Opinion
No. 99 C 2162
January 17, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Roy Coates was found guilty by a trial judge on counts of armed robbery, vehicular invasion, and aggravated unlawful restraint and received concurrent sentences of eight, four and two years respectively. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, Coates now petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Coates' petition raises a single, albeit two-tiered, constitutional challenge: he argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because of the unreliability of the victim's in-court identification. After a careful review, the court dismisses Coates' habeas corpus petition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The court has not received the state court record, and thus uses the citations to such record provided by Coates in his Notice of Appeal in People v. Coates, 96C5-50316.
On January 29, 1996, Coates was in the custody of the Cook County Sheriff on numerous misdemeanor charges. (R. A4-5.) After his court appearance on those charges, he was taken to the Bridgeview Police Department, identified in a police line-up by Krista Hughes, the victim of an October 31, 1995 carjacking and robbery, arrested and charged with Armed Robbery (Count 1), Armed Violence (Counts 2, 3 and 4), Vehicular Invasion (Count 5), Aggravated Kidnaping (Counts 6 and 7), and Aggravated Unlawful Restraint (Count 8). (R. A7, A17.) Coates, who was represented by counsel both during pre-trial and at trial, waived his right to trial by jury. Coates also moved to suppress the January 29 identification. (R. A26-29.) The court granted this motion because Coates "was the only person [in the lineup] with brown khaki pants, with those khaki pants having the letters DOC [Department of Corrections] on the front." (R. A29.)
At trial, the prosecution's case-in-chief consisted solely of the testimony of Hughes and Detective Michael Tardi. Hughes testified that she was stopped at a red light at 8:30 in the morning on October 31, 1995 when a man, identified by Hughes in court as Petitioner Coates, approached her driver's-side window with a gun, walked in front of her car, opened her passenger-side door, and stepped inside. (R. B14-17.) Hughes testified that she watched the assailant during the few seconds it took for him to walk in front of her car and open the door. (R. B18.) The assailant then commanded Hughes to drive and, while she drove, he emptied her purse and took some of her credit cards and cash. (R. B20, 40.) Hughes also testified that both while driving and when stopped at traffic lights she was able to look at the assailant's face out of the corner of her eye. (R. B23, 39.) After about thirty minutes, the assailant told Hughes to pull her car over to the side of the road. He then exited the vehicle. (R. B21-22.)
At around 10:30 that morning, Hughes met with an Officer Stevens and Detective Tardi of the Hickory Hills Police Department. (R. B26-27, 54-55.) Hughes first gave a brief description of her assailant to Officer Stevens. (R. B61.) Hughes then provided information to Tardi, and Tardi used an IDENTI-KIT to convert her description into a composite sketch. (R. B55.) As part of her description, Hughes told Tardi that the assailant wore a gold hoop earring in his left ear and had a two-inch growth of blond hair on his chin. (R. B36-37, 65-66.) Hughes did not mention a moustache, beard, nor did she describe any hair between the assailant's eyebrows. (R. B49, 51, 66-67.) Hughes also told Tardi that the color of the assailant's eyes was green, a detail not reflected in the black and white sketch. (R. B67.) Hughes viewed the sketch when it was completed and agreed that it was an accurate portrayal of her assailant's appearance. (R. B26-27.) She reconfirmed her confidence in the sketch at trial. (R. B55.) The interview of Hughes and the composite sketch comprised the entire investigation; no fingerprints were lifted either from the vehicle or Hughes' purse after the robbery. (R. B68-69.)
After the State rested, Coates presented six witnesses — two of his sisters, Sheila O'Ryan (a female friend who had asked Coates to accompany her to her cousin's wedding on November 5, 1995), his father, his mother and himself — and offered into evidence four photographs taken of him around October 31, 1995. Coates' two sisters were shown the first photograph (Defendant's Exhibit 1) and testified that it was taken on October 19, 1995, as a gift for their mother's birthday on October 23, 1995. (R. B5-6, 72-73.) In that picture, Coates was clean-shaven, had blue eyes, and did not have an earring in his left ear. (R. B7-8.) Coates' sisters testified that Coates had worn an earring as a teenager, but did not recall him wearing an earring around the time of the crime at issue (at which time, Coates was 24 years old). (R. B7-8, 74.) O'Ryan was shown the second and third photographs (Defendant's Exhibits 3 4) and testified that they were taken at her cousin's wedding on or around November 5, 1995. (R. B76-78.) In those pictures, Coates has facial hair on his cheeks and chin and some on his upper lip. Finally, Coates offered the fourth photograph (Defendant's Exhibit 6), taken by the Burbank Police Department on November 2, 1995, wherein he has a beard and moustache. (R. B101.)
