Opinion
No. 1:04-CR-139.
March 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Currently pending before the Court is the second motion to suppress of defendant, Titus A. Reed ("Reed"). [Court File No. 56]. Reed has also filed an Addendum, supplementing his second motion to suppress [Court File No. 60]; and a Supplemental Affidavit in support of the second motion to suppress. [Court File No. 66]. The government has filed a response to Reed's second motion to suppress. [Court File No. 61]; and, Reed has filed a reply to the government's response to his second motion to suppress. [Court File No. 65].
Consequently, Reed's second motion to suppress is now ripe for review. [Court File No. 56]. For the reasons set forth in detail, infra, Reed's second motion to suppress, as twice supplemented, the searches of three real estate parcels — the Old Grandview Highway property, the Baker Lane property, and the Sabo Road property — of September 3, 2004, [Court File No. 56, 60] will be DENIED.
Also pending before the Court is the third motion to suppress of Defendant Titus A. Reed [Court File No. 62]. In his third motion to suppress, Reed seeks to suppress the search of the Old Grandview Highway residence because "the Search Warrant was executed at a time that Officers knew the Defendant would be at his Aunt's funeral." [Court File No. 62]. For the reasons stated in detail, infra, Reed's third motion to suppress [Court File No. 62] will be DENIED.
Further, pending before the Court is the fourth motion to suppress of Titus A. Reed [Court File No. 64]. In his fourth motion to suppress, Reed seeks to suppress the search of his residence on the Old Grandview Highway property because the search was executed by someone not authorized to do so. Id. For the reason set forth in detail, infra, Reed's fourth motion to suppress [Court File No. 64] will be DENIED. II. Background
Reed owns three parcels of real estate in a remote portion of the Cumberland Plateau in Eastern Tennessee — the Old Grandview Highway property, the Baker Lane property and the Sabo Road property. In this case, Reed is charged with, inter alia, growing marijuana on, or near, each of these real estate parcels. On September 3, 2004, law enforcement officers obtained from a United States Magistrate Judge a warrant to search each of the parcels, and each parcel was subsequently searched.
On November 23, 2004, Reed filed a motion to suppress challenging the searches of September 3, 2004. [Court File No. 19]. Following a hearing on Reed's motion on January 5, 2005, this Court denied Reed's motion to suppress. [Court File No. 32]. The Court also denied Reed's motion to reconsider its denial of the aforementioned motion to suppress. [Court File No. 49].
Reed filed the instant motion to suppress on March 18, 2005. [Court File No. 56]. In his second motion to suppress Reed challenges the searches of September 3, 2004, on the ground that the items to be seized were not named or identified with particularity in the search warrants. More specifically, Reed asserts that the search warrants refer or list the property to be seized in an "Attachment A." [Court File No. 56]. Reed states that there was no "Attachment A" affixed to the copies of the three search warrants which were delivered/left at his Old Grandview Highway residence on September 3, 2004. Reed contends that without "Attachment A" affixed, the search warrants were not particular or specific enough in naming the items to be searched to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Copies of the search warrants were entered into evidence as government's exhibits 1, 3, and 5 during the January 5, 2005 suppression hearing. A copy of the search warrant for the Sabo Road property which was alleged to have been left at Reed's Old Grandview Highway residence on September 3, 2004, is attached to the Addendum to his motion to suppress. [Court File No. 60].
The portion of the three warrants which states "describe the person or property to be seized" states "See Attachment A." [Govt' Exhibit 1, 3, 5; Court File No. 60]. There is no "Attachment A" affixed to the copy of the search warrant for the Sabo Road property which is part of the Addendum to his motion to suppress and was allegedly left at Reed's Old Grandview Highway residence on September 3, 2004. [Court File No. 60].
However, there is an "Attachment A" affixed/attached to each of the three search warrants which were entered into evidence during the January 5, 2005 suppression hearing. [Gov't Exhibit 1, 3, and 5]. Copies of the three search warrants, including a very detailed "Attachment A" are attached to this memorandum and order as Exhibit 1.
