Mr. Taylor's assent to the plea agreement containing stipulations on the enhancements is dispositive. Plea agreements are contracts, United States v. Pappas , 409 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005), and the inclusion of specific terms demonstrates the result of negotiations, seeUnited States v. Cook , 406 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, "[i]f a defendant knowingly agreed to relinquish a specific right in exchange for concessions from the government, then that right has been intentionally abandoned and thus waived."
"Waiver and forfeiture are related doctrines; waiver occurs when a defendant intentionally relinquishes or abandons a known right, whereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant fails to timely assert his rights." United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "A forfeiture is basically an oversight; a waiver is a deliberate decision not to present a ground for relief that might be available in the law."
And more specifically, a defendant cannot invite a district court to impose restitution and later complain that the court was without authority to require any restitution. Id. at 1179 (citation omitted) (ruling in a case in which the defendant stipulated to a smaller amount of restitution than the court ordered); see also United States v. Sukhtipyaroge , 1 F.4th 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2021) (ruling in a visa-fraud case that by expressly agreeing that a person "was entitled to at least some restitution as an ‘identifiable victim,’ [the defendant] cannot now make the exact opposite argument on appeal" (citation omitted)); United States v. Pappas , 409 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that defendant waived any challenge to the restitution amount when he stipulated to that amount in his plea agreement). By stipulating to the total-restitution amount, Williams did more than not object.
See United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir.2014) (“a defendant who affirmatively states ‘I do not object’ or ‘I withdraw my objection’ has not forfeited the right, but rather intentionally relinquished or waived the right and cannot ask for review.”) “ ‘[W]aiver occurs when a defendant intentionally relinquishes or abandons a known right, whereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant simply fails to timely assert his rights.’ ” United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir.2005), quoting United States v. Harris, 230 F.3d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir.2000). A forfeiture generally reflects an oversight, whereas a waiver encompasses a deliberate decision not to present a ground for relief.
After the mistrial, the district court did not indicate to the parties that any waivers from the first trial would carry over to the second trial, and it is unnecessary for us to decide whether such an indication would have been effective. Under the facts of this case, we decline to find that Campbell waived (rather than forfeited) his right to challenge the harboring instructions. See generally United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir.2005) (discussing forfeiture and waiver). “In order to reverse for plain error, we must find (1) error (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the defendant's substantial rights.”
Brown's state convictions did not meet those conditions. Finally, Brown wants to argue that the district court should not have ordered him to pay the gun dealer for the stolen rifles without making a finding that he had the ability to pay. But in his plea agreement Brown committed to paying restitution, and by statute a district court is authorized to impose restitution as agreed by the parties. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3); see United States v. Allen, 201 F.3d 163, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that sentencing court is not required to independently evaluate defendant's ability to pay when the parties have agreed to restitution as part of plea agreement); see also United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that defendant's promise to pay restitution as part of plea agreement is binding). Accordingly, we GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
Since plea agreements are contracts, their content and meaning are determined according to ordinary contract principles. See United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). The terms of promises must be read according to their natural meaning, United States v. Salazar, 453 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2006), and in light of the parties' reasonable expectations, United States v. Atkinson, 259 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Matchopatow, 259 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2001).
The United States argues that Mr. Hill waived the issue of whether the dismissal of the original prosecution occurred with or without prejudice when, during the prior proceedings, his counsel failed to raise this issue and secure a ruling by the Magistrate Judge. See United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[W]aiver occurs 7 when a defendant intentionally relinquishes or abandons a known right." (quoting United States v. Harris, 230 F.3d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). On the facts before us, we do not agree that this issue was waived by Defendant or his prior counsel.
been compensated fully does not prevent a district court from pursuing the rehabilitative and retributive functions of the criminal law served by restitution."); United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d. 386, 393 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[T]his court has already held that a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery" (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir. 1993)); United States v. Gallant, 537 F.2d 1202, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that a private settlement cannot abrogate the language of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act); United States v. May, 500 F. App'x 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) ("'[a] private settlement between a criminal wrongdoer and his victim releasing the wrongdoer from further liability does not preclude a district court from imposing a restitution order for the same underlying wrong" (quoting United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3d 1031, 1041 (6th Cir. 2001)). In United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit considered a circumstance in which the defendant acknowledged the amount of restitution in the plea agreement, but argued at sentencing that he had entered into a civil settlement agreement with the victim in which the victim would release him from further civil liability in exchange for a lower amount. The district court imposed the restitution, minus the lower amount the defendant had paid to the victim under the terms of the settlement agreement, and the defendant appealed.
Id. (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 733); see also United States v. Pappas, 409 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Waiver and forfeiture are related doctrines; waiver occurs when a defendant intentionally relinquishes or abandons a known right, whereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant fails to timely assert his rights.") (quotations and citations omitted).