Opinion
Case No: 2:04-CR-153 DB.
August 19, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and is presently before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. At the end of the hearing, Defendant requested additional time to research and brief the issues, and the court set a briefing schedule for both parties. However, Defendant failed to file a brief or otherwise inform the court regarding the issues raised during the hearing. Now, having conducted a hearing on the motion, and after reviewing the facts of this case and the relevant law, the court enters this Report and Recommendation to deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
Hearing on Motion to Suppress Evidence, July 7, 2004.
Facts
The facts recited are as found by the magistrate judge from the testimony at the hearing. The testimony was not disputed in any material respect.
Sometime before February 3rd, 2004, Officer Tyler Boelter contacted Ryan Ludlow about an investigation regarding purchases of iodine. They made an appointment for February 3rd so that Mr. Ludlow and Ms. Springmeyer could come to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) office to give statements. Mr. Ludlow had been told previously that he was the target of an investigation, that it was possible that charges would be filed, and that if he would come down and speak with the officer he would not then be arrested.
The defendant, Michelle Springmeyer, was driven by her mother-in-law to that appointment with Ryan Ludlow, and arrived at the DEA office sometime before 11:00 a.m. The officers interviewed Mr. Ludlow first from about 11:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Ms. Springmeyer was not present during that interview. Ms. Springmeyer's interview with Officer Boelter and Officer John Coyle began around 11:30 a.m. Officer Boelter conducted the interview and provided Ms. Springmeyer with Miranda warnings before he asked her any questions. Officer Boelter asked, "Having everything in mind are you willing to talk to me now?" Ms. Springmeyer answered, yes, or "yeah." She did not, after hearing the Miranda warnings, ask any questions about them. She did not request an attorney or request to leave during the interview. There is no indication of restraint on her ability to leave. No force was exercised against her. Ms. Springmeyer answered questions during the interview regarding the purchase of iodine and her knowledge of the intended use of that iodine. She testified that she felt it was in her best interest to come down and submit to the interview. She was not taken into custody, and left freely with arranged transportation after the interview was completed.
As to her subjective characteristics, Ms. Springmeyer testified that she was involved in special education programs from the 4th to the 12th grade, requiring special assistance in reading, english, comprehension, and math, but that she is a high school graduate. She demonstrated, in her direct and cross-examination, her comprehension of the questions asked and answered, along with an understanding of the specific rights that were explained to her during the interview.
Analysis
Defendant Springmeyer argues that, under the circumstances of this case, she was subjected to a custodial interview. She also argues that during the custodial interview she was not properly advised of her Miranda rights, and thus did not know what her rights were, and did not waive her rights to have counsel present during the interview.
Statement of Particularity in Connection with Motion to Suppress Evidence, docket no. 86-1, filed June 10, 2004, at 1.
Id. at 2.
It is well established that under Miranda v. Arizona, "law enforcement officers must administer prophylactic warnings regarding the privilege [against self-incrimination] to any person subjected to `custodial interrogation.'" "In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but `the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" The court's determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances, not the subjective views of the defendant or the police. "Mere presence at a police station during interrogation is not alone sufficient to establish that a suspect was in custody." Furthermore, "giving a Miranda warning does not, in and of itself, convert an otherwise non-custodial interview into a custodial interrogation."
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
United States v. Erekson, 70 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curium) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
See id. at 323.
United States v. Oldman, 156 F. Supp.2d 1252, 1260 (D.Utah 2001) (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (suspect came voluntarily to police station and was immediately informed that he was not under arrest).
United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 1998).
In this case, it is undisputed that Ms. Springmeyer came voluntarily to the DEA office to answer the officer's questions regarding iodine purchases. There is no indication that Ms. Springmeyer was ever restrained in her ability to leave and she never asked to leave. Although she may have had a subjective feeling that what she was doing was the best thing for her, there is not any evidence that she felt constrained, other than by her own good judgment, to be there. After completing the interview, Ms. Springmeyer freely left the DEA office with her own previously arranged transportation. Ms. Springmeyer was not placed under arrest or restrained, threatened, or pressured in any way by the officers. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the questioning occurred in a non-custodial situation and therefore did not require Miranda warnings. Consequently, because Defendant was not in custody, further analysis of Defendant's Miranda issues are not necessary.
See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976) (holding that Miranda would not be extended to cover non-custodial circumstances after a police investigation had focused on the defendant as a suspect).
RECOMMENDATION
Under the totality of the circumstances, Ms. Springmeyer was not in police custody when she made the statements she seeks to suppress. The officers' conduct and questioning during the interview at the DEA office did not rise to the level of restraint on Defendant's freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Accordingly, the Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied.Copies of the foregoing Report and Recommendation are being mailed to the parties, who are hereby notified that they have the right to object to the Report and Recommendation. The parties are further notified that they must file any objections to the Report and Recommendation with the clerk of the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), within ten (10) days after receiving it. Failure to file objections may constitute a waiver of those objections on subsequent appellate review.