Opinion
Case No. 2:05CR153DAK.
August 24, 2005
ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant Ivan Asgard Sanchez Quintana's Motion to Suppress. An evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress was held on May 31, 2005. Defendant appeared and was represented by Regis Covey. Plaintiff was represented by Michael Kennedy. The court held closing arguments on the motion on August 11, 2005. The court has carefully considered the evidence presented at the hearing, the memoranda submitted by counsel, and the law and facts relating to this motion. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Order.
A. FINDINGS OF FACT
Sergeant Daniel Endter is an officer with the Washington County Sheriff's Office, with thirteen years of experience. In his career, he has performed thousands of traffic stops. While assigned to the investigations unit in January 2005, he was conducting two or three traffic stops per day.
On January 13, 2005, based on a citizen tip, Utah Highway Patrol dispatch in Cedar City put out an attempt to locate notice on a black two-door Infiniti without a license plate that reportedly was speeding south-bound on I-15 near milepost 27. Endter monitored the attempt to locate on the radio in his unmarked sheriff's office vehicle.
About eight minutes after the attempt to locate notice, Endter was at I-15 south-bound Exit 16, when he observed a dark black car approaching from behind at a high rate of speed. The vehicle did not have visible plates. Endter was traveling the speed limit, 75 mph, and the vehicle passed him going an estimated 80 mph. Endter pursued the vehicle, and paced it for approximately one mile. He paced it by maintaining a consistent distance between himself and the suspect vehicle, while counting off time as the vehicles passed fixed highway markers.
Endter uses this pacing technique "all the time" and, during the time that he was a detective, he was doing so "two or three times a day." During the time he paced the vehicle, both vehicles entered a construction zone in which the speed limit was 60 mph. During the entire time he paced the suspect vehicle, both he and the other vehicle were traveling 80 mph.
At Exit 13, Sergeant Endter signaled the vehicle to stop, and it did so without incident. Endter approached the vehicle from the driver's side and identified himself to the driver as an officer and explained the reason for the stoop. The subject vehicle was being driven by the Defendant, Ivan Sanchez-Quintana. Sergeant Endter asked for a driver's license and registration. Defendant retrieved his wallet. Holding the wallet extremely close to his chest, Dfendant opened it and pulled out a driver's license in the name of Sealtiel Tinajero. Defendant presented it to Endter.
Endter considered the manner in which Defendant held his wallet to be suspicious. In his experience from thousands of stops, Endter testified that stopped motorists typically hold their wallets on their laps. In the few times a motorist has held the wallet close to the chest as Defendant did, upon further inquiry Endter has discovered contraband or false identification. Based on his observation, Endter asked Defendant if there was anything in his wallet he was trying to hide. Defendant stated, "no," and fully opened his wallet.
At that point, Endter observed the left edge of another Utah Driver's license in the credit card slots on the right side of the wallet. In all of his thousands of traffic stops, Endter has encountered individuals with more than one license only thirty or forty times, and of those, only about ten have been legitimate. Endter asked Defendant to give him the license, and Defendant complied. The license was in Sanchez-Quintana's own name. Endter asked him about the discrepancy, and Defendant stated that the second license was not his. Endter had Defendant get out of the case and stand in the area between his vehicle and Endter's vehicle. Endter looked through the wallet and observed credit cards in three different names. Endter also ran both driver's licenses through dispatch. The Tinajero license came back valid and the SanchezQ-uitana license came back as suspended. At that point, Endter arrested Defendant. Endter did not know Sanchez-Quintana's true identity at that point.
To the extent that Defendant's testimony regarding the events relating to the wallet and driver's license differed from Endter's testimony, the court finds Endter's testimony more credible. While Defendant was in Sergeant Endter's custody, he did not advise Defendant of his Miranda rights.
Endter asked Washington County Sheriff's Office Detective Shauna Jones, who had stopped to help Endter, to transport Defendant to the Washington County Jail. Following standard procedures, Endter began an inventory search of Sanchez-Quintana's vehicle. In the vehicle, he found university paperwork in the name of Ivan Sanchez and purchase paperwork for two vehicles in the name of Sealtiel Tinajero. One set of paperwork was for the subject Acura, and the second set of paperwork was for a Volkswagen Jetta. Endter called St. George Motorcars and was told that Sealtiel Tinajero had purchased both vehicles on December 28, 2004.
While Detective Jones was transporting Defendant to the jail, Defendant attempted to initiate a conversation with her. She had him wait until she conducted radio business, and then asked him if he still wanted to tell her something. Defendant asked if could explain something, and Jones asked if Sergeant Endter had advised him of his Miranda rights. Defendant said that he had. Jones asked him if he understood that those rights would still apply to his conversation with her, and he said that he understood his rights. Defendant then told Jones that he had lied to Sergeant Endter about his identity because he was unaware of his cousin's immigrations status and his true identity was Ivan Sanchez.
