Even then, we may only exercise our discretion to correct those errors that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 284, 166 L.Ed.2d 217 (2006). Additionally, "[w]e bear in mind that fleeting comments that passed without objection during the rough-and-tumble of closing argument in the trial court should not be unduly magnified when the printed transcript is subjected to painstaking review in the reflective quiet of an appellate judge's chambers."
” United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); internal citation omitted)
There is no doubt that some starter pistols are readily susceptible to being converted into a weapon that can expel a projectile by the explosion of a projectile. See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2006). But, as the testimony in this case illustrated, not all starter pistols can be so converted.
And a starter gun—which is expressly mentioned in the text of § 921(a)(3)—is a GCA firearm because it can be converted to expel projectiles using basic tools, without any specialized knowledge, "in a matter of minutes" and "easily [in] less than an hour." United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 755-56 (8th Cir. 2006). NFA weapons like machine guns are a different story.
To obtain a reversal ... the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks or conduct were improper, and (2) the remarks or conduct prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial." United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion because (i) the remarks were related to the evidence and not "likely to inflame bias in the jury," id. at 759 ; (ii) the remarks were not so prejudicial as to deprive Garrett of a fair trial; (iii) the district court's instruction that closing arguments are not evidence "serve[d] to alleviate any risk of prejudicial impact," United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) ; and (iv) we agree with the district court that the evidence of Garrett's guilt was overwhelming.
" Bass v. United States, 655 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Roundtree, 534 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2008) ). No matter, however, "[t]he relevant question ultimately is whether the prosecutor's comments, if improper, ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ " United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) ). Here, the government's questioning during its case-in-chief and comments during closing arguments were not improper vouching, but rather arguments about Baker's credibility in the face of repeated accusations by Atkins about her trustworthiness.
“To obtain a reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks or conduct were improper, and (2) the remarks or conduct prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial.” United States v. Brown, 702 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir.2013), quoting United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir.2006). If there is no objection, this court reviews for plain error. United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 958 (8th Cir.2008) (“[I]f an arguably improper statement made during closing argument is not objected to by defense counsel, we will only reverse under exceptional circumstances.
"To obtain a reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks or conduct were improper, and (2) the remarks or conduct prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial." United States v. Brown, 702 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013), quoting United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2006). If there is no objection, this court reviews for plain error. United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 958 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[I]f an arguably improper statement made during closing argument is not objected to by defense counsel, we will only reverse under exceptional circumstances."
Because there was no contemporaneous objection to these statements, we review them only for plain error. United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir.2006). To obtain relief, a defendant must show (1) that there was error; (2) that the error was plain; and (3) that it affected the defendant's substantial rights.
It is well-settled that prosecutorial "appeals to the passion, prejudice, or sympathy of jurors during closing argument are improper." Eagle, 515 F.3d at 805 (citing Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943)); see also United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 759 (8th Cir. 2006). In Eagle, the prosecution made similarly strong statements regarding the impact of a crime on an eight-year-old victim of sexual assault.