See generally United States v. Kapenekas, 413 Fed.Appx. 778, 778-79 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jacobson, 406 Fed. Appx. 91 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 922 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Feaster, 394 Fed.Appx. 561, 564 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ramirez-Nicholas, 179 Fed.Appx. 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Urquilla-Avalos, 144 Fed.Appx. 447 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000); Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2000). Cf. United States v. Donovan, 410 Fed.Appx. 979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kingcade, 562 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lacey, 569 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998); Gilbert v. United States, 1997 WL 312278, *1-2 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Seybold, 979 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1992). As a general rule, a defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues.
The Court has yet to address, however, whether the Due Process Clause requires such disclosures outside the context of a trial. See United States v. Tadros, 310 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a] violation of the Brady rule occurs only when the government withholds evidence which, had it been disclosed, creates a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different"); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202-03 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1994) (refraining from addressing the issue of whether " Brady may be invoked to challenge the voluntariness of the plea where a defendant's (otherwise voluntary plea) was given without knowledge of . . . undisclosed exculpatory evidence"). A recent decision by the Supreme Court, however, indicates that such a claim might be viable in certain cases.
The alleged inconsistency about who reported Daniels to law enforcement “cannot be characterized as anything but minor.” United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994). Any “incremental impeachment value [Daniels] would receive from [this] minor inconsistenc[y] . . . does not raise a reasonable probability that, had the [report] been disclosed to [his] counsel, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
See also Shuttlesworth v. Richardson, No. 14-CV-567, 2016 WL 6651412, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 10, 2016) ("It is uncertain whether Brady applies outside the trial context."); United States v. Knox, No. 89 CR 908-24, 1995 WL 443968, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1995) ("We initially observe that it is not entirely clear that a Brady violation can serve as the basis for a collateral attack on a guilty plea . . . though at least two circuits have concluded that a Brady violation is cognizable following a guilty plea, the Seventh Circuit has recently declined to rule on the issue.") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We note. . . that at least two other Circuits have stated that, where a defendant later challenges a guilty plea, Brady may be invoked to challenge the voluntariness of the plea where a defendant's (otherwise voluntary) plea was given without knowledge of the undisclosed exculpatory evidence. Defendants, however, did not raise or argue this point in the district court or on appeal.