In effect, the law treats "persons who know enough to blind themselves to direct proof of critical facts" as having "actual knowledge of those facts." Id.; see United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). A willful blindness instruction is justified if "(1) a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, (2) the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and (3) the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as mandating an inference of knowledge."

A willful-blindness instruction is appropriate only when (a) the defendant alleges he lacked knowledge, (b) the evidence—examined in the light most flattering to the prosecution—shows he deliberately closed his eyes to the true facts, and (c) the instruction, viewed in context, does not suggest that an inference of knowledge is required rather than permitted. See, e.g., United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). We address each part of this test in turn.

Direct evidence of willful blindness is not required; what is needed are sufficient warning signs that call out for investigation or evidence of deliberate avoidance of knowledge. United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Keene, 341 F.3d at 83. The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the government.

We recount the facts in the light most flattering to the government's theory of the case, consistent with record support. See United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2000). The appellant is a Ugandan national, mayor of the capitol city of Kampala, proprietor of a successful currency exchange bureau in Uganda, and a frequent visitor to this country.

"A willful blindness instruction is justified when the defendant claims to lack guilty knowledge, yet the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, suffices to support an inference that he deliberately shut his eyes to the true facts." Khorozian, 333 F.3d at 508 (quoting United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000)). Defendant does not appear to dispute that he placed his lack of guilty knowledge in issue at trial.

Guilty knowledge can be inferred based on the defendant's disregard of warning signs "sufficient to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry notice." United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). This standard aligns with the jury instructions given at Mr. Gordon's trial, and Mr. Gordon does not challenge those instructions, only the sufficiency of the evidence as to willfulness.

We briefly rehearse the background and travel of the case, taking the facts in the light most congenial to the government, consistent with record support. See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2000). In September of 2012, the defendant falsely posed as a commercial goldsmith to order one hundred grams (at least five hundred lethal doses) of ninety-eight percent pure potassium cyanide (cyanide) from a California vendor.

Consequently, Denson's first argument goes nowhere. See, e.g., De Jesús–Viera, 655 F.3d at 59;United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 n. 4 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 66 n. 6 (1st Cir.1995). Targeting the good-faith instruction, Denson tells us next that that charge was less than what he deserved because (despite his request) it did not “clarify” that good faith turned on what he subjectively believed instead of what some reasonable person would have believed.

The Government need not present direct evidence of conscious avoidance to justify a willful blindness instruction. E.g., United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). In any event, the District Court did not err in concluding that the instruction was warranted in this case.

"The test is whether the evidence, construed favorably to the government, permitted rational jurors to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant [is] guilty as charged." United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2000)). As per Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, García moved for an order of judgment of acquittal in the district court orally and in writing.