Opinion
CRIMINAL NO. 03-10268-PBS
March 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant Keion Rowell, charged with drug trafficking, moves to suppress the evidence obtained by the Boston Police Department on the ground that the officers lacked a reasonable basis to stop him for failure to have a vehicle inspection sticker. Defendant contends that because the owner had recently registered the car, he was in compliance with the law which permitted the owner to obtain the sticker within a seven-day grace period after registration. The Government responds that the stop was constitutional because the car violated the Massachusetts environmental law requiring that certain used vehicles obtain an emissions inspection within seven days of the date the car was purchased.
At the evidentiary hearing, Boston Police Officers Thomas Brooks and Jon-Michael Harber testified for the Government. Mark LaFrance, a project manager in the Vehicle Safety and Compliance Service division of the Registry of Motor Vehicles who oversees the state inspection program, testified on the Defendant's behalf. The Government in response submitted the affidavit of Paul Davis, Acting Branch Chief of the Inspection and Maintenance Program for the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP").
After an evidentiary hearing and review of the briefs, the Court ALLOWS Defendant's motion to suppress.
I. FACTUAL FINDINGS
a. The Stop
On June 26, 2003, Boston Police Officers Jon-Michael Harber and Thomas Brooks were on patrol in Roxbury when they observed a blue, 1989 Honda Civic driving up Dewey Street toward Blue Hill Avenue. The Honda Civic quickly pulled to the side of the street when the patrol car came into view. It did not violate any law. Nonetheless, because of this abrupt pullover, the officers entered the license plate information into the Mobile Data Terminal ("MDT") in their cruiser.
The cruiser's computer screen exhibited information about the automobile obtained from the Registry of Motor Vehicles, including its make, color, model, and owner. One field, "STKR#-DT" (meaning "Sticker number and date obtained"), was blank. Other fields contained the following information: "EFF DT: 6/24/2003" (the date the owner applied for and obtained registration); "EXP-DT 3/05" (license plate expiration date); "OR-ISS-DT: 6/24/2003" (original issue date of the license plate); "TITLE-DT: 6/24/2003" (date of application for approval of title); and "PURCH DT: 5/22/2003" (date of vehicle purchase). Understanding the blank in the "STKR#-DT" field to indicate that the vehicle was being illegally operated without a valid sticker, the officers believed that the car was in violation of the state inspection requirements. There is no evidence that the police officer visually observed an invalid inspection sticker on the car, and there appears to be no dispute that the windshield still displayed the inspection sticker from the prior registration, valid through March 2004. (Docket No. 33, at 2.) Therefore, the stop was based on the information provided on the computer screen.
The officers pulled up a side street, observed the Honda Civic drive by them on Blue Hill Avenue, and implemented the lights and siren. The Defendant then pulled the car to the side of the road. When Officer Brooks asked the Defendant for his license and registration, the Defendant replied that his license was suspended. Another MDT inquiry revealed that his license had been revoked and there was an outstanding warrant for him. The Defendant was arrested, given a citation for failure to obtain a vehicle inspection (issued against the vehicle's owner), taken to the station, and eventually charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base on the basis of drugs obtained as a result of the stop.
b. Applicable Regulations for Inspection
Under Registry regulations, a new car owner has seven days from the date of registration to obtain a sticker. The applicable regulation provides:
[E]very owner or person in control of a motor vehicle which is newly acquired in the Commonwealth shall submit such motor vehicle for a required inspection within seven days of the date on which the motor vehicle is registered to said owner in the Commonwealth.540 C.M.R. § 4.03(1)(a) (West 2003). See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 7A (West 2004) (delegating authority to promulgate inspection regulations). The MDT displayed the registration as being effective on 6/24/2003 ("EFF-DT: 6/24/2003"). The MDT fields indicated that the car had been registered two days prior to the stop and Defendant was easily within the seven-day window within which a new owner can lawfully operate the vehicle without getting the inspection required by the Registry.