Attached to Reed's second motion to suppress [Court File No. 56] is the affidavit of Lee Reed. Lee Reed's affidavit, which is dated March 8, 2005, states:
I am the brother of Titus Reed, the Defendant in this case. On or about September 4 or 5, 2004, I went to Titus Reed's residence at Old Grandview. I personally picked up the three search warrants which were at his residence. None of the search warrants had any attachment on them and certainly did not have any attachment named Attachment A. The only documents were the actual search warrants themselves. The only other document there was the inventory filled out by the police of the items they seized. They were sent to Attorney Jim Smith who was co-counsel for Titus Reed at that time.Id.
In support of his motion to suppress, Reed has also submitted the affidavit of his former counsel, Attorney James B. Smith Jr., dated March 22, 2005. [Court File No. 66]. Smith's affidavit states in pertinent part:
1. I am a licensed attorney and have practiced . . . in Roane County, Tennessee . . . I have done some work for Titus Reed. . . .
2. Within a day or so after TBI and Federal authorities conducted searches on several parcels of Mr. Reed's property . . . Mr. Reed consulted me about the matter and brought me all of the paperwork, i.e., copies of search warrants, which were left at the respective properties. I remember seeing three (3) different warrants . . . The only paperwork Mr. Reed brought me consisted of one sheet of paper for each of the three (3) warrants which showed a time on its face when the warrant had been signed by the relavent [sic] Federal authority, and in the case of the house there was, I believe, an inventory list of items taken from the house attached. I remember specifically asking Mr. Reed where the other attachments . . . were, specifically attachment A . . . Mr. Reed advised me in no uncertain terms that he had brought me everything that had been left on the premises . . .
[Court File No. 66].
III. Reed's Motions to Suppress [Court File No. 56].
(1) Reed's second motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that ". . . no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. As a general rule "the proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated." United States v. Leveto, 343 F. Supp.2d 434, 441 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1987)).
In Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 158 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004), which is relied on by Reed in his second motion to suppress, Groh, a Special Agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") prepared and signed an application for a search warrant for a ranch owned by Ramirez. Id., 540 U.S. at 554, 124 S. Ct. at 1287-88. The application described the place to be searched and the contraband which was expected to be found there, but the warrant itself:
. . . failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. In the portion of the form that called for a description of the "person or property" to be seized, [Groh] typed a description of [Ramirez's] two-story blue house rather than the alleged stockpile of firearms. The warrant did not incorporate by reference the itemized list [of contraband expected to be found] contained in the application. It did, however, recite that the Magistrate was satisfied the affidavit established probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed on the premises, and that sufficient ground existed for the warrant's issuance.Id., 540 U.S. at 554-55; 124 S. Ct. at 1288.
Moreover, after executing the search warrant, law enforcement officers gave Ramirez's wife a copy of the warrant, but not a copy of the application supporting the search warrant because it has been placed under seal. Id. 540 U.S. at 555, 124 S. Ct. at 1288. The next day, after being contacted by Ramirez's attorney, Groh sent a facsimile copy of the page of the application that listed the items to be seized to the attorney. Id.
The Groh Court held that the search warrant was facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment despite the fact that the application did describe the items to be seized with particularity. Id., 540 U.S. at 557, 124 S. Ct. at 1289. The Groh Court explicitly stated:
We do not say that the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrant from cross-referencing other documents. Indeed, most Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant. But in this case the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference, nor did either the affidavit or the application (which had been placed under seal) accompany the warrant. Hence, we need not further explore the matter of incorporation.Id., 540 U.S. at 557-58, 124 S. Ct. at 1290 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Groh Court held that where the warrant "did not describe the items to be seized at all," the warrant was so obviously deficient that any search performed pursuant to the warrant must be regarded as "`warrantless' within the meaning of our case law." Id., 540 U.S. at 558, 124 S. Ct. at 1290.
Also, in the very recent decision in Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 578503 (6th Cir. 2005), ATF agent Michael Johnson applied to a magistrate judge in the Western District of Kentucky for a search warrant. Id., 2005 WL 578503 at * 1. The description of the person or property to be seized stated, "See Attached Affidavit." Id. at * 2. When the warrant was issued it referred to the person or property to be seized as ". . . See Attached Affidavit;" and the magistrate judge who issued the affidavit ordered that both the application for the search warrant and the supporting affidavit be placed under seal. Id. at * 5.
