The alleged inconsistency about who reported Daniels to law enforcement “cannot be characterized as anything but minor.” United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994). Any “incremental impeachment value [Daniels] would receive from [this] minor inconsistenc[y] . . . does not raise a reasonable probability that, had the [report] been disclosed to [his] counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
See also Shuttlesworth v. Richardson, No. 14-CV-567, 2016 WL 6651412, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 10, 2016) ("It is uncertain whether Brady applies outside the trial context."); United States v. Knox, No. 89 CR 908-24, 1995 WL 443968, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1995) ("We initially observe that it is not entirely clear that a Brady violation can serve as the basis for a collateral attack on a guilty plea . . . though at least two circuits have concluded that a Brady violation is cognizable following a guilty plea, the Seventh Circuit has recently declined to rule on the issue.") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We note. . . that at least two other Circuits have stated that, where a defendant later challenges a guilty plea, Brady may be invoked to challenge the voluntariness of the plea where a defendant's (otherwise voluntary) plea was given without knowledge of the undisclosed exculpatory evidence. Defendants, however, did not raise or argue this point in the district court or on appeal.
A "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal of a guilty plea is that the plea was involuntary. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994). The Defendant's Petition does not convince the Court that the statement he made under oath when he entered his guilty pleas were false. Nor do they suggest to the Court that he was unable to comprehend what he was doing when he entered those pleas.
These conversations are therefore immaterial, and neither an evidentiary hearing nor any further discussion of Brady is needed. See United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Because . . . the omissions were not material, we need not determine whether [the officer's] omissions were intentional or reckless."); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim of Brady violation where defendants failed to show the evidence at issue was material to their case). None of the other arguments in Givens's voluminous filings warrants consideration on the merits, because they do not aim to "correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence."
At the outset, the Court notes that a "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal of a guilty plea is that the plea was involuntarily. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A guilty plea is voluntary when it is not induced by threats or misrepresentations and the defendant is made aware of the direct consequences of the plea.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, in his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, the Defendant does not point to any deficiency in the Court's Change of Plea Hearing on November 6, 2014. That is, he does not allege that the Court failed to follow Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal. Nor does he submit that any of his comments during the hearing suggested that his plea was anything other than knowing and voluntary.
See generally United States v. Kapenekas, 413 Fed.Appx. 778, 778-79 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jacobson, 406 Fed. Appx. 91 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 922 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Feaster, 394 Fed.Appx. 561, 564 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ramirez-Nicholas, 179 Fed.Appx. 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Urquilla-Avalos, 144 Fed.Appx. 447 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000); Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2000). Cf. United States v. Donovan, 410 Fed.Appx. 979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kingcade, 562 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lacey, 569 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998); Gilbert v. United States, 1997 WL 312278, *1-2 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Seybold, 979 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1992). As a general rule, a defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues.
" That is an entrapment defense. Having waived it by pleading guilty, United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cottage, 307 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 2002), the defendant could not require the judge to consider it anew in sentencing. See United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1990).
Representations and admissions made by a defendant in a plea agreement and during a change of plea hearing are therefore entitled to `a presumption of verity.'") (citation omitted); see also United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994) ("`[V]oluntary responses made by a defendant under oath before an examining judge [are] binding.") (citation omitted). The rest of the change of plea hearing further supports the finding that Love's plea was knowing and voluntarily, since he credibly stated that he understood the Government's allegations against him, that he hadn't been influenced by any promises outside of the plea agreement, that he is bound by the Court's sentence and not by any recommendations of the Government, and that his sentence may exceed any estimates made by his lawyer.
No one raised this doctrine, either below or on appeal. We should generally refrain from deciding nonjurisdictional issues on grounds not asserted by the parties, see United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202, n. 5 (7th Cir. 1994), not least because it sabotages the adversarial process. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) ("What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.").
See id.; United States v. Brown, 870 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir. 1989); Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704, 707 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880, 93 S.Ct. 208, 34 L.Ed.2d 135 (1972).United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994). See also United State v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1989); United States v. Wallace, 280 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2002); Young v. United States, 124 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 1997).