U.S. v. Mullins

65 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Smith

    508 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2007)   Cited 35 times

    Even then, we may only exercise our discretion to correct those errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 284, 166 L.Ed.2d 217 (2006). Additionally, "[w]e bear in mind that fleeting comments that passed without objection during the rough-and-tumble of closing argument in the trial court should not be unduly magnified when the printed transcript is subjected to painstaking review in the reflective quiet of an appellate judge's chambers."

  2. United States v. Hopkins

    CR. 20-50095-JLV (D.S.D. Jan. 25, 2023)

    United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); internal citation omitted)

  3. Walker v. State

    192 Md. App. 678 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    There is no doubt that some starter pistols are readily susceptible to being converted into a weapon that can expel a projectile by the explosion of a projectile. See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2006). But, as the testimony in this case illustrated, not all starter pistols can be so converted.

  4. VanDerStok v. Garland

    86 F.4th 179 (5th Cir. 2023)   Cited 19 times

    And a starter gun—which is expressly mentioned in the text of § 921(a)(3)—is a GCA firearm because it can be converted to expel projectiles using basic tools, without any specialized knowledge, "in a matter of minutes" and "easily [in] less than an hour." United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 755-56 (8th Cir. 2006). NFA weapons like machine guns are a different story.

  5. United States v. Garrett

    898 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2018)   Cited 11 times
    Finding no error when the district court instructed the jury on knowledge and intent elements without objection, and where defense counsel argued the theory of defense "at length"

    To obtain a reversal ... the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks or conduct were improper, and (2) the remarks or conduct prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial." United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion because (i) the remarks were related to the evidence and not "likely to inflame bias in the jury," id. at 759 ; (ii) the remarks were not so prejudicial as to deprive Garrett of a fair trial; (iii) the district court's instruction that closing arguments are not evidence "serve[d] to alleviate any risk of prejudicial impact," United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) ; and (iv) we agree with the district court that the evidence of Garrett's guilt was overwhelming.

  6. United States v. Atkins

    881 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2018)   Cited 7 times

    " Bass v. United States, 655 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Roundtree, 534 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2008) ). No matter, however, "[t]he relevant question ultimately is whether the prosecutor's comments, if improper, ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ " United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) ). Here, the government's questioning during its case-in-chief and comments during closing arguments were not improper vouching, but rather arguments about Baker's credibility in the face of repeated accusations by Atkins about her trustworthiness.

  7. United States v. Sevilla-Acosta

    746 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2014)   Cited 4 times
    Finding appropriate the government's comments about a cooperating witness's benefits and motivation for testifying truthfully, characterizing them as arguing credibility and not crossing the line into vouching for credibility

    “To obtain a reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks or conduct were improper, and (2) the remarks or conduct prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial.” United States v. Brown, 702 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir.2013), quoting United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir.2006). If there is no objection, this court reviews for plain error. United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 958 (8th Cir.2008) (“[I]f an arguably improper statement made during closing argument is not objected to by defense counsel, we will only reverse under exceptional circumstances.

  8. United States v. Sevilla-Acosta

    No. 13-1887 (8th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014)

    "To obtain a reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks or conduct were improper, and (2) the remarks or conduct prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial." United States v. Brown, 702 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013), quoting United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006). If there is no objection, this court reviews for plain error. United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 958 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[I]f an arguably improper statement made during closing argument is not objected to by defense counsel, we will only reverse under exceptional circumstances."

  9. U.S. v. Coutentos

    651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 70 times
    Holding that rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was not unconstitutional

    Because there was no contemporaneous objection to these statements, we review them only for plain error. United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir.2006). To obtain relief, a defendant must show (1) that there was error; (2) that the error was plain; and (3) that it affected the defendant's substantial rights.

  10. United States v. Two Elk

    536 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2008)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) is a separate-act offense

    It is well-settled that prosecutorial "appeals to the passion, prejudice, or sympathy of jurors during closing argument are improper." Eagle, 515 F.3d at 805 (citing Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943)); see also United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 759 (8th Cir. 2006). In Eagle, the prosecution made similarly strong statements regarding the impact of a crime on an eight-year-old victim of sexual assault.