The following day, the search warrant was executed. Id. As the agents were executing the search/seizure warrant, they met the manager of the storage facility which was the subject of the warrant. Id. The manager of the storage facility requested to see the affidavit, which was referenced in the warrant, but not part of it. Id. The manager was told "that the affidavit was part of the court records which were sealed;" and, the facility manager was told that unless he directed the agents to the particular property they were seeking, the entire building would be searched. Id. At that point, the warrant was read to the manager, who indicated "that the warrant was defective without a description of what was to be seized and indicated that his acquiescence to let the agents enter the building was not voluntary." Id.
The Baranski court indicated that in light of the decision in Groh, the search warrant did not comply with the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at * 8. The Baranski court stated that:
. . . it is undisputed that Agent Johnson's supporting affidavit was not attached to the warrant . . . there is no dispute that the affidavit which was under seal, was not at the scene of the search and seizure and, therefore, it was not, and could not have been, readily accessible.Id.
In this instance, the search warrants for the Old Grandview Highway property, the Baker Lane property, and the Sabo Road property did incorporate "Attachment A" by reference. Moreover, based upon the copies of the three search warrants entered into evidence by the government during the January 5, 2005 suppression hearing, an "Attachment A" was affixed to each of the three warrants. [Exhibit 1].
Further, unlike the situation in Baranski, based upon the evidence before the Court, particularly, the affidavit of Lee Reed, who stated that he picked up the affidavits from Titus A. Reed's Old Grandview Highway residence on September 4 or 5, 2004, it does not appear that anyone was present at the residence when the warrants were executed. Apparently, based upon the assertions in Lee Reed's affidavit, agents left copies of the warrants at the Old Grandview Highway residence on the evening of September 3, 2004, and Lee Reed retrieved the documents on September 4 or 5, after the warrants had been executed.
During the January 5, 2005 hearing, Rhea County (Tennessee) Sheriff Mike Neal testified that at the time the warrants were executed, the law enforcement officers did not have copies of the warrants in hand. [Court File No. 35, Transcript of Suppression Hearing, p. 49]. Rather, Sheriff Neal stated:
[w]hen they called Sergeant Farmer or Lieutenant Farmer with the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office who is also assisting us, when they called him and told him that the search warrant was signed. We were running out of daylight, basically, and when he said the warrant was signed, and we executed the warrant.
[Court File No. 35, p. 50]. On cross-examination by Reed's counsel, Neal reiterated that when the execution of the search warrants commenced, law enforcement officers were aware the warrant had been signed, but they did not have it in hand. Id. at p. 67.
Agent Marnie Corbitt, the affiant in each of the applications for the three search warrants also testified at the January 5, 2005 hearing. She testified that she and her supervisor Dave Shelton were present at the Magistrate Judge's office and that Shelton called Lieutenant Farmer to tell him that the warrants had been signed. Id. at p. 77. Corbitt further testified that she was not present at the Old Grandview Highway property when the warrants were executed, but she arrived there after the warrants had been executed. Id. at p. 77. Agent Corbitt testified that she spoke with the agents/officers who executed the warrants at the Old Grandview Highway property, who told her that in terms of the executions of the warrants
. . . they were at a specific location were staging basically, and waiting until I told them that the search warrant was signed. And when Dave Shelton phoned . . . that's when they said let's go and that's when they went and searched, executed the search warrant.Id. at p. 78.
With regard to the search warrants, Agent Corbitt testified that she obtained three warrants and that the same affidavit applied basically to all three. Id. at 81. Agent Corbitt testified that as soon as the warrants were signed, the phone call was made that the warrants were signed. Id. at 81-82. Agent Corbitt testified that once the warrants had been signed it was "a 45-minute drive, good 45-minute drive" for her to travel from the location of the magistrate judge's chambers to the Old Grandview Highway property. Id. at p. 82.