Coates' father and mother then provided alibi testimony. Coates' father testified that Coates, who lived at home with his parents, normally left to go to work at his job at a construction company before 7:00 a.m., but did not go to work on the morning of October 31, 1995 because it was a "rain day." (R. B81-82.) Coates' mother testified that Coates was home, and in her sight, from 7:30 a.m. until around 11:00 a.m. (R. B87.)
After considering the testimony and other evidence, the court found Coates guilty of Armed Kobbery (Count 1), Vehicular Invasion (Count 5), and Aggravated Unlawfulul Restraint (Count 8), and not guilty of Counts 2, 3, 6 and 7. (R. B121-124.) While the court believed that "the photos and the dates that were testified to [were] true and correct," it concluded that due to "[Hughes'] ability to observe, the amount of time she had to observe the assailant, the time of day taking into consideration it was daylight hours, the proximity that she had between the assailant and herself, her description to the police and the sketch [. . .,] the State has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id.) The court appeared to focus most intently on what it considered to be a remarkable similarity between Coates and the black and white composite sketch created by Hughes and Tardi.
Coates moved for a new trial and the court denied this motion. (R. C4.) In doing so, the trial judge stated: "I did not disregard the testimony of the Defendant nor his witnesses. I did pay attention to it, but I found it not to be as least [sic] persuasive or believable in light of the testimony and everything else that I heard. Therefore, your motion for a new trial is denied." ( Id.) Coates was sentenced to 8 years on Count 1, 4 years on Count 5, and 2 years on Count 8, all sentences to run concurrently. (R. C13.) Coates then timely appealed his case to the Illinois Appellate Court. The specific and only issue appealed was: "Whether the Defendant was properly convicted of Armed Robbery, Vehicular Invasion, and Aggravated Unlawful Restraint beyond a reasonable doubt where the testimony of the sole identification witness was doubtful and uncertain and the Defendant's alibi witnesses were uncontradicted and unimpeached." (Coates' state appellate court brief in People v. Coates, 1-97-0524.) In a Summary Order, the First District Appellate Court denied his appeal on November 25, 1997. People v. Coates, No. 1-97-0524. Citing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992), the court concluded that there was "sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find that defendant's identity as the assailant and his guilt of the offenses . . . was proved beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Coates, No. 1-97-0524. Coates sought leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, where he advanced the same argument he had advanced in the appellate court. On April 1, 1998, the Illinois Supreme Court denied Coates' leave to appeal.
On March 30, 1999, Coates filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, again raising the same grounds for relief.
On December 20, 1999, Coates was released from the Vienna Correctional Center on parole. Seehttp://www.idoc.state.il.us/asp/inms.asp. His release, however, does not moot his habeas petition. See Phifer v. Clark, 115 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Although Phifer is physically outside prison, on parole his freedom is restrained. Thus, Phifer, while on parole, remains in custody within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute and his petition is not moot merely because he is on parole.").
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of ReviewA petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court is governed by § 2254 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under § 2254, a prisoner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if he is being held under a state court judgment obtained in violation of the Constitution. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 (2000). A federal court will not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless that state decision (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (2); Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000)). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" clearly established law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. Here, as discussed below, the appellate court identified the correct governing legal principles, and, therefore, this court must determine whether the appellate court unreasonably applied those principles to the facts of Coates' case.
Because Coates has exhausted his state law claim and has not procedurally defaulted on it, the court now turns to the merits of Coates' arguments.
II. The Merits
Two key principles are at issue in this case. The first, and overarching, principle directs that when presented with a claim of insufficient evidence, a court should affirm the verdict if, after viewing such evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The appellate court did not expressly mention Jackson in its Summary Order, but it indirectly relied on Jackson's "sufficiency of the evidence" standard through its citation of People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 374-75, 586 N.E.2d 1261, 1266-67 (1992). In Campbell, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "when faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court applies the reasonable doubt standard as set forth in People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 261 (1985) [and] derived from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)." Campbell, 146
Ill.2d at 374, 586 N.E.2d at 1265. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), then, this court must determine whether the appellate court properly applied the Jackson principle to the facts of this case. Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 199 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that federal review "turns on whether the state court provided fair process and engaged in reasoned, good-faith decision making when applying Jackson's `no rational trier of fact' test").
