Opinion
Crim. File No. 97-235(01) (MJD/JGL).
April 16, 2001
D. Gerald Wilhelm, on behalf of the United States.
James E. Ostgard, on behalf of the Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Harvey Rea entered a conditional guilty plea to this Court to a charge of conspiracy to commit arson of a church annex, under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). He appealed, arguing that the factual basis for his plea did not support a finding that the church annex was "used in interstate . . . commerce . . ." as required by section 844(i). The Eighth Circuit reversed the sentencing order but affirmed the conviction. United States v. Rea ("Rea I"), 169 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 2000). After granting certoriari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Jones v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1904 (2000).
In the same order, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded United States v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1999).
The Eighth Circuit held that, in light of the new standard enunciated in Jones, the factual record was an insufficient basis for finding that the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement had been met. United States v. Rea ("Rea II"), 223 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2000). The case was reversed and remanded to this Court, for a determination of whether the church annex was used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce.
Background
Harvey Rea broke into the basement of the St. James A.M.E. Church annex on July 12, 1997, with his brother Jeremy, and stole a computer. Jeremy started a fire in the annex in order to destroy evidence of the crime; the fire spread, and destroyed much of the annex and its contents. The brothers were charged in a two-count indictment with conspiracy to commit arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 844(i), and aiding and abetting in the commission of arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, 844(i). Jeremy agreed to cooperate with the government, and pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact in the arson. Harvey entered a conditional guilty plea to the conspiracy count, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to enter a judgment of acquittal.
The annex is separated from the main church building by a three foot wide alley.
Analysis
The federal arson statute makes it a crime to damage or destroy, "by means of fire or an explosive, any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). In Rea I, the Eighth Circuit held that "section 844(i) reaches arson of any property having even a de minimis connection to interstate commerce." Rea, 169 F.3d at 1113 (quoting U.S. v. Ryan, 41 F.3d at 364). After that case was decided, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Jones v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1904 (2000), which heightened the standard for determining when a building is "used" in interstate commerce.
In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a private, owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity. Id. In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized the Congressional intent that the destroyed property itself must have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce. Id. at 1906. The proper inquiry, the Court affirmed, is "into the function of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1910, quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Jones Court held that the phrase "used in an activity affecting commerce" must be read to mean "active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce." Id. at 1910. Further, the word "use" ordinarily means "active employment." Id.
In January, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied the new standards enunciated in Jones to a case involving a church building destroyed by fire. In United States v. Grassie, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conviction of Walter Grassie under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), for burning down a church belonging to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ("LDS"). 2001 WL 46411 (10th Cir. 2001). The Grassie Court noted that the Supreme Court in Jones did not discuss the de minimis standard for effects on interstate commerce, but instead focused on active use versus a passive or passing relationship to commerce. Id. at *7. Once "active employment" is found, no particular "quantum of effect" is required. Id. The court held that, even under the new Jones standards, the LDS church was being "used" in interstate commerce. The court cited the broad range of activities which took place in the church, including educational, recreational and religious programs. In addition, the Church was frequently host to members of the faith from out of state. The decision cited the LDS leadership structure, noting that it is a unitary, monolithic religious faith whose leaders are out of state. Id. at *3. Thus, "by reasonable inference," the court deduced, the church buildings themselves were the nexus for a "constant flow of information, money, travel, and purchase and delivery of goods back and forth across state lines." Id.
Most significantly, the Grassie court reasoned that the defendant's stipulation of facts, which read: "[A]t all times relevant to the indictment the [church was] engaging in activities affecting interstate commerce," provided ample support for its finding. The court distinguished both Rea and Johnson, on the grounds that neither case involved a similar stipulation, and neither contained the type or quantity of evidence in the Grassie trial. Id. at *10.
In United States v. Johnson ("Johnson I"), 194 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit vacated the defendant's guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) for burning down a church, holding that the factual basis for the guilty plea did not satisfy the interstate commerce element of the statute. The Johnson I Court explicitly affirmed its earlier decision in United States v. Robinson, where it held that "in any particular case, proof of a slight effect on interstate on interstate commerce suffices." Id. at 660, quoting Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1997). However, the court held, neither the church's status as a dues-paying member of an organization that funded a national body, nor the out-of-state insurer's payment of a claim to the church, met that de minimis standard.
On grant of certoriari, the Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Jones. 120 S.Ct. 2193 (2000). On remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its earlier decision, adding that nothing in the Jones decision was inconsistent with the reasoning of Johnson I. See United States v. Johnson ("Johnson II"), 2001 WL 314606 (5th Cir. April 2, 2001) The Johnson II court clarified, however, that its decision was based on a determination that the factual basis for the plea did not show that the church building was being "actively employed for commercial purposes." Id. at *2.
The Eighth Circuit, reconsidering the Rea case on remand, noted the heightened standard and subsequent insufficiency of the evidence relied upon in Rea I, particularly the Church's use of materials purchased in interstate commerce and its use of natural gas from an out-of-state source. See United States v. Rea ("Rea II"), 2000 WL 1141030, *1 (8th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Ryan, 227 F.3d 1058 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that former fitness center, supplied with out-of-state natural gas, was not used in an activity affecting interstate commerce).
With these revised standards in mind, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on November 27, 2000. The evidence presented established that the St. James A.M.E. Church is a member of the Fourth Episcopal District of the General Conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. The General Conference has nineteen districts that cover all states in the United States, as well as ten foreign countries. Local churches must hold real estate in trust for the General Church, and are subject to the General Church's doctrine and discipline. The Fourth Episcopal District is governed by the District's Bishop, who resides in Chicago, Illinois, and a Presiding Elder, who is appointed by the Bishop. The Presiding Elder travels quarterly to the Church from Chicago for conferences regarding the governance of the Church, the efficiency of the pastor, and implementation of the General Churches guidance. St. James A.M.E. Church pays for the Presiding Elder's travel, lodging and meal for those quarterly meetings.
The hearing also established that the church annex itself was being used for meetings of the Board of Trustees, which has authority to establish budgets, approve expenditures, oversee financial administration, and make general decisions regarding the church, and of the Board of Stewards, which oversees the pastor. Sunday school and after-school programs were held in the annex, which was also used at various times for computer classes and a small food shelf.
Jones v. United States mandates a two-step analysis for the determination of when a building is used in interstate commerce; first, the court must determine the function of the building, and then determine whether that function affects interstate commerce. See 120 S.Ct. at 1909. Accordingly, the Court finds first that the primary function of the annex was to serve as the meeting place for the governing bodies of the church. St. James A.M.E. is part of a national church structure, and receives constant guidance and instruction from its national leadership. In particular, the meetings of the Board of Trustees, which were held in the annex, determined the financial administration of the church, supervised the church's general administration, and financed frequent interactions with members of the church hierarchy, all of whom are located out of state. The church annex, as the site of the Board of Trustees, was the nexus for a constant flow of information, finances and materials from out of state sources. See Grassie, 2001 WL 46411, *3. The Court finds therefore that the evidence establishes a sufficient factual basis for finding that the church annex was being "used in interstate commerce," as that term is defined in Jones. See id. at 1910.
Therefore, the Court find that the requisite jurisdictional elements of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) have been met. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's conviction is reinstated.