Agent Corbitt also testified at the detention hearing before United States Magistrate Judge Susan Lee on October 21, 2004. [Court File No. 29, Transcript of Detention Hearing]. Agent Corbitt testified that Reed voluntarily surrendered sometime after the September 3, 2004, search of the three pieces of property. [Court File No. 29, pp. 45-46]. She also testified that the return which is attached to the warrant for the Old Grandview Highway property was signed at approximately 8:00 P.M. on September 3, 2004. Id. at p. 39.
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from Groh and Baranski. First, unlike the situation in Groh, the three search warrants are not defective. The three search warrants clearly and unambiguously incorporate "Attachment A" by reference. Further, "Attachment A" is extremely detailed and certainly does describe the items to be seized from the search of the Old Grandview Highway property, the Baker Lane property and the Sabo Road property with particularity. Thus, unlike the situation in Groh, as a result of the incorporation by reference of "Attachment A", the three search warrants at issue do satisfy the particularity requirement.
Second, unlike the situation in Baranski, this is not a situation where at the time the three search warrants were executed, "Attachment A" existed and had been incorporated by reference into the search warrant but was unavailable to the agents because it was under seal. "Attachment A" had not been placed under seal. Further, by his own admission in the memorandum in support of his third motion to suppress [Court File No. 63], Reed was attending the funeral of his aunt at the time the three properties, particularly, the Old Grandview Highway residence, were searched. Therefore, unlike Baranski, no one was present when the three search warrants were executed and demanded to see "Attachment A" before the searched proceeded.
Further, although Reed asserts that no "Attachment A" was left with the copies of the search warrants that were left at his Old Grandview Highway residence, the evidence submitted by Reed does not establish that no copy of "Attachment A" was left at Reed's residence on September 3, 2004. Attached to Reed's addendum in support of his second motion to suppress [Court File No. 60] are copies of the search warrants for the Baker Lane and Sabo Road properties and a copy of the return for the warrants, which was completed by Lieutenant Farmer at approximately 20:00 — 8:00 p.m. — on September 3, 2004. Copies of the warrants would have been left at Reed's Old Grandview Highway on or about that time, e.g., sometime in the late evening hours of September 3, 2004. [Court File No. 60].
Lee Reed's affidavit states that he went to Reed's residence on Old Grandview Highway to pick up the three search warrants "on or about September 4 or 5, 2005." [Court File No. 56, Lee Reed affidavit]. Lee Reed states that when he picked up the copies of the warrants — for delivery to Attorney James B. Smith, Jr. — there was no "Attachment A." Id. The affidavit of Attorney James B. Smith Jr. states that "within a day or so" after the searched on Mr. Reed's property, Mr. Reed brought him the paperwork which had been left at his residence, and there was no "Attachment A" with the paperwork. [Court File No. 66].
As has been noted, Reed admits that there was no one present at his residence when the searches were conducted on September 3, 2004. [Court File No. 62, 63]. The affidavit of Lee Reed states that he retrieved the affidavits from the Old Grandview Highway residence on September 4 or 5 [Court File No. 56], a considerable period of time — perhaps twenty-four hours, or more, after the warrants were executed and copies were left. Moreover, because no one was present at the time the warrants were executed at the Old Grandview Highway residence, the law enforcement officers must have had to force their way into the residence — possibly by breaking down the door.
A defendant has the burden of proof in challenging the validity of the execution or service of a search warrant. United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1981). Reed has not satisfied his this burden. While the evidence established that when the copies of the search warrants were retrieved from the Old Grandview Highway residence sometime after the warrants were executed and the copies were left that there was no copy of "Attachment A," the evidence does not establish that no copy of "Attachment A" was left with the warrants on September 3, 2004. However, merely for purposes of the instant motion to suppress, the Court will assume arguendo that the law enforcement agents unintentionally, i.e., erroneously or inadvertently, failed to leave a copy, or copies, of Attachment A at the Old Grandview Highway residence at the time they left copies of the search warrants and the return for the warrants.
