In Christman, we disavowed such a rationale, reasoning that “[w]hile it is not an abuse of discretion for a judge to take note of a defendant's educational background and skill, neither is a defendant's job, in and of itself, relevant to sentencing absent unusual circumstances.” 607 F.3d at 1119 (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Pool, 474 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.2007) (“Notwithstanding, it is not extraordinary that in the area of white collar crime, a principal's business and employees may suffer if he is incarcerated.”). The district court's heavy reliance on unremarkable aspects of Peppel's characteristics constituted an abuse of discretion. Nothing in the record establishes unique circumstances other than his chosen profession and status in the community, both of which are decidedly inappropriate to form the basis of such a large downward variance.

The court relied in particular on the value of preserving Pool's business and his employees' jobs, the need for Pool to continue his significant charitable activities, and the existence of his medical problems. See United States v. Pool, 474 F.3d 1127, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 2007). The government appealed, and this court vacated the probationary sentence as an unreasonable variance, noting that while the circumstances the district court relied on were "appropriate considerations, the court gave too much weight" to these factors, which did "not justify a variance of this magnitude," and gave insufficient weight to other section 3553(a) factors, such as the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.

"We review a district court's variance from the advisory guidelines range under a reasonableness standard that is similar to an abuse of discretion review." United States v. Pool, 474 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Plaza, 471 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2006)). An abuse of discretion may occur "if a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case."

However, if a district court did take such an impact into consideration, we think it would also have been necessary to consider the fact that "[i]t is not extraordinary that in the area of white collar crime, a principal's business and employees may suffer if he is incarcerated." United States v. Pool, 474 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.2007). Furthermore, the court was also obligated to consider whether Taylor's sentence would serve the purpose of providing "adequate deterrence to criminal conduct."

Jones did not request a departure under the guidelines, and the district court's denial came moments after the parties argued about the propriety of a variance. See, e.g., United States v. Pool, 474 F.3d 1127, 1129 n. 1 (8th Cir. 2007) (assuming from context that the district court "varied" when it stated that it was going to "depart" from the guidelines). Jones argues here that this statement by the district court is evidence that it "failed to appreciate" that the sentencing guidelines are now advisory.

But "[t]he Montreal Convention is the successor to the Warsaw Convention of 1929," and the two Conventions share many substantive provisions. Narayanan, 474 F.3d 1127 n.2 (citing Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (the "Warsaw Convention")). "Accordingly, in interpreting the Montreal Convention, courts have routinely relied upon Warsaw Convention precedent where the equivalent provision in the Montreal Convention is substantively the same."