U.S. v. Slater

Full title: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Dustin SLATER…

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

Date published: Apr 20, 2010

373 F. App'x 526 (5th Cir. 2010)

Opinion

No. 09-50075 Conference Calendar.

April 20, 2010.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Evers Jason Leach, Law Offices of E. Jason Leach, Odessa, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, USDC No. 7:08-CR-131-1.

Before SMITH, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:[fn*] [fn*] Pursuant to 5TH CIR R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Dustin Slater entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of knowingly failing to comply with the registration requirements of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). He was sentenced to a 24-month term of imprisonment and to a 5-year term of supervised release.

Slater contends that his conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. He argues that, as applied to him, SORNA increases his possible punishment beyond that imposed by his initial conviction and that SORNA is criminal and punitive in nature. He seems to challenge the sanctioning provision of SORNA ( 18 U.S.C. § 2250) by suggesting that it punishes him retroactively. He further suggests that SORNA's registration provision ( 42 U.S.C. § 16913) increases the punishment for his 2007 sex crime. In support of his arguments, Slater attempts to differentiate the requirements of SORNA from the provisions of an Alaska sex offender statute which survived an ex post facto challenge in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). He also argues that as a sex offender he is a member of an unpopular group.

This court considered identical contentions in an as-applied challenge to SORNA. See United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2009). Like the defendant in Young, Slater traveled in interstate commerce and failed to comply with the registration requirements after SORNA became applicable to him. See id. at 201. Thus, the sanctioning provision of SORNA, as applied to Slater, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. All of Slater's remaining arguments were explicitly rejected in Young and therefore are foreclosed. Id. at 204-06. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.