"Constructive possession of the firearm is established where the suspect `has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself.'" United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir.2002), quoting United States v. Lapsley, 263 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir.2001). Possession may be joint; it need not be exclusive. Sianis, 275 F.3d at 733.

In order to be convicted of this offense, all that is required is for the defendant to have possessed a gun that was at some point previously transported in interstate or international commerce. In United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2002) Sianis made a similar argument concerning a felon in possession charge. Sianis admitted that the firearm had been manufactured in another state but argued that there was insufficient interstate nexus because he had not personally moved the firearm through interstate commerce.

The offense of felon in possession of a firearm requires the government to prove: 1) the defendant was previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year; 2) she knowingly possessed a firearm; and 3) the firearm must have been in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lapsley, 263 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2001). Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment is limited to challenging the first element of the government's case: the existence of a prior conviction.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. See United States v. Spears, 454 F.3d 830, 832 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review); United States v. Brown, 422 F.3d 689, 691-92 (8th Cir. 2005) (elements of felon-in-possession offense); see also United States v. Bradley, 473 F.3d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 2007) (while mere physical proximity is insufficient to establish constructive possession of firearm found in vehicle driven by another, factfinder may infer defendant had control of it based on totality of circumstances, which included defendant's movements indicative of reaching to check on or hide firearm); United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2002) (constructive possession is established where defendant has dominion over premises where firearm is located, or has control, ownership, or dominion over firearm itself; possession need not be exclusive). We reject Devers's other arguments.

We have repeatedly held this is sufficient to satisfy § 922(g). United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2002). C

"Constructive possession of the firearm is established where the suspect `has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself.'" United States v. Smart, 501 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1258, 170 L.Ed.2d 94 (2008), quoting United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2002). "Possession may be joint; it need not be exclusive."

This was sufficient evidence from which the jury could determine that LaBuff had knowledge of and access to the weapon. SeeUnited States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 734 (9th Cir.2002) (finding that Sianis's knowledge of the location of the gun in one of his drawers sufficiently implied that he constructively possessed the gun). Therefore, we affirm LaBuff's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

We can tie these cases to the underlying statutory purpose of felon-in-possession laws by noticing that the felon is no less dangerous when he arms his associates in a criminal endeavor than when he arms himself. Alternatively these could be considered cases of joint possession, which is normally treated as a subset of constructive possession, United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2002), though it would be actual rather than constructive if, for example, two gangsters were acting as the crew of a machine gun operated by a loader and a firer. The government asks us to take a step beyond the decided cases.

This is consistent with the principle that constructive possession may be joint rather than exclusive. See United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2002). II. The government's cross-appeal

Under Nebraska law, "a felon's right to possess a firearm may only be restored through the Nebraska Governor's express authorization." United States v. Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 734-35 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,130; Nebraska v. Illig, 237 Neb. 598, 467 N.W.2d 375, 384 (1991)). The Nebraska Governor never restored Defendant's right to possess a firearm.