Mr. Finley's mental condition, as set forth by Dr. Wicks, will be presented at trial to show that Mr. Finley did not have the intent to defraud, the requisite mens rea for the crime. The case of United States v. Rahm[,] 993 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) contains a very similar fact pattern and is legal authority for the admission of the evidence. I have attached a copy of the opinion for your convenience.

In cases decided since Brodie, however, we have held Rule 704(b) does not preclude an expert from testifying to a predicate matter, even if the jury might infer the necessary mens rea from such testimony, so long as the testimony as to the predicate matter does not necessarily imply the mens rea element. See United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947, 111 S. Ct. 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326 (1990). We take this opportunity to overrule Brodie.

We treat the erroneous admission of expert testimony the same as all other evidentiary errors, by subjecting it to harmless error review. See United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1415 (9th Cir.1993). We reverse “only if the error affect[ed] a substantial right of the party.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court's refusal to allow an expert to testify regarding a witness's psychiatric condition. United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1993). The defense proffered the testimony of an expert witness to establish that Doe had a "dependent personality disorder.

Here, the district court instead focused on Dr. Karim’s bottom-line opinions, rather than "his proposed expert testimony ," id. , contrary to our guidance in Christian . There, we emphasized "that a district court deciding whether to admit expert testimony should evaluate whether that testimony ‘will assist the trier of fact in drawing its own conclusion as to a fact in issue’ and should not limit its consideration to ‘the existence or strength of an expert’s opinion .’ " Id. (quoting United States v. Rahm , 993 F.2d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993) ). We explained this is necessary because the doctor there could not have testified that the defendant "lacked the capacity to form the specific intent to threaten," id. at 812 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 704(b) ), and "[i]t would make little sense to require a conclusive opinion in determining admissibility, and then absolutely to forbid expression of the opinion in testimony," id. (quoting Rahm , 993 F.2d at 1411 n.3 ).

Nonetheless, in light of Bayer-Boring's extensive academic qualifications and experience and the relevance and value of her testimony to the jury, the "proffered testimony otherwise satisfie[d] the requirements for admission." United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir.1993).

Mr. Finley’s mental condition, as set forth by Dr. Wicks, will be presented at trial to show that Mr. Finley did not have the intent to defraud, the requisite mens rea for the crime. The case ofUnited States v. Rahm[,] 993 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) contains a very similar fact pattern and is legal authority for the admission of the evidence. I have attached a copy of the opinion for your convenience.

A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an “erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts.” United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1410 (9th Cir.1993). The basic test for admissibility under Rule 702 is whether the expert will aid the trier of fact.

Id. at 1036. Oregana also relies on the Ninth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2002), United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993), discussed in detail below. The government objects to Dr. Perez-Arce's testimony on Rule 704(b) grounds and also on the grounds that it constitutes an impermissible expert opinion.

We have explained that a district court deciding whether to admit expert testimony should evaluate whether that testimony “will assist the trier of fact in drawing its own conclusion as to a ‘fact in issue’ ” and should not limit its consideration to “the existence or strength of an expert's opinion.” United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir.1993) (emphasis in original). In Rahm, the defendant was charged with possession of counterfeit currency and attempting to pass counterfeit currency; her only defense was that she did not know the currency was counterfeit.