Opinion
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
On Remand from the United States Supreme Court.
Before REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Hernan Ramirez was indicted for being a felon in possession of firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court suppressed the evidence of the firearms on the theory that they had been discovered in connection with a violation of Ramirez' knock-and-announce rights. Ramirez argued in support of that ruling. He also sought to support the suppression decision on the ground that the search warrant was obtained without probable cause, although the district court found to the contrary.
The United States Supreme Court has held that there was no knock-and-announce violation. See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998). We, therefore, dispose of that issue in a published order. In this disposition, we take up Ramirez' alternate ground for affirming the district court's suppression decision.
We disagree with Ramirez' contention that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant. Of course, the evidence presented to the magistrate had to show that there was a fair probability that Shelby would be found at Ramirez' home. See United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670, 674 (9th Cir.1998). The district court found that there was probable cause, and the Supreme Court implied as much. See Ramirez, 523 U.S. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 996-97. Given the propinquity of the date of Shelby's escape, the dates of his probable presence at Ramirez' home on at least two days, the date of issuance of the warrant, and the date of service of that warrant, we cannot disagree with them.
Were we in any doubt whatever, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would preclude suppression in this case because the warrant was not so deficient that reliance upon it could be dubbed unreasonable. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (9th Cir.1986).
We, therefore, AFFIRM the district court on the probable cause issue, and, as set forth in our published order filed this date, REVERSE its suppression order and REMAND.