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U.S. v. Secretary of State of Kansas

United States District Court, D. Kansas
Sep 3, 2003
Case No. 03-1170-JTM (D. Kan. Sep. 3, 2003)

Opinion

Case No. 03-1170-JTM

September 3, 2003


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


The United States has brought this civil action to compel the Kansas Secretary of State to remove a lien placed on the property of a federal judge by a federal criminal inmate, William Earl Packard. Several motions are before the court.

Packard has filed two motions to dismiss. The first asserts a variety of grounds, including the failure of the complaint to include an affidavit, and argues that the United States cannot sue or be sued because it is bankrupt. (Dkt. No. 3). The second argues that the matter should be dismissed, apparently on the basis of various attached exhibits declaring he no longer considers himself a United States citizen, but a citizen of the Republic of Kansas. (Dkt. No. 6). In addition, Packard has subsequently filed a motion to enter plea. In support of this motion, Packard writes simply:

I, William Earl Packard Junior(r) 2001, pro-se, non-attorney, flesh and blood man with a soul, appearing before this Court by Special Appearance make the Plea of "IN BAR CORAM NON JUDICE."

(Dkt. No. 14, at 1).

Packard's motions are denied. The present matter is a civil action; the request to enter a plea by the defendant has no merit or purpose. His first motion to dismiss is founded on a series of wholly unjustified claims. Nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint be accompanied by an affidavit. The matter is properly before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1345. Packard's assertion that he is not domiciled in the United States is belied by his admission that he is incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institute in Forrest City, Arkansas. The defendant Secretary of State resides in Kansas. Venue here is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

None of the remaining discourse in Packard's first motion would support dismissal, except perhaps for the suggestion that he filed the lien solely as to the judge in his personal capacity. But this is contradicted repeatedly by Packard's own statements throughout the rest of his motion, as for example, his statement that he filed the lien because of the judge's actions "while operating as an [sic] United States Official Officer." (Dkt. No. 3, at 8).

Packard's other motion to dismiss is denied as well. The fact that Packard believes he has Tax Exempt Foreign Status has no bearing on whether the lien here was properly filed, or whether the United States is entitled to the relief sought.

Also before the court is the motion for summary judgment of the United States. Neither defendant has filed any response to the motion. The facts presented in the motion are deemed admitted pursuant to D.Kan.Rule56.1(b)(2).

The uncontoverted facts establish that on June 5, 2000, Packard pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas before United States District Court Judge Carlos Murguia to two counts of attempting to manufacture Methamphetamine and conspiring to manufacture Methamphetamine, and one count of possessing Psuedoephebine with the intent to manufacture Methamphetamine. On September 25, 2000, defendant Packard was sentenced by Judge Murguia to 180 months imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. He is currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institute in Forrest City, Arkansas.

On January 13, 2003, a UCC Financing Statement signed by William Earl Packard as "Secured Party," at address c/o P.O. Box 9000, Forrest City, Arkansas, and showing "Judge Mureuia[sic] Carlos U.S. District of Kansas" as "Debtor" for $15,000,000 was filed with the Kansas Secretary of State. (Def. Exh. 2, UCC Financing Statement.) The statement is without validity in law or fact.

Judge Carlos Murguia did not know and had never met or talked to Packard prior to Packard's plea of guilty. Judge Murguia is not presently and has never been indebted to Packard in any manner. He has never granted Packard or anyone on Packard's behalf a security interest or lien in any real or personal property owned by or in the possession of Judge Murguia. His sole dealings with Packard consist of Packard's plea of guilty before him on June 5, 2000, and his subsequent sentencing of Packard. He does not know Packard in any capacity other than in his official capacity as United District Court Judge for the District of Kansas.

In light of the failure of either defendant to submit any response to the motion for summary judgment, the motion is granted pursuant to D.Kan. Rule 7.4. In addition, the motion is granted on the merits.

The uncontroverted facts support the relief sought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202, which gives the court the ability to declare the rights and other legal relations of interested parties, and may grant further necessary or proper relief based on its declarations. Here, the facts compel the conclusion that the illegal lien filed by Packard is null, void, and of no legal effect. Packard had no factual or legal basis to file such lien. The United States is entitled to a declaratory judgment voiding, nullifying and dissolving the illegal lien intended to obstruct the execution of the laws of the United States of America.

The court notes that the plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunction preventing Packard and his agents, employees and any others in active concert or participation with him from filing or recording, or attempting to file or record, any document or instrument of any description which purports to create a "lien" or record of any kind against the person or property of Judge Carlos Murguia without the prior permission of this court, or from taking any steps to retaliate or to harass Judge Carlos Murguia physically or financially. The court finds that such relief is appropriate. See Tyler v. Kansas Lottery, 14 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (D. Kan. 1998) (discussing standard for injunctive relief).

As noted previously, Judge Murgia's only interactions with Packard arose from his official duties. Any claim Packard might assert against Judge Murgia would be barred by absolute immunity. United States v. McKinley, 53 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1995). The government has clearly demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

It has also demonstrated that Packard's false and retaliatory lien interferes with the performance of proper governmental functions. Packard's actions create an imminent threat of irreparable injury to the United States because such abuse of the lien statutes creates the prospect of abuse of federal employees and interference in the performance of their duties. United States v. Poole, 916 F. Supp. 861, 863 (C. D. Ill. 1996).

The continuing prospect of injury to the United States outweighs any harm a permanent injunction would cause Packard. As discussed earlier, the lien — and the underlying claims it supposedly protects — are utterly without merit. Packard's legitimate rights are not imperilled by the requested relief. Requiring Packard to obtain the court's approval before filing public records involving Judge Murguia will afford Packard an appropriate means of filing of legitimate documents, as well as limit legally invalid filings.

The injunction will advance the public interest. As noted earlier, there is a strong public interest in protecting public officers from wholly groundless, retaliatory abuse of civil process. Here, Packard's filing of this totally meritless, frivolous, and fraudulent lien, coupled with his persistent refusal to release the lien and continuing iteration of a litany of bizarre legal theories, raises the prospect of continuing abuse. Permanent relief is appropriate. See United States v. Moore, 21 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1994).

IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 30th day of October, that defendant Packard's various motions (Dkt. Nos. 3, 6, 14) are denied; plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 12) is granted. The referenced lien is null, void and of no legal effect. Defendant Secretary of State is hereby ordered to completely remove and expunge the lien filed by Packard against Judge Murguia from all records maintained by the State of Kansas, and all records maintained by credit reporting agencies, if any, as to which the State of Kansas has provided such lien information. Defendant Secretary of State is further ordered, as to the financing statement filed by Packard removed and expunged but not destroyed pursuant to this order, that a copy of this order be attached to the face of the statement. Defendant Packard, along with his agents, employees and any others in active concert or participation with him, is hereby permanently enjoined from filing or recording, or attempting to file or record, any document or instrument of any description which purports to create a "lien" or record of any kind against the person or property of Judge Carlos Murguia without the prior permission of this court; defendant Packard is permanently enjoined from taking any steps to retaliate or to harass Judge Carlos Murguia in any manner whatsoever, including but not limited to physical and financial means.


Summaries of

U.S. v. Secretary of State of Kansas

United States District Court, D. Kansas
Sep 3, 2003
Case No. 03-1170-JTM (D. Kan. Sep. 3, 2003)
Case details for

U.S. v. Secretary of State of Kansas

Case Details

Full title:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. SECRETARY OF STATE OF KANSAS and…

Court:United States District Court, D. Kansas

Date published: Sep 3, 2003

Citations

Case No. 03-1170-JTM (D. Kan. Sep. 3, 2003)