See generally United States v. Kapenekas, 413 Fed.Appx. 778, 778-79 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jacobson, 406 Fed. Appx. 91 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 922 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Feaster, 394 Fed.Appx. 561, 564 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ramirez-Nicholas, 179 Fed.Appx. 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Urquilla-Avalos, 144 Fed.Appx. 447 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000); Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734-35 (11th Cir. 2000). Cf. United States v. Donovan, 410 Fed.Appx. 979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kingcade, 562 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lacey, 569 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998); Gilbert v. United States, 1997 WL 312278, *1-2 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Seybold, 979 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1992). As a general rule, a defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues.
" That is an entrapment defense. Having waived it by pleading guilty, United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cottage, 307 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 2002), the defendant could not require the judge to consider it anew in sentencing. See United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1990).
No one raised this doctrine, either below or on appeal. We should generally refrain from deciding nonjurisdictional issues on grounds not asserted by the parties, see United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202, n. 5 (7th Cir. 1994), not least because it sabotages the adversarial process. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) ("What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.").
The Court has yet to address, however, whether the Due Process Clause requires such disclosures outside the context of a trial. See United States v. Tadros, 310 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a] violation of the Brady rule occurs only when the government withholds evidence which, had it been disclosed, creates a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different"); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202-03 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1994) (refraining from addressing the issue of whether " Brady may be invoked to challenge the voluntariness of the plea where a defendant's (otherwise voluntary plea) was given without knowledge of . . . undisclosed exculpatory evidence"). A recent decision by the Supreme Court, however, indicates that such a claim might be viable in certain cases.
Such weak impeachment evidence on an issue tangential to the conviction is not sufficient to warrant the drastic remedy of a new trial. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1220 n. 5; United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994). The withheld material Perez complains of is more directly related to the evidence against him.
Faced with such trivial discrepancies, the district court held that the government's failure to turn over Anderson's grand jury testimony did not result in prejudice because it could have no conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Cf. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting Brady claim where impeachment evidence "cannot be characterized as anything but minor" under the facts); United States v. Montgomery, Nos. 96-1303, 97-1313, 129 F.3d 120, 1997 U.S.App. LEXIS 27227 (7th Cir. October 1, 1997) (unpublished) (while officer's notes revealed inconsistencies with trial testimony, minor nature of discrepancies would not have discredited officer's testimony). The district court's holding does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Martin's argument rests on the concept that a guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional defenses to the crime at issue. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994). But the nexus with interstate commerce, which courts frequently call the "jurisdictional element," is simply one of the essential elements of § 844(i).
Martin's argument rests on the concept that a guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional defenses to the crime at issue. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994). But the nexus with interstate commerce, which courts frequently call the "jurisdictional element," is simply one of the essential elements of § 844(i).
A voluntary and knowing plea of guilty to this charge waives all but jurisdictional challenges. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994) ("A defendant's plea of guilty admits, in legal effect, the facts charged and waives all non-jurisdictional defenses . . . ."). JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
There is nothing but mere speculation that the sixty-one remaining hours of the Vienna intercept contain any Brady material, and under our cases, speculation is not enough to establish that the Government has hidden evidence. United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). There is no requirement under Brady that the Government transcribe the entire sixty-five hours of the intercept, much of which contains irrelevant information.