In Frisby v. United States, 79 F.3d 29 (6th Cir. 1996), a special agent from the Internal Revenue Service obtain a search warrant for the plaintiff's home and office which "incorporated by reference an `Attachment A,' which specifically enumerated the items to be seized." Id., 79 F.3d at 30. The law enforcement
agents served plaintiff with a copy of the warrant at the time of search, The agents inadvertently failed to provide plaintiff with a copy of Attachment A. However, after completing the search and before leaving the premises, the agents provided plaintiff with a complete inventory of the items they had seized.Id. at 31.
The Frisby court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the search and seizure were unlawful pursuant to the Fourth Amendment stating:
the search and seizure took place pursuant to a valid warrant and there is no allegation that the failure to serve plaintiff with a copy of Attachment A was either intentional or deliberate. Under these circumstances, the search and seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.Id. at 32.
Likewise in this situation, the search of Reed's residence took place pursuant to a valid search warrant, Reed has not asserted that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant and the evidence he has presented has not established that the failure, if any, to leave a copy of "Attachment A" was intentional or deliberate.
Furthermore, the Court need not suppress the evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41. Fed.R. Crim P. 41(d) states in relevant part:
The officer taking property under the warrant shall give to any person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place from which the property was taken. . . .
A violation of Rule 41(d) is "essentially ministerial in nature and a motion to suppress should be granted only when the defendant demonstrates legal prejudice or that non-compliance with the rule was intentional or in bad faith." Marx, 635 F.2d at 441 (citing United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 562 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S. Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980); United States v. Dauphinee, 538 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. McKenzie, 446 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 1971)). In order to show prejudice based upon non-compliance with Rule 41, a defendant "must show . . . he was subjected to a search that might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive had the rule been followed." Marx, 635 F.2d at 441 (citing United States v. Burke, 517 U.S. 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1975).
As noted above, Reed has not established that the failure, if any, to leave a copy of "Attachment A" at his Old Grandview Highway residence was either done intentionally or in bad faith. Further, because the search was performed pursuant to a valid search warrant, Reed cannot show that due to the the failure, if any, to leave a copy of "Attachment A" at his Old Grandview Highway residence he was subject to a search that would not have occurred. Moreover because Reed has not asserted that the search of his residence exceeded the scope of the warrant he cannot establish that the failure, if any, to leave a copy of "Attachment A" at his Old Grandview Highway residence resulted in a search that would have been less abrasive had a copy of "Attachment A" been left at his residence. Therefore, Reed has not established that he is entitled to suppression based upon the government's alleged failure to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 41.
Accordingly, Reed's second motion to suppress [Court File No. 56] will be DENIED. (2) Reed's Third Motion to Suppress [Court File No. 62].
In his third motion to suppress, Reed seeks to suppress the search of his residence on the Old Grandview Highway property on the ground that the search warrant was executed at a time when the officers knew he would be at his aunt's funeral. [Court File No. 62]. In his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Reed cites the decision in United States v. Finazzo, 583 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 441 U.S. 929, 99 S. Ct. 2047, 60 L.Ed.2d 657 (1979), as support for the proposition that because the law enforcement officers executed the warrant at a time the officers knew the defendant would be at the funeral of his aunt, the search of his residence constituted a break in (breaking and entering); and, therefore, the evidence/contraband seized as the result of the search of the Old Grandview Highway residence should be suppressed. [Court File No. 63].
However, Finazzo is inapposite to the situation presented by this case. In Finazzo, the Sixth Circuit held: (1) under the 1968 eavesdropping statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510- 2520, judges did not have the power to authorize breaking and entering (a break in) in order to install electronic eavesdropping/wiretapping devices; (2) that under the Fourth Amendment judges did not have the authority to authorize breaking and entering in order to install electronic/wiretapping devices; and (2) federal law enforcement agents did not have either independent statutory or constitutional authority to install eavesdropping/wiretapping devices. Finazzo, 583 F.2d at 838.
In this instance, the search warrant did not authorize law enforcement officers to enter, much less break and enter into, the residence on the Old Grandview Highway property in order to install an electronic eavesdropping/wiretapping device. Rather, the warrant authorized law enforcement officers to enter the residence to search for "contraband and/or property designed or intended for use which is or has been used as the means of committing violations of the Contraband Substance Act ( 21 U.S.C. § 841, 843(b) and 846) or violations of the money laundering statutes ( 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957)." [Exhibit 1 — Government Exhibit 1 Attachment A].
