United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.1998). See also United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962, 966 n. 7 (11th Cir.2004) (adopting Balogun's reasoning); United States v. Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480, 487 (8th Cir.2000) (same). "`[W]e presume that Congress does not employ the same word to convey different meanings within the same statute.

As we have recognized in another context, "[a] supervised release order cannot simultaneously be suspended and actively in effect." United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Whether a District Court exceeds its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 when it orders that a term of supervised release be tolled during the time that a defendant is excluded from the United States following removal is an issue of first impression in our court. Four of our sister courts of appeals have held that such tolling exceeds a district court's power to set conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1998). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) authorizes district courts to include a period of supervised release as part of a defendant's sentence.

These courts, citing the expressio unius maxim, have ruled that the pertinent statutes do not authorize tolling a term of supervised release during the period in which an offender is absent by reason of his deportation. See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Ossar-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480, 487-88 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1998). We think that when Congress explicitly allows for tolling in a particular circumstance, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to allow tolling in other circumstances.

In this regard, he argues that the "catchall" provision in § 3583(d) does not authorize the court to impose the reporting requirement. Finally, he submits that, because there would be no way to enforce a violation of this condition while he remained outside the United States, the condition "effectively toll[ed] his supervised release until a hypothetical future return," which is prohibited under United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2004). Second, he contends that the court's condition is "unreasonable" because it did not relate to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that are cross-referenced in § 3583(d).

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see also U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962, 965 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Because . . . § 5D1.3 mirrors the language used in this statute, we consider it together with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) in reviewing the district court's imposition of a special condition on a supervised release."). III.

Finally, Ossa-Gallegos challenges the district court's authority to toll the period of supervised release during the time that he remains outside of the United States. Although Ossa-Gallegos recognizes that the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Isong, 111 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 1997), held that the period of a deported alien's supervised release may be tolled until he or she returns to this country, three circuits have since rejected that holding. See United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Balogun, 146 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1998). Ossa-Gallegos therefore argues that the present case should serve as a vehicle for the reconsideration of Isong through en banc review.

" Doc. 18 at 2. The defendant points to four (4) cases where circuit courts have held that this contradicts section 3624(e) of the Sentencing Reform Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3524(e); see United States v. Ossa-Gallegos, 491 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v.Juan-Manuel, 222 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Balogum, 146 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1998). The defendant admits, however, that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not yet considered the issue.

Neither we nor the Supreme Court have interpreted the meaning of "supervision" in the context of whether the conditions of supervision apply when a judgment states that supervision is "waived" upon deportation. However, we have held that, if the provisions of supervised release require a defendant to remain outside the United States, the district court cannot toll the defendant's conditions of release while the defendant is outside the country because "a defendant [cannot] be excluded from the United States as a condition of supervised release while, at the same time . . . all conditions of supervised release [are] suspended for the duration of that exclusion." United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), "[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days." See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57, 59 (2000) ("Supervised release has no statutory function until confinement ends."); United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 962, 964, 967 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that "Congress's intent under [§ 3624(e)] was to support the 'primary goal' of supervised release to ease the defendant's transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense" (quotation marks omitted)). In Johnson, the Supreme Court addressed whether a prisoner's excess prison time, served for convictions that were later declared invalid, should be credited against his mandatory three-year term of supervised release under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), thereby reducing its length.