt to secede from the Houston school district and create its own splinter district. Id. at 939. To prevent this from occurring, and thereby impeding desegregation of schools city-wide, Houston Independent School District and the United States moved to enjoin the creation of this splinter district, filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Id. In light of these numerous legal actions, the United States District for the Southern District of Texas abstained from any further proceedings until the state proceedings were first resolved. Id. at 941. Houston Independent School District then moved to intervene in Civil Action 5281 to have the same splinter issue heard. Id. Ross is easily distinguishable from the instant case, as it involved abstention. "The abstention doctrines do not embody jurisdictional principles nor are they to be considered as rules of law. Rather, their application is committed to the exercise of a sound discretion based on the facts of each case." Id. at 942 (citing Hill v. City of El Puso, 437 F.2d 352) (5th Cir. 1971)). The doctrine of abstention is designed to ensure comity between sister courts and the conservation of judicial resources. Id. However, Ross is also instructive as to how abstention has been applied in the school desegregation context. The Fifth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion in abstaining from adjudicating the splinter issue because resolving the federal litigants' claims would not require the district court to decide any of the claims pending in the state proceedings. Id. With respect to Houston Independent School District's attempt to present its same claims in 5281, the Fifth Circuit found it both "unseemly" and "wasteful" to have two courts hear the identical dispute, particularly when "the matter had been extensively developed" in one of the courts." Id. at 945.
The abstention doctrine involves the question whether the federal courts have an obligation to adjudicate claims that are properly supported under a statutory grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Chief Justice John Marshall stated that the federal courts have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
Application of the Ross factors shows that neither unseemliness nor waste is at stake in the instant case. This case does not involve a party filing identical actions in two separate federal district courts in the hopes of securing a favorable ruling in either one of them. Quite the contrary, the parties seek relief from one court for a violation of that court's order. Additionally, as in Ross, the Court is not required to decided any part of the issues in the Hearne school desegregation case pending in the Western District. See Id. at 943 ("It is not the intention of this court to reach or to decide any part of these state law issues, and there will be no reason for the district court to do so on remand."). Rather, the United States and Hearne moved for the Court to decide whether the TEA violated, and Mumford interfered with, this Court's state-wide order prohibiting funding of segregative inter-district transfers. Moreover, this matter has been extensively developed in the Court, and the other notion has been inactive for nearly 20 years. The parties have completed discovery, briefed dispositive motions, and completed a trial of the claims. To decline to rule on the dispute now would result in the very waste of judicial resources that the abstention doctrine is intended to prevent.
VII. PRINCIPLES OF COMITY
Mumford suggests that principles of comity divest the Court of jurisdiction to assess the effects of transfers on Hearne and order appropriate relief. Mumford submits that the Court cannot rule on whether transfers are reducing or impeding desegregation because Hearne's individual desegregation order also contains language prohibiting transfers that reduce or impede desegregation. But no party asks the Court to interpret or apply Hearne's individual desegregation order in any way. Nor would a ruling in favor of Hearne or the United States subject Hearne to conflicting obligations: both orders prohibit transfers that reduce or impede desegregation. Making a factual finding regarding the effect of transfers on desegregation in Hearne would not invade the province of any court and is well within the Court's purview in deciding the case before it. Additionally, Hearne is not the defendant in this action; Hearne is simply trying to enforce 5281 against Mumford, a school district to which 5281 clearly applies.
Mumford further asserts that the Court lacks the necessary jurisdiction to make a factual finding relative to the existence of vestiges of discrimination in Hearne because it was another court that found Hearne to have discriminated in the first place. Defs. Mumford and Bienski's Br. in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss, p. 6-7. Again, none of the parties demand the Court to interpret or apply Hearne's individual desegregation order in the instant case. Hearne's individual court order is simply not an issue at play. Moreover, no rule of comity or jurisdiction divests the Court of the power to consider facts stemming from an event de jure segregation in Hearne — that another court, in a separate matter, found to have occurred. A single factual event, and the factual vestiges of that event, can be relevant to cases in different courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant Mumford and Bienksi's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction shall be, and is hereby, DENIED. In denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not pass judgment on substantive issues pertaining to Plaintiffs' allegations. This memorandum opinion addresses only the fact that the Court has the subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case and order all appropriate relief thereto; all other issues in this case remain unresolved and will be addressed in future memorandum opinions and orders issued by the Court.