Detective Jones never advised Sanchez-Quintana of his Miranda rights because of his statement to her that Endter had already advised him of those rights and she believed him. Sanchez-Quintana testified at the evidentiary hearing that he told Detective Jones that he was not sure if Detective Endter had advised him of his Miranda rights but that he understood them. He specifically testified that he understood he had the right to remain silent and that whatever he told Detective Jones could be used against him.
At the jail, Detective Jones learned that Defendant was on probation or parole. She also attempted to obtain a current address or phone number for Sealtiel Tinajero. In the process, Jones discovered that on December 3, 2004, Tinajero had reported as stolen his wallet, containing the driver's license, social security card, and two debit cards. The stolen property report had been lodged with the Cedar City Police Department.
Sergeant Endter also went to the jail, where he was advised that Sanchez-Quintana was under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole ("APP"). Endter learned that SanchezQ-uintana's parole supervisor was Richard Bauer. Endter spoke with Bauer and informed him of Sanchez-Quintana's arrest, the false information regarding Sealtiel Tinajero, and the autos purchased under Tinjero's name. Bauer said that he would visit Defendant's residence and speak with his girlfriend.
Defendant was a signatory of a parole supervision agreement entered into in February 2004, and which was still in force on January 13, 2005. Condition Number 6 of the probation agreement provides that the parolee/probationer agrees that APP officers may search his residence and property without a warrant at any time on reasonable suspicion.
Bauer and another APP officer, Todd Mitchell, went to Defendant's residence on January 13, 2005 and conducted a search of the residence and of a Volkswagen Jetta. Bauer and Mitchell spoke with Christy Greener, Defendant's girlfriend who was at the home. She indicated that she lived at the home with Defendant. She gave them permission to search the home and the Volkswagen Jetta. She also indicated that the Volkswagen Jetta was hers and gave them the keys to it. Mitchell and Bauer were later assisted in the search by Sergeant Endter and Detective Jones. Numerous items of evidence were seized from the residence.
B. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendant contends that (1) the initial stop of his vehicle for speeding was not based on an observed traffic violation, (2) Officer Endter improperly questioned him about and seized his wallet and driver's licenses, (3) the search of his residence was invalid because police officers participated in addition to probation officers, and (4) any statements by him must be suppressed based on the officers' failure to advise him of his rights pursuant to Mirana v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).1. Initial Stop for Speeding
Defendant argues that Officer Endter did not have a basis for stopping Defendant because the pacing method employed by Endter was not reliable. "A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." United States v. Botero-Ospino, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
In this case, Endter heard an attempt to locate a speeding black car with no license plates issued by UHP dispatch in Cedar City. Several minutes later, and consistent with the time and place the vehicle may have reached, Endter viewed Defendant approaching at a high rate of speed in a black car with no license plates. Endter was traveling 75 mph and he estimated that Defendant passed him traveling 80 mph. Endter pursued the vehicle and paced it for a mile. Although Defendant's objections to the stop are based almost entirely on the reliability of the pacing method employed by Endter, the facts at the evidentiary hearing did not demonstrate that the method was unreliable. Endter routinely uses the pacing method to stop vehicles. In addition, his practice of verifying the accuracy of the speedometer on his vehicle does not raise concerns. Endter paced the car at 80 mph even when the cars entered a 60 mph construction zone. The arguments made by Defendant as to the accuracy of the pacing method may have been relevant if Defendant was stopped for driving only five mph above the posted speed limit. However, Endter did not stop Defendant until he was traveling 20 mph above the posted speed limit. At that time, Endter clearly had both reasonable suspicion and probable cause that a traffic violation was occurring. Therefore, Endter's observation of the speeding violation justified the stop of Defendant's vehicle.
2. Questioning and Search of Wallet and Driver's Licenses
Defendant argues that the search and seizure of his wallet was an improper warrantless search because it does not meet any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Defendant addresses only the automobile exception and the plain view doctrine. However, the court agrees with the government that Endter's initial interactions with Defendant during the stop can be evaluated using the general reasonableness of Endter's actions rather than the automobile or plain view exceptions. United States v. Oliver, 363 F.3d 1061, 1067 (10th Cir. 2004).
