When a defendant is charged with a scheme to conceal material facts, underlying acts taken in furtherance of the scheme may establish venue, even if the concealment is completed in another district. See United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774, 780 (11th Cir.1989) (in § 1001 prosecution for concealment of material facts from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) by using false loan documents to avoid having filing Currency Transaction Reports (“CTRs”), venue was proper in Northern District of Florida, even though defendant argued that CTRs can only be filed in Washington, D.C., because “almost all affirmative acts occurred in the Northern District of Florida,” including preparation of false loan documents); United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir.1986) (in § 1001 prosecution for concealment of material facts from the IRS in money laundering scheme, venue was proper in Southern District of Florida because defendant engaged in “scheme” to conceal there, including collection and exchange of cash for structured checks to avoid CTR filing requirement, even though CTRs were required to be filed in Washington, D.C.); United States v. Curran, 1993 WL 137459, at *22 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 28, 1993) vacated on other grounds, 20 F.3d 560 (

That location is after all where a person would most likely receive or deposit currency in their capacity as a businessperson, and it is also where their duty to file a report would arise if the amount of that currency was in excess of $10,000 for any one transaction or two or more related transactions. The Government cites to United States v. Donahue, 885 F.2d 45 (3rd Cir. 1989), and United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774 (11th Cir. 1989), to support its contention that the Defendant engaged in a continuing crime. In Donahue, the Third Circuit found venue to be proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania when the defendant failed to file a report regarding the exporting or importing of currency in excess of $10,000 pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5316.

Now, as support for its current position that the evidence would support a finding of specific intent because the Defendants consciously avoided the requirements of the law, the government relies on three cases involving money laundering. See United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 374, 107 L.Ed.2d 360 (1989); U.S. v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 328, 98 L.Ed.2d 356 (1987). Unfortunately, these cases bear no factual resemblance to the instant case and provide little insight into the application of the law of deliberate avoidance to the requirement of specific intent: in each case, there was direct evidence of actual knowledge of the regulation.

) In other contexts, however, we have acknowledged that juries may consider devious conduct along with other circumstantial evidence to infer specific intent. For example, the defendant in United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958, 110 S.Ct. 374, 107 L.Ed.2d 360 (1989), was convicted of failing to file federal cash transaction reports (CTRs) for transactions involving $10,000 or more in currency. We held that, in addition to other evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the reporting requirement, "the jury could have inferred knowledge on Rigdon's part from the manipulative and shadowy nature of his structuring of the transactions."

In reaching this conclusion we note that other courts have affirmed convictions for aiding and abetting the failure to file a CTR only upon a finding that the defendant actively participated in conduct that assisted or rewarded the failure to file. See, e.g., Kington, 875 F.2d at 1095-96 (defendants conducted transactions without filing CTRs when required and also disguised the character of the transactions so that co-workers would overlook the need to file a CTR); United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958, 110 S.Ct. 374, 107 L.Ed.2d 360 (1989) (defendant acted like a teller, took in money and disguised its character to avoid filing a CTR); United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986) (defendant knowingly received cash and delivered it to the people acting as the financial institution knowing that they would not file a CTR); United States v. Heyman, 794 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 585, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986) (defendant purposely structured deposits so that his company would not realize its obligation to file a CTR). In rendering a post-conviction judgment of acquittal the trial court did not err. The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.

The evidence established that Donahue, bearing large sums of currency, on various occasions boarded a plane in Pennsylvania, changed planes in Florida without filing the requisite report, and proceeded on to Grand Cayman Island. In our view, this uninterrupted series of events is properly regarded as one continuing offense for purposes of venue, beginning in Pennsylvania and ending in Grand Cayman Island. Cf. United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774, 779-80 (11th Cir. 1989) (venue for failure to file CTR as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5313 not only proper in Washington, D.C., where CTRs can be filed, but also in Northern District of Florida where cash was exchanged for cashier's checks.) § 3237.

Simply failing to disclose a material fact does not satisfy Section 1001(a)(1); affirmative conduct to falsify, conceal or cover up is required. United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774, 779 (11th Cir. 1989). The defendant's marriage was a material fact, and it concerned a matter within SSA's jurisdiction.

Franco does not contest that an individual may be determined to be a "financial institution" under the statute. See U.S. v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958, 110 S.Ct. 374, 107 L.Ed.2d 360 (1989). However, Franco argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he is a financial institution under the statute.

Several other circuits have held that venue under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 lies either where a false statement is prepared or where it is filed. See United States v. Rigdon, 874 F.2d 774, 779-80 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 374, 107 L.Ed.2d 360 (1989); United States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213, 105 S.Ct. 1184, 84 L.Ed.2d 331 (1985); United States v. Ruehrup, 333 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 903, 85 S.Ct. 194, 13 L.Ed.2d 177 (1964); Imperial Meat Co. v. United States, 316 F.2d 435, 440 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820, 84 S.Ct. 57, 11 L.Ed.2d 54 (1963); De Rosier v. United States, 218 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921, 75 S.Ct. 660, 99 L.Ed. 1253 (1955). This Court is persuaded to the same result.

The Eleventh Circuit, construing 31 U.S.C. § 5313, has noted that the currency involved in a structured transaction need not be "dirty" to support criminal charges. United States v. Ridgon, 874 F.2d 774, 777 (11th Cir. 1989). Section 5322(b) provides that where the structuring is connected with other criminal violations or is part of a pattern of illegal activity, the violator is subject to more severe penalties.