U.S. v. One Chrysler Sedan, Motor No. C77048

5 Citing cases

  1. United States v. One 1956 Model 4-Door Pontiac Catalina Auto.

    159 F. Supp. 955 (M.D. Ga. 1957)

    With such knowledge imparted to the dealer, who knew, of course, of John's interested activity in the selection and purchase of this car, it could hardly be said that the dealer had no reason to believe that it would be used illegally. See in this connection, United States v. One Chrysler Sedan, Motor No. C77048, D.C.M.D.Pa., 18 F.Supp. 684; United States v. 1938 Buick Sedan, etc., D.C. Minn., 24 F.Supp. 739; United States v. Automobile Financing, Inc., 5 Cir., 99 F.2d 498, affirmed 307 U.S. 219, 59 S.Ct. 861, 83 L.Ed. 1249; United States v. One 1935 Plymouth Sedan Automobile, etc., D.C.W.D.Ky., 36 F.Supp. 261; United States v. One 1947 DeSoto Sedan, D.C.W.D.Mo., 87 F.Supp. 1005; C.I.T. Corporation v. United States, 4 Cir., 86 F.2d 311, and United States v. One 1941 Ford Coach Automobile, etc., D.C.W.D.Va., 42 F.Supp. 246.         Accordingly, the United States Attorney may prepare an order forefeiting the vehicle and denying claimant's claim.

  2. U.S. v. One 1955 Model Buick Coupe Automobile

    145 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Ga. 1956)   Cited 2 times

    In other words, as in the instant case, the automobile salesman cannot overlook the fact that a purchaser's husband who assisted in the negotiation of the purchase of an automobile by his wife was known to the salesman to be in the bootleg or moonshine liquor business. In deciding the question of whether the lack of good faith and the knowledge of the dealer should be imputed to the claimant finance company, the Court in United States v. One Chrysler Sedan, D.C., 18 F. Supp. 684, 687, in a case identical to this, held: "* * * the claimant must be held to knowledge of facts known to the dealer, whether disclosed to the claimant or not."

  3. U.S. v. 1938 Buick Sedan, Etc.

    24 F. Supp. 739 (D. Minn. 1938)   Cited 3 times

    The burden of proof in this proceeding is upon the claimant to establish his right to relief under the Act. United States v. One 1936 Model Lafayette Coupe, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 1003; United States v. One 1933 Ford Coach, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 243; United States v. One Chrysler Sedan, D.C., 18 F. Supp. 684. The record does not disclose that the interest asserted by the claimant does not arise out of or is not subject to a contract or agreement with Harold Clemmer, a person having a record and reputation for violating laws relating to liquor, with reference to the automobile.

  4. United States v. One Terraplane Sedan

    23 F. Supp. 710 (E.D.N.Y. 1938)   Cited 8 times

    Had he been convicted, no doubt, the libellant would have submitted evidence thereon. The following cases have been submitted by the attorneys for the parties as applicable to the case at bar: C.I.T. Corporation v. United States, 4 Cir., 86 F.2d 311; United States v. One 1936 Model Lafayette Coupe Automobile, etc, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 1003; United States v. One 1933 Ford V-8 Coach, D.C., 14 F. Supp. 243; United States v. One Ford V-8 Truck et al., D.C., 17 F. Supp. 439; United States v. One 1935 Dodge Rack-Body Truck, etc., 2 Cir., 88 F.2d 613; United States v. One 1935 Ford Standard C. Automobile, D.C., 13 F. Supp. 104; United States v. One Studebaker Commander 8 Coupe, D.C., 13 F. Supp. 619; United States v. One 1935 Chevrolet Coupe, D.C., 13 F. Supp. 986; United States v. 1935 Ford Coupe Engine No. 18-1654854, D.C., 17 F. Supp. 331; United States v. One Chrysler Sedan, D.C., 18 F. Supp. 684; United States v. One Chevrolet Sedan, D.C., 18 Fed.Supp. 799; Federal Motor Finance v. United States, 8 Cir., 88 F.2d 90, and C.I.T. Corporation v. United States, 4 Cir., 89 F.2d 977; Shelliday v. United States, 4 Cir., 25 F.2d 372; Byroad v. United States, 59 App.D.C. 105, 35 F.2d 875; United States v. One Nash Coach, D.C., 39 F.2d 245, and United States v. C.I.T. Corporation, 2 Cir., 93 F.2d 469. There are hundreds of thousands of automobiles sold on the installment plan in the United States. Claimant in its brief states, and I have no reason to doubt it, that in the year 1934 there were 2,371,693 automobiles sold in the United States on the installment plan. If inquiries were made in each of these instances of the law enforcement agencies, such as the Alcohol Tax Unit, their time would be taken up by answering inquiries rather than in the enforcement of the law.

  5. Duckworth v. Bernstein

    55 Md. App. 710 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    Finding individual was agent of mortgagor for purpose of attesting to consideration for mortgage, but not deciding whether he was agent for purpose of negotiating loan

    See also Baltimore American Ins. Co. v. Ulman, 165 Md. 630, 170 A. 202 (1934) (knowledge of mortgagee's agent imputed to mortgagee even though agent was also acting as special agent of mortgagor in procuring mortgage); and Elliott Building and Loan Ass'n v. Karopchinsky, 156 Md. 302, 144 A. 254 (1929) (agent's knowledge attributable to principal even though agent claimed 10 percent commission from borrowers for obtaining loan). And see U.S. v. One Chrysler Sedan, 18 F. Supp. 684 (D.C. Pa. 1937) (imputing of agent's knowledge to principal especially applicable where agent is employed to obtain the knowledge sought to be charged to principal). The reason for this rule is based on the principle that one who elects to transact his business through another must ordinarily be held accountable for what the other does or does not do in conducting that business. It is the principal who has selected the agent, and if he has chosen unwisely, it is he who should bear the burden, and not a third party who has dealt with the agent to the third party's detriment.