U.S. v. Rupley

3 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. FEIL

    No. CR 09-00863 JSW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010)   Cited 5 times
    Granting bill of particulars requiring the government to name unnamed coconspirators due to lengthy duration and scope of conspiracy and the heavy volume of discovery

    The Court agrees and, therefore, denies the motions with respect to Mr. Swanson's requests numbered 12-14 and Ms. Feil's requests numbered 10-12. Relying on United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1980) and United States v. Rupley, 706 F. Supp. 751 (D. Nev. 1989), the Government also argues that the Indictment is not required to allege all items of property that might be subject to forfeiture and that it sufficiently advises them of the prospect of forfeiture. Defendants cite no authority in support of their request and have not addressed the Government's argument on reply. Although it addresses former Rule 7(c)(2), when read in conjunction with the plain language of Rule 32.2(a), the Court finds the reasoning of Rupley persuasive.

  2. United States v. Peters

    257 F.R.D. 377 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that Santos does not apply in forfeiture cases

    Rather, it modifies only a portion of the government's forfeiture request-the " included, but not limited to" assets-and therefore does not negate the overriding notice included in the indictment. SeeUnited States v. Rupley, 706 F.Supp. 751, 753 (D.Nev.1989) (rejecting the argument that " includes but is not limited to" restricts the government's forfeiture request, noting " [t]he Government should not be foreclosed from seeking forfeiture of all property subject to the penalty, simply because it listed some items with particularity" ).          This Court is similarly unpersuaded by Peters's second argument, which is that the government is bound by its pre-trial representations that the maximum amount subject to forfeiture is $1,596,000.

  3. In re Moffitt, Zwerling Kemler, P.C.

    846 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Va. 1994)   Cited 23 times
    Disqualifying defense counsel who persuaded the defendant not to plead guilty because doing so would reflect poorly on counsel's firm after the government obtained a court order restraining the law firm from disbursing the fees because of possible forfeiture

    And the central finding of this memorandum opinion is that, at this time, the facts and circumstances known to the Law Firm precluded a reasonable belief in the legitimacy of the cash used to pay the fee. See also United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing that an indictment need not describe each item subject to forfeiture), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 399, 93 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986); United States v. Rupley, 706 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D.Nev. 1989) (where the indictment makes defendant aware that all profits from criminal enterprise are potentially forfeitable, "[t]he Government should not be foreclosed from seeking forfeiture of all property subject to penalty, simply because it listed some items with particularity"). As already noted, fees paid prior to indictment are not immune from forfeiture.