Further, the law enforcement officers did not break and enter into Reed's residence, they entered the residence while executing a valid search warrant. Moreover, by Reed's own admission at the time they officers arrived at the residence to execute the search warrant, Reed was attending the funeral of a family member — hence, the law enforcement officers would have been unable to locate anyone to admit them to the residence.
Finally, Reed has not presented a scintilla of evidence in support of his assertion that the law enforcement officers deliberately waited to execute the three search warrants, including the warrant for the Old Grandview Highway property, until they were aware that he was not at home.
Accordingly, Reed's third motion to suppress [Court File No. 62] is without merit and will be DENIED. (3) Reed's Fourth Motion to Suppress [Court File No. 64].
In his fourth motion to suppress, Reed challenges the search of his residence on the Old Grandview Highway property because the search warrant was executed by someone not authorized to do so. [Court File No. 64]. Specifically, Reed asserts that the only person named in the record as executing the search warrant was Tommy Farmer of the Hamilton County (Tennessee) Sheriff's Department. Id. Although Reed admits he can find no case law in support of the proposition he asserts that pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41, "an officer of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department certainly does not have the authority nor the jurisdiction to execute a search warrant in Rhea County." Id.
During the October 21, 2004 detention hearing before United States Magistrate Judge Susan Lee, Special Agent Marnie Corbitt of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation testified. [Court File No. 29]. Agent Corbitt was the affiant for the three applications for search warrants which were issued on September 3, 2004. Agent Corbitt testified that she is also specially assigned to the DEA. Id. at p. 18. Agent Corbitt testified that she "and other law enforcement agents executed a number of search warrants at various parcels of property owned by . . . Titus Reed." Id. She also testified:
Q You, yourself, were part of the team that searched this particular residence, the residence on Grandview, is that right?
A Yes, sir.Id. at p. 20.
At the January 5, 2005 suppression hearing, Agent Corbitt testified that she arrived at the Old Grandview Highway residence after the search had been performed, but while "[t]hey were still waiting on a few things to finish up." [Court File No. 35, p. 77]. She stated, "I was there." Id.
Agent Corbitt testified that she talked with the officers, in particular, she stated that she spoke with Lieutenant Tommy Farmer and Detective David Sowder, who were with the Hamilton County, Tennessee, Sheriff's Office. Id. Agent Corbitt stated that Lieutenant Farmer and Detective Sowder "[w]ere part of the group that executed the search warrant at the Old Grandview Road home." Id. at p. 78.
Further, as previously noted, Rhea County Sheriff Mike Neal testified during the January 5, 2005 suppression hearing. Rhea County Sheriff Neal testified that he assisted in searching the Baker Lane property after the search warrants were issued on September 3, 2004. [Court File No. 35, p. 49]. When asked when or at what point, he executed the search warrant for the Baker Lane property, Sheriff Neal testified, "[w]hen they called Sergeant Farmer or Lieutenant Farmer with the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office who is also assisting us. . . ." Id. at p. 50.
Thus, although Lieutenant Farmer and Detective Sowder are the only officers who have been explicitly been identified in the record as having been involved in executing the search warrant at the Old Grandview Highway residence, Sheriff Neal's and Agent Corbitt's testimony makes it clear that officers of the Hamilton County Sheriff's department were assisting officers/agents from Rhea County, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration in the simultaneous execution of the three search warrants on the Old Grandview Highway property, the Baker Lane property and the Sabo Road property on September 3, 2004.
Accordingly, Reed's fourth motion to suppress [Court File No. 64] is without merit and will be DENIED. IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above:
(1) The second motion to suppress, as twice supplemented, of defendant Titus A. Reed, [Court File No. 56] is hereby DENIED;
(2) The third motion to suppress of defendant Titus A. Reed [Court File No. [Court File No. 62] is hereby DENIED; and,
(2) The fourth motion to suppress of defendant Titus A. Reed [Court File No. 64] is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.