Rivera-Rodriguez, 318 F.3d at 276. Compare United States v. Petrelli, 306 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (scheme exceeded one year); United States v. Bovee, 291 F. Supp. 2d 557, 560 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (claim that marijuana growing operation from fall of 2001 to January 2002 was committed without significant planning and was of limited duration "borders on the preposterous.") with United States v. Nunemacher, 362 F.3d 682 (10th Cir. 2004) (implying that a two week interval of web access and distribution of child pornography may be of limited duration, where the defendant removed and destroyed the material before he knew he was being investigated by the FBI). In United States v. Dewire, 271 F.3d 333, 340 (1st Cir. 2001), a Grandmaison analysis case, the First Circuit upheld the sentencing court's conclusion that the defendant's act was not aberrant, because he had received child pornography on "three previous occasions."

hallenges his sentence on several grounds relating to the district court's failure to comply with the strict requirements imposed on departures from a guideline sentence. He argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable (1) because the court did not tie it to any departure provision under the guidelines, see United States v. Robertson, 568 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir.2009) (departure must be based on “permissible departure factors”); (2) because the court did not explain “why [Defendant's case] stood out from the heartland of cases involving § 924(c) brandishing represented by the Guideline sentence of seven years,” Aplt. Br. at 22, see United States v. Osborne, 593 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (10th Cir.2010) (the district court should justify a departure by determining the heartland of cases covered by the applicable guidelines and explaining why the case falls outside that heartland); and (3) because the court did not explain its methodology for arriving at a sentence of 20 years, see United States v. Nunemacher, 362 F.3d 682, 691 (10th Cir.2004) (“District courts are supposed to give some rationale tied to the Guidelines for the degree of departure in the specific case.”). We review these claims for plain error because they were not preserved below.

e. the costs and response actions conform to the national contingency plan.See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) ; see also B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom., Zollo Drum, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 524 U.S. 926 (1998), overruled on other grounds by New York v. National Servs. Indus., 362 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2003); Buffalo Color Corp. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 139 F. Supp.2d 409, 415 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, a defendant may avoid liability only if it establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threatened release was caused by an act of God, an act of war, certain acts or omissions of third parties other than those with whom the defendant has a contractual relationship, or a combination of these reasons.

Neither can the Court find the Defendant's voluntary termination from the conduct prior to law enforcement intervention constitutes a basis for departing downward. The Defendant relies on United States v. Nunemacher, 362 F.3d 682, 689 (10th Cir. 2004), which allowed a district court to consider downwardly departing for a defendant's voluntary termination of criminal conduct before such conduct was brought to the attention of law enforcement. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that voluntary termination reflected that the criminal conduct was atypical and, therefore, worthy of consideration for a departure, if exceptional.

(analyzing the relevant retroactivity event and concluding statute had no retroactive effect); Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 459 F.3d 640, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2006) ("A focus on the ‘relevant activity’ in this case leads inexorably to the conclusion that the change in the regulation was not impermissibly retroactive. ... [T]he regulatory change had no retroactive effect because the presumption defined by the listing is a rule of adjudication and therefore has its effect on claims at the time of adjudication."); United States v. Nunemacher , 362 F.3d 682, 685–86 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding new standard of appellate review applied notwithstanding that it was adopted after the proceedings in the trial court were concluded); United States v. Mallon , 345 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Holloman , 765 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1091 (C.D. Ill. 2011) ("Therefore, the relevant retroactivity event is the sentencing date, not the date the offense was committed, because the application of a mandatory minimum is a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense. Accordingly, the application of the FSA is the prospective application of current law, not a retroactive exercise."

" Id. As noted in Pyatt , subsection (b) "is specifically directed to appellate review," and "not to proceedings in the trial court, which, in this case, predated the amendment." 298 Ga. at 747 (3) n. 9, 784 S.E.2d 759, citing United States v. Nunemacher , 362 F.3d 682, 686 (10th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Mallon , 345 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (both of which applied a new standard of appellate review notwithstanding that it was adopted after conclusion of the trial court proceedings). Taking these factors into consideration, we agree with the majority opinion in Quiller that, because subsection (b) of OCGA § 17-8-57 is not aimed at regulating any conduct at trial, but instead addresses the standard of appellate review of an error already made at trial, the standard of appellate review set out in that subsection is properly given retroactive effect to cases tried before the enactment date but appealed after that date.

(Emphasis in original)). See also United States v. Nunemacher, 362 F.3d 682, 686 (10th Cir.2004) (new standard of appellate review applied, notwithstanding that it was adopted after the proceedings in the trial court were concluded); United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir.2003) (same). But because there is no reversible error in this case even under the former version of the statute, we need not decide whether the 2015 amendment properly applies.

Rather, that provision is specifically directed to appellate review.” Id., citing United States v. Nunemacher , 362 F.3d 682, 686 (10th Cir. 2004) (“new standard of appellate review applied, notwithstanding that it was adopted after the proceedings in the trial court were concluded”). Pyatt , supra, at 747 (3), n. 9, 784 S.E.2d 759. For this reason, we hold that subsection (b) of newly amended OCGA § 17–8–57 should be given retroactive effect. We therefore overrule Alday v. State , 336 Ga.App. 508, 784 S.E.2d 860 (2016) (physical precedent only) in which former OCGA § 17–8–57 was applied rather than current OCGA § 17–8–57 (b).