We remain highly deferential to jury verdicts, but are obligated, as judges, to reverse a conviction where, having viewed all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we must conclude that the record cannot support a conclusion that the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Id. at 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781; United States v. Ragan, 24 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1994) (“Although the strict nature of this standard demonstrates our reluctance to interfere with jury verdicts, this case is an example of why courts of appeal must not completely abdicate responsibility for reviewing jury verdicts.”). In the closing argument at trial, Keith's trial counsel attempted to explain this failure, arguing that although these witnesses were aware that Keith was the subject of a criminal investigation, they did not notify law enforcement of their suspicions regarding George because they did not know the investigation of Keith was a serious matter.
David was convicted, but this court reversed his conviction on appeal for insufficient evidence. United States v. Ragan, 24 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1994). David was also a party in a multi-district civil suit alleging that he participated in fraudulent transactions while employed for ContiArbitrage-Houston. See In re ContiCommodities Servs., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd in part sub nom, ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1318 (1996).
The conviction was reversed on appeal to this court because the record did not show a sufficient connection between David Ragan and the charged offenses. United States v. Ragan, 24 F.3d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court's grant of summary judgment against David Ragan, on the basis of his conviction which was on appeal at the time of judgment, was improper.
"[a]lthough the strict nature of this [sufficiency of the evidence] standard demonstrates our reluctance to interfere with jury verdicts, this case is an example of why courts of appeal must not completely abdicate responsibility for reviewing jury verdicts."Crain, 33 F.3d at 487 (quoting United States v. Ragan, 24 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1994)). For these reasons, we reverse McMillian's conviction in Count 3 for possession with the intent to distribute.
In reviewing the evidence supporting the conviction: United States v. Ragan, 24 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 266, 126 L.Ed.2d 218, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 560, 126 L.Ed.2d 460 (1993). It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every rational hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
"[a]lthough the strict nature of this standard demonstrates our reluctance to interfere with jury verdicts, this case is an example of why courts of appeal must not completely abdicate responsibility for reviewing jury verdicts."United States v. Ragan, 24 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1994). For the reasons stated, we hold that the evidence was insufficient to convict Crain for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.