Opinion
04 Cr. 1036 (GEL).
April 7, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
On February 3, 2006, a jury returned a verdict finding defendant Javier Robles guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count of robbery affecting interstate commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. On motion of the defendants, the Court extended the time for filing post-trial motions to March 3, 2006. No motions were received by that date. On April 6, 2006, the Court received a letter from defendant Robles, dated April 4, 2006, challenging an aspect of the Court's instructions to the jury, which the Court will deem a belated pro se motion for a new trial. The motion will be denied.
Robles argues that the Court's instruction to the jury that, as a matter of law, "if . . . the object of the robbery at issue was to obtain illegal drugs or money earned from the sale of illegal drugs, [the interstate commerce] element is satisfied" (Tr. 2285-86), was improper. During the Court's charge conference, none of the defendants objected to the language Robles now challenges (Tr. 1959-1980), despite the fact that all parties received the Court's draft instructions several days before the conference, and despite a lengthy discussion earlier in the day regarding the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act charges in connection with defendants' Rule 29 motions (Tr. 1906-14).
To support his argument, Robles cites an opinion in which Judge McKenna, having given a similar charge, granted a new trial motion on the ground that the instruction was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995). See United States v. Gomez, 99 Cr. 740, 2005 WL 1529701, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005).
This Court respectfully disagrees. The instruction that "obtaining the proceeds of narcotics trafficking is interstate commerce" was specifically upheld by the Second Circuit inUnited States v. Fabian, 312 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting instruction and holding that "the jury instruction was proper"), a decision not discussed by Judge McKenna in connection with the jury instruction (although cited in passing in a different context, see 2005 WL 1529701, at *9). The Second Circuit's approval of the charge, in an opinion decided afterGaudin, is dispositive of Robles's argument. It is a question of law whether the interstate commerce requirement of the Hobbs Act is satisfied by the fact that a robbery is intended to secure illegal narcotics or the proceeds of illegal narcotics sales. The factual question of whether the robberies charged in this case were so intended was a question for the jury, and that question was properly submitted to the jury and left to its decision.
Accordingly, treating defendant's pro se submission as a motion for a new trial, the motion is denied. The Clerk is respectfully directed to docket defendant's letter.
SO ORDERED:
LETTER