U.S. v. One Chrysler Sedan, Motor No. C77048

1 Citing case

  1. Duckworth v. Bernstein

    55 Md. App. 710 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    Finding individual was agent of mortgagor for purpose of attesting to consideration for mortgage, but not deciding whether he was agent for purpose of negotiating loan

    See also Baltimore American Ins. Co. v. Ulman, 165 Md. 630, 170 A. 202 (1934) (knowledge of mortgagee's agent imputed to mortgagee even though agent was also acting as special agent of mortgagor in procuring mortgage); and Elliott Building and Loan Ass'n v. Karopchinsky, 156 Md. 302, 144 A. 254 (1929) (agent's knowledge attributable to principal even though agent claimed 10 percent commission from borrowers for obtaining loan). And see U.S. v. One Chrysler Sedan, 18 F. Supp. 684 (D.C. Pa. 1937) (imputing of agent's knowledge to principal especially applicable where agent is employed to obtain the knowledge sought to be charged to principal). The reason for this rule is based on the principle that one who elects to transact his business through another must ordinarily be held accountable for what the other does or does not do in conducting that business. It is the principal who has selected the agent, and if he has chosen unwisely, it is he who should bear the burden, and not a third party who has dealt with the agent to the third party's detriment.