"We cannot find that the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to consider an argument that Defendant did not raise, particularly where, as here, the court would have been obligated only to consider—not to accept—the argument." United States v. Embry, 728 F. App'x 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 345 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that the defendant's sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to consider the defendant's "status as a father and his enrollment in an electrician training program," explaining that "these mitigating factors, when weighed in light of the totality of the circumstances, are insufficient to rebut the presumption that his within Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable" (citing United States v. Saffore, 216 F. App'x 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2007)). In short, the district court did what was required: it analyzed applicable sentencing factors, "considered the parties' arguments[,] and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority."

Manley's allegation that the court "failed to balance [his] criminal history with [his] personal characteristics" falls short under our precedents. See, e.g., Cochrane, 702 F.3d at 345 (holding that mitigating factors must be weighed in light of the totality of the circumstances, including a defendant's criminal history and background); United States v. Garza, 478 F. App'x 995, 996 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a 33-month supervised release sentence, 24 months of which were consecutive, was reasonable where the defendant, while on supervised release, returned to the same type of behavior underlying his original conviction); United States v. Saffore, 216 F. App'x 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that a defendant's personal qualities and desire to be a productive member of society does not render a within-Guidelines sentence substantively unreasonable given the defendant's criminal history). Here, the district court similarly listened to, considered, and rejected Manley's mitigation arguments before fashioning his within-Guidelines sentence.

But these mitigating factors, when weighed in light of the totality of the circumstances, are insufficient to rebut the presumption that his within Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable. See United States v. Saffore, 216 Fed.Appx. 531, 536 (6th Cir.2007) (finding that a defendant's personal quality as a good father does not render a within Guidelines sentence substantively unreasonable given the defendant's criminal history). The district court did not abuse its discretion because its choice of prison terms was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

nce Booker in numerous published and unpublished cases. See United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 235 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Key, No. 05-6277, 256 Fed.Appx. 775, 780, 2007 WL 4293456, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec.6, 2007); United States v. Darden, No. 06-1767, 253 Fed.Appx. 568, 569-70, 2007 WL 3329454, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.7, 2007); United States v. Muse, 250 Fed.Appx. 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Grant, 247 Fed.Appx. 749, 752-53 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Scadin, 246 Fed.Appx. 319, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bowden, 240 Fed.Appx. 56, 58-59 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilson, 232 Fed.Appx. 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Duncan, 236 Ped.Appx. 168, 170 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ruiz-Chavez, 224 Fed.Appx. 467, 469-70 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Saffore, 216 Fed. Appx. 531, 532 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Harden, 195 Fed.Appx. 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Carroll, 189 Fed.Appx. 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Willis, 176 Fed.Appx. 653, 656-57 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Parks, 155 Fed.Appx. 841, 842 (6th Cir. 2005). Vonner did not argue either in his original appellate briefs or in his supplemental en banc briefs that Bostic should be overruled or that it otherwise should not apply to our review of post-Booker sentences.

3(a) factors before pronouncing sentence, we fail to see how requiring the defendant to then protest the term handed down as unreasonable will further the sentencing process in any meaningful way. Certainly we do not mean to discourage district courts from entertaining argument about the reasonableness of a sentence after its pronouncement, nor do we suggest that our longstanding insistence on proper objections as to other sentencing issues, e.g., the application of a guideline adjustment, should be relaxed. All we conclude here is that our review of a sentence for reasonableness is not affected by whether the defendant had the foresight to label his sentence "unreasonable" before the sentencing hearing adjourned.United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2005); accord United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 3054, 168 L.Ed.2d 766 (2007); United States v. Saffore, 216 Fed.Appx. 531, 533 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 3077, 168 L.Ed.2d 783 (2007). We therefore turn to the question whether the length of Wiley's sentence is unreasonable.

Scadin, relying at oral argument on an unpublished opinion of this court, argues that his request at sentencing for a shorter sentence fully preserves his right to challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. See United States v. Saffore, 216 Fed.Appx. 531, 532 (6th Cir. 2007). He failed, however, to make any argument at all — beyond his bare assertion that a shorter sentence, or one of community confinement, would have been sufficient — that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Because Bowden did not object on any of these procedural grounds when the district court gave him the chance to do so at the end of the sentencing hearing, we limit our review on that score to plain error. See JA 283 (After announcing the sentence, the district court asked whether any "objections . . . complaints, comments, or anything else for the record" "ha[d] emerged"; Bowden's counsel responded, "No, Judge."); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Bailey, 488 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that "when the district court asks at sentencing whether there are any objections to the sentence and the appellant raises none, we review the sentence only for plain error"); United States v. Saffore, 216 Fed.Appx. 531, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); United States v. Harden, 195 Fed.Appx. 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); United States v. Carroll, 189 Fed.Appx. 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). The district court did not commit plain error.