The totality of the circumstances, as well as the reasonable inferences and conclusions that may be drawn by an officer, support Endter's questioning with respect to the wallet. Endter testified that Defendant held the wallet unusually close to himself and that in his experience almost all drivers place their wallets on their laps. Endter also testified that in the few times when drivers do hold their wallet closely, a majority of such incidents result in some sort of offense. It was reasonable for Endter to rely on his experience in these situations in response to Defendant's behavior. In response to Defendant's unusual behavior, Endter asked Defendant if he had anything to hide. The court finds the question reasonable under the circumstances. When Defendant stated "no" in response to Endter's question, he opened his wallet in a gesture to show that he had nothing to hide. Endter testified that he then saw the second driver's license. When Endter observed what he believed was a second license he reasonably asked for it to be given to him. There was no need for the second license to be suspected contraband. An officer conducting a Terry-type investigative detention is entitled to obtain identification from the subject. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972). Endter was reasonably entitled to pursue the matter in order to identify the driver and ensure that he was legitimately operating the vehicle. United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995) (subject may be detained "until [the officer is] assured that the driver's license is valid and the driver is legitimately operating the vehicle."). Moreover, such questioning did not extend the length of the stop. The court concludes that the questioning regarding the wallet and driver's license, as well as the request for the second driver's license to be handed over, were reasonable under the circumstances.
Once Endter was in possession of the two driver's licenses with different names, it was reasonable for him to inquire about Defendant's possession of two licenses. Defendant responded that the other driver's license was not his. At this time, Endter had probable cause to believe that Defendant was providing false information to him. Once this probable cause was established, Enter was entitled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle and any containers within it. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Endter's warrantless search of the wallet for evidence of the offense was justified and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
3. Search of Defendant's Home
Defendant seeks to suppress all items seized by Detective Jones from his home because Jones is not his probation officer. Defendant also asserts that in order to search the house and Greener's vehicle, the probation department would have needed facts which would have reasonably supported a belief that Defendant had common authority over the vehicle and home. Utah v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 534 (Utah 1998).
In this case, Defendant had signed a probation supervision agreement on February 10, 2004, which was still in effect on the date of the search. As a probationer, Defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy in his home. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001). A search pursuant to a probation agreement may be based on reasonable suspicion alone. Id. at 121. Defendant's agreement in this case also clearly provided for a warrantless search based on reasonable suspicion.
Although Defendant focuses on the participation of the police officers in the search of his home, he does not provide any support for the impropriety of their involvement. In fact, cases appear to recognize joint searches as a routine practice. The government argues that to the extent that Defendant's arguments are drawing a distinction between an investigative search and a probation enforcement search, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a state "has a dual concern with a probationer. . . . Its interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law . . . may therefore justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen." United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120-21 (2001). In this case, there was not only reasonable suspicion, there was probable cause to search Defendant's property. The court concludes that nothing precluded participation by police officers in addition to probation officers from searching Defendant's home.
Defendant also argues that the police did not adequately ascertain Defendant's authority over the house or vehicle. However, the testimony established that Greener gave the APP officers permission to search the home and the Volkswagen Jetta. Therefore, the court finds no basis for suppressing the evidence seized from Defendant's home.
4. Miranda
Defendant also seeks to suppress any statements he made to Detective Jones because he was never read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant also argues that the interrogation should have terminated after he requested an attorney. The government concedes that the requirements of Miranda attach because Defendant was in custody and the questioning meets the legal definition of interrogation. Generally a failure to give the warnings would preclude the admissibility of any statements made by the Defendant. Dickerson v. United states, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). However, the government argues that Defendant's statement that he had already been read his rights excuses Detective Jones recitation of the full test of the Miranda warnings.
In United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, the Tenth Circuit recognized that a blind adherence to the test of the Miranda warning has never been required. The facts of this case are unusual. While Detective Jones was transporting Defendant to the jail, Defendant tried to initiate a conversation with her. After she completed business on the radio, she asked him if he still wanted to tell her something. Defendant asked her if he could explain something. Because Jones had not been present the entire time that Endter had stopped Defendant, she asked Defendant if Endter had advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant said that Endter had done so. Jones then asked him if he understood those rights would still apply to his conversation with her, and Defendant said that he understood his rights. Defendant then told Jones that he had lied to Endter about his identity because he was unaware of his cousin's immigration status and that his true identity was Ivan Sanchez.
It was Defendant's own actions that prevented the Miranda warnings from being given. Detective Jones tried to ensure that Defendant had been given his rights and understood them. Had Defendant truthfully stated that Endter did not read him his rights, Detective Jones would have known that she needed to given him his rights. Defendant not only stated that he had been given his rights, he specifically told Detective Jones that he understood his rights. There is no testimony that Defendant was having difficulty understanding the conversation in any way. Based on Defendant's representations, it would be unreasonable in this situation to expect Detective Jones to have repeated the Miranda warning. Therefore, the court declines to suppress his statements on Miranda grounds. Should the government seek to admit Defendant's statements to Detective Jones at trial, they will be subject only to the additional requirement of an ordinary voluntariness determination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
C. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, based upon the above reasoning, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.