Another regulation also applies to the purchaser of an used car. Environmental emission regulation 310 C.M.R. 60.02(4)(c) requires an emissions inspection for certain used cars within seven days of the date of purchase, not registration. See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 142M (West 2003) (delegating authority to promulgate emissions regulations). It provides:
For any used motor vehicle purchased or leased on or after the effective date of 310 CMR 60.02, the motorist shall obtain an emissions inspection as part of his or her motor vehicle inspection for the vehicle within seven days from the date of purchase unless otherwise exempt in accordance 310 CMR 60.02(3)(b)1., 3., 1., 2., or 6.
(Emphasis added). The purpose of this provision is to allow Massachusetts residents an opportunity to take advantage of the Lemon Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 7N (2001), which permits a purchaser of a used vehicle to return the vehicle within seven days of purchase if it does not pass an emissions inspection and the cost of repairs exceeds 10% of the vehicle's purchase price. (See Aff. of Paul Davis of Feb. 4, 2004 ("The Department's inclusion of the requirement in 310 CMR 60.02(4)(c) that a motorist obtain an emissions inspection within seven days from the date of purchase of a used motor vehicle was deliberate, and was intended to enable motorists to avail themselves of the benefits of the Massachusetts Lemon Aid Law.").)
A website apparently operated by the Commonwealth, www.vehicletest.state.ma.us/generalinfo.html (accessed by counsel on 2/3/2004), states that the "Registry . . . requires that all vehicles, whether new or used, be inspected within seven calendar days of registration in order for them to be operated on Commonwealth roadways."Id. This website also states, under a heading titled, "What happens if I buy a used car and it fails the emissions test?":
When you buy a used car, you must bring the car to get it inspected within seven days of purchasing it. If your vehicle fails to pass the Enhanced Emissions Safety Test, and if the estimated cost of repairs exceeds 10% of the vehicle's purchase price, the state's Lemon Aid Law allows you to void or cancel the sale.Id. Later, the same website states:
State law requires that a vehicle be inspected within seven days of registration in order for it to be operated on Commonwealth roadways. However, for your own protection, if you purchase a used vehicle for personal or family use, you should have the vehicle inspected for safety and emissions within seven calendar days after purchase, even if it already has a valid inspection sticker on it.Id. at /faqs.html.
c. Sticker Shock
The police officers making the stop did not make the stop because of any belief that the environmental emissions inspection requirement was violated. Indeed, they agreed that the only reason the Defendant was stopped was because they believed the blank inspection field indicated a violation of the Registry inspection requirement, and because of a failure to read the MDT screen completely. Neither of the police officers had been trained with respect to the environmental emissions inspection requirements, or knew about them. Officer Harber candidly acknowledged that he would not have stopped the Defendant had he known then what he knows now about the information that was presented on the MDT. This stop resulted from a good faith mistake by the police officers reading the MDT screen.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Traffic Stops"As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). As long as officers have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, it is reasonable for them to stop an automobile and temporarily detain the driver. United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 217 (1st Cir. 1997).
Many courts have evaluated traffic stops using the reasonable suspicion standard for investigative Terry stops. See, e.g., United States v. Marsica, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 511-12 (10th Cir. 2000);United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1219 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (declining to decide whether a traffic stop must be made on probable cause or reasonable suspicion). "Warrantless investigatory stops are allowable if, and to the extent that, police officers have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing — a suspicion that finds expression in specific, articulable reasons for believing that a person may be connected to the commission of a particular crime." United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); United States v. Maguire, 359 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. March 3, 2004) (holding that officers must "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences derived from those facts, reasonably show that an investigatory stop was warranted"). "The officer making the stop 'must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' linking an individual to criminal activity."United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "Consequently, the proper focus for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence of reasonable suspicion centers upon the objective significance of the particular facts under all the circumstances." Id. at 8.
The threshold issue is the standard for evaluating the legality of the stop. Whether the traffic stop is justified by reasonable suspicion underTerry or probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred under Whren, the touchstone is reasonableness.
Defendant argues that the police officers made a mistake when they interpreted the computer screen to mean that he failed to have his car inspected in a timely fashion, when in fact it showed that he was within the grace period. Some circuits have adopted a mistake of law — mistake of fact distinction. Under this doctrine, "[a] traffic stop based on an officer's incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). But "if an officer makes a traffic stop based on a mistake of law, the stop violates the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that officer's mistake in believing that car displaying one Michigan license plate in California was required to display two plates, while reasonable, could not support a Terry stop). Therefore, if the police officers' assessment of the significance of the empty field next to "STKR-DT" was reasonable, even though it turned out to be wrong, the stop was proper. United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 512 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that mistake of fact that high beams were illegally in use was reasonable);United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a rental car that the agency incorrectly reported was overdue).
