In assessing sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and we draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, we consider the evidence in its totality, not in isolation, and the government need not negate every possible theory of innocence.

We address here Song's most significant argument on appeal — namely, that the District Court erred when it precluded Song from testifying as to certain statements made to him by the "manager" and Mrs. Kim, who allegedly had hired Song to serve as a tour guide after he had responded to an advertisement on a Korean language website seeking "drivers" for an unspecified purpose. As a preliminary matter, we agree that much or all of the excluded testimony was not in fact hearsay, inasmuch as the challenged statements were offered not for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather, to demonstrate the motivation behind Song's actions, which were taken in response to the assertedly false statements made to him by the "manager" and Mrs. Kim. See United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that excluded testimony "apparently was not offered for the truth of the matters asserted" where "the conversations . . . would assertedly have established that [the defendant] had been duped . . . into thinking he would be carrying back a package of gold jewelry, not cocaine"); United States v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6, 11 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Although [defendant's] testimony as to what he had been told by [his friend] regarding the contents of [a] package [later found to contain cocaine] was inadmissible to prove the truth of the statement itself, since for that purpose it was hearsay, the testimony was clearly admissible to prove that the statement had been made, which was relevant to the material issue of whether [defendant] believed that the package contained valuables or securities rather than narcotics."). Despite this error, we conclude that Song's explanation for his activities on the day of his arrest — namely, that he was an innocent tour guide who had been deceived into

In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991). All permissible inferences must be drawn in the government's favor.

This standard imposes a heavy burden on the defendant, as a conviction must be otherwise affirmed. When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991).

When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991). The Court must consider direct evidence as well as any circumstantial evidence proffered.

It is well established, though, that statements offered for their effect on the listener are non-hearsay. See United States v. Garcia, 900 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that statements were properly admitted as non-hearsay to provide context in which drug transaction occurred); see also United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991). Hospital staff notified the New York City Police Department. New York City Police officer Rosado was assigned to investigate D.G.'s complaint.

Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). An out-of-court statement offered for some other purpose, such as to show that a statement was made, United States v. Kohan, 806 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir.1986), to demonstrate the statement's effect on the listener, United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1365 (2d Cir.1991), or to show the circumstances under which subsequent events occurred, United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 200 (2d Cir.1984), is not hearsay. In this case, the proffered evidence was not offered for its truth but to show that the statements occurred and that, given their effect on the defendants' state of mind, they provided a good faith basis for the defendants' actions.

The statements are instead offered to show the information he had when he applied for the arrest warrant." Id. at 200; see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) (" `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."); see also United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[The] proffered testimony regarding these conversations apparently was not offered for the truth of the matters asserted. Thus, the statements would not have been hearsay as offered.

"When reviewing a conviction for an alleged insufficiency of evidence, this Court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, construe all permissible inferences in its favor, resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jury's verdict, and uphold a conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Reyes, 157 F.3d 949, 955 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Brown, 937 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1991), United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1991) and United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1357 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A. Count One

See United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, we consider the evidence in its totality, not in isolation, and the government need not negate every theory of innocence.