"We will find non-constitutional evidentiary errors harmless where it is 'highly probable that the errors did not influence the verdict.'" United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 23 (1st Cir. 2011)). And, while the government bears the burden of showing harmlessness, the requisite "case-specific inquiry" into factors including "the centrality of the tainted evidence, its uniqueness, its prejudicial impact, the use to which the
Furthermore, her statement to the effect that “In that moment, I found out that my ex-husband did not have a real case” constitutes an unhelpful lay opinion into the ultimate issue of the case and is precluded. See e.g. United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516 (1st Cir. 2011) (“However, lay opinion testimony on the ultimate issue in a case must satisfy Rule 701's helpfulness requirement, and “seldom will be the case when a lay opinion on an ultimate issue will meet the test of being helpful to the trier of fact since the jury's opinion is as good as the witness'[s]....”) (internal quotations omitted)
Thus, lay opinion is not considered helpful to the jury "'when the jury can readily draw the necessary inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion.'" United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 515 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Lynch v. City of Bos., 180 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1999)). Placy's opinion as to whether or not Loignon is at fault for Lacaillade's death, as well as her opinion on the merits of the lawsuit, essentially tell the jurors what result to reach.
Because we conclude that Villa is entitled to a new trial, we decline to address the procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges to his sentence that he raises in his opening brief, his argument that the district court erred by limiting his cross-examination of Herrera regarding Herrera's alleged bail violation and revocation, and his unpreserved Brady challenge that he raised for the first time in a separate pro se filing in this court. See United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 511 n.7 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29, 45 (1st Cir. 2009).
A lay opinion will fail the second "helpfulness" requirement if "the jury can readily draw the necessary inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion." United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 515 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1999)). We afford the district court "considerable discretion" in deciding whether lay opinion testimony is admissible under Rule 701.
Both the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantee criminal defendants the right to confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination, as well as a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ; United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 513-14 (1st Cir. 2011). But the mere assertion of these rights does not automatically ensure the admissibility of testimony or other evidence that could effectuate these rights or otherwise support a defense theory.
And while appeals courts do not often have to exercise this function, they do it when they must, offering various explanations depending on what occurred at the lower-court proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516–19 (1st Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Dwyer, 843 F.2d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1988). The matter can be put in many different ways, and one way may be more apt than others depending on the precise issue.
And while appeals courts do not often have to exercise this function, they do it when they must, offering various explanations depending on what occurred at the lower-court proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516-19 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Dwyer, 843 F.2d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1988). The matter can be put in many different ways, and one way may be more apt than others depending on the precise issue.
In the only case cited by Keys that speaks directly to testimony regarding the truthfulness of a defendant's statements, the First Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony because, in that particular circumstance, it was not helpful—not simply because it touched on an ultimate issue in the case. See United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516 (1st Cir. 2011). It was not error to admit Halbert's testimony.
Rather than accept the invitation to lay a proper foundation, Williams's counsel chose not to pursue the matter further. The district court's implicit concern was that this line of questions would “waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box” that there was some evidence that the officers were lying. United States v. Tucker, 533 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Beeks, 224 F.3d 741, 746 (8th Cir.2000)); see also United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 514 (1st Cir.2011) (“[A] district court may properly limit cross-examination on inherently speculative theories of bias, where the defendant is unable to lay a proper evidentiary foundation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Martinez–Vives, 475 F.3d 48, 53–54 (1st Cir.2007)). Williams had no good-faith basis to believe that the officers had planted a handgun in this case and offered only a purported conversation with “a retired police officer” as a basis for the belief that such a practice occurred generally. We conclude that the district court was well within its wide latitude of discretion when it required Williams to first lay a proper evidentiary foundation before implying that Officers Hendricks and Christensen had planted a handgun on Williams and perjured themselves.