Here, however, the police officers' assessment of the facts was both wrong and unreasonable because the MDT screen in the cruiser, when read correctly, plainly demonstrated that defendant was within the seven-day grace period permitted by the Registry regulation. This unreasonable mistake of fact would violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, to the extent that the police officers made a mistake of law with respect to the legal availability of the grace period, the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
B. Whren
The Government argues that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the motor vehicle was in violation of the motor vehicle emissions test, and the information available to the police at the time of the stop objectively provided probable cause and reasonable suspicion for the stop — even if the police officers were subjectively motivated by an unreasonable assessment of the available facts and applicable law. The Government relies on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813 (1996), which involved allegations of improper race-based motives behind a traffic stop otherwise justified by probable cause to suspect a traffic violation had occurred. The Court held:
'[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'. . . We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.517 U.S. at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). Cf. United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("As long as Casiano had an objectively valid ground upon which to arrest Bookhardt, the fact that he articulated an invalid one does not render the arrest invalid."); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The probable cause justifying a lawful custodial arrest, and therefore a search incident to that arrest, need not be for the charge eventually prosecuted.").
Under the Whren analogy, the question becomes whether probable cause existed to justify the stop even if the actual subjective thought-processes of the police officers involved were unreasonable. The Government argues that an objective officer would have reasonably believed from the screen that the emissions regulation was violated because there was no inspection sticker more than seven days after the purchase date, the emissions test is performed the same time as the safety test, and the combined tests result in a sticker.
The Government does not argue that any other circumstances (like the sudden pullover) provided objectively reasonable suspicion for this stop.
Although a valiant attempt to salvage this case, the Government's argument suffers from a number of problems. First, the Government has provided no evidence that the emissions test and the safety test are necessarily performed together. This is not a matter on which judicial notice is appropriate. See United States v. Marsical, 285 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that judge could not fill in gap in record by finding that a road was heavily traveled). According to Mr. LaFrance, only one sticker is issued by the Registry upon completion of both the emissions and inspection regulations, and he insisted that to be on the roadway a sticker must be obtained within seven days of the registration date, not the purchase date. Therefore, looking at the MDT screen, an objectively reasonable officer would have had no knowledge one way or another as to whether an emissions inspection requirement had been violated. The emissions test could have been performed for purposes of the Lemon Law and the new owner still would have had a few days left in the grace period to get the Registry inspection sticker. Indeed, the car had a valid inspection sticker from the previous owner, and there is no separate sticker for the emissions test. An objectively-reasonable officer would have reason to believe only that Defendant was within the seven-day window provided by the Registry after the registration date, which was listed on the MDT screen. Pointing to inadequate training, both officers here stated that knowing what they do now, they believe that they stopped the car improperly based on a misunderstanding of the computer screen. An objectively-reasonable officer would state the same.
The Defendant has another strong argument for invalidating the stop. As a matter of law, he contends, the environmental regulations do not provide a reasonable basis for the stop, as the regulations do not overrule the regulations set forth by the Registry that provide for a grace period of seven days from the date of registration to be on the roadways without an inspection sticker. Rather, they simply impose an emission inspection requirement as a prerequisite for invoking the Lemon Law protections for used cars. Additionally, Defendant argues, the ambiguity in terms of the timing under the two applicable regulations, compounded by the website, must be resolved in the Defendant's favor. See Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279 ("Even if the statutes were ambiguous, that ambiguity could not help the Government's case[, for] [t]o do so would violate the fundamental principle that a criminal statute that is so vague that it does not give reasonable notice of what it prohibits violates due process."). A RMV official and two law enforcement officers were unaware of the possibility that the environmental regulation might trump the RMV regulation, and the website is hardly clarifying. In light of the ambiguity, the regulations do not provide reasonable notice to a purchaser of a used car.
The parties do not dispute that if the stop of the car is held unlawful, the drugs should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.