Intertwined with this Jackson analysis, however, is the second legal principle — which focuses on the reliability of Hughes' in-court identification of Coates. The evaluation of an in-court identification involves a two-step inquiry. First, the court must decide "whether the identification procedure was unreasonably suggestive." United States v. Alanis, 109 F.3d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1997). The defendant has the initial burden of establishing that the procedure was unreasonably suggestive. See United States v. L'Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988). If the procedure is deemed unreasonably suggestive, the court must then determine "whether the identification, viewed under the totality of the circumstances, is nonetheless reliable." United States v. Alanis, 109 F.3d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1997). The factors to be considered when assessing the reliability of an in-court identification were established by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). They are as follows: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of attention at the time of the crime, (3) the accuracy of the witness's pre-identification description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the identification, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification. See United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 536 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200).
Coates argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient for him to have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because (1) Hughes' in-court identification of him was suspect in light of the suppressed lineup and the discrepancies in Hughes' description of her assailant to Tardi on October 31; and (2) the testimony of his alibi witnesses was, for all intents and purposes, unjustifiably ignored. Because the only evidence against Coates at trial was Hughes' identification, the court can only determine whether the evidence was sufficient by first considering whether Hughes' in-court identification of Coates was independently reliable. If found reliable, the evidence on the whole would certainly meet the Jackson standard, notwithstanding any decision by the trial judge to discount or overlook the testimony of Coates' alibi witnesses. See United States v. Chrans, 869 F.2d 1084, 1089 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Credible testimony of one identification witness is sufficient to support a conviction."). See also Rivera v. Sheriff of Cook County, 162 F.3d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1998) ("One witness is enough, if the trier of fact believes that witness . . . ."); People v. Berland, 74 Ill.2d 286, 307, 385 N.E.2d 649, 658 (1979) ("Trial judge [was] not obligated to believe the testimony of the alibi witnesses over the positive identification of the accused."). If the in-court identification is found unreliable, however, the evidence against Coates would clearly fall short of the Jackson standard.
The court therefore applies the aforementioned two-step inquiry. Because the suggestive nature of the January 29, 1996 lineup is undisputed, the court advances to the second step of the inquiry, where it must determine whether, under "the totality of the circumstances," Hughes' in-court identification of Coates was reliable. As already noted, the trial judge already evaluated the identification at trial and concluded that due to "[Hughes] ability to observe, the amount of time she had to observe the assailant, the time of day taking into consideration it was daylight hours, the proximity that she had between the assailant and herself, her description to the police and the sketch . . . the State has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt." The appellate court affirmed, and while it did not explicitly mention Biggers in its Summary Order, it did cite to People v. Slim, 127 Ill.2d 302, 537 N.E.2d 317 (1989), a case in which the Supreme Court of Illinois relied on Biggers in its evaluation of a contested identification. See Slim, 127 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 537 N.E.2d at 319 ("[I]n assessing identification testimony, our courts have generally been using steps set out by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers."). While this court "need not accept the Illinois appellate court's conclusion on this issue, and is free to reweigh the Biggers factors," see Abrams v. Barnett, 121 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1997), the evaluation that follows only serves to confirm the appellate court's conclusion.
Notably, Coates does not seriously challenge the first two Biggers factors — the opportunity Hughes had to witness her assailant or the amount of attention she paid to him. After all, Hughes watched her assailant produce a gun and enter her car, and then drove with him in the passenger seat for upwards to thirty minutes. See Newman, 144 F.3d at 536 (applying the Biggers factors and finding that the identification was reliable because, among other reasons, the witness observed the defendant for a ten to fifteen minute period); United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 201, 202 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Defendant fails to cite any authority for the proposition that ten minutes of observation is insufficient to support an identification. To the contrary, this court has supported convictions based on identifications made after much shorter periods of observation."); United States v. Duprey, 895 F.2d 303, 308 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying the Biggers factors and finding that the identification was reliable because, among other reasons, a witness identified the defendant after observing him for five minutes in a motel lobby); People v. Taylor, 143 Ill. App.3d 252, 255, 492 N.E.2d 1011, 1013 (2nd Dist. 1986) (applying the Slim/Biggers factors and noting that "[a]n initial viewing time of 5 to 10 seconds has been held sufficient.").
Coates' strongest challenge to the reliability of Hughes' identification focuses on the third factor of the Slim standard — the accuracy of Hughes' prior description of her assailant. As Coates points out, Hughes told Detective Tardi on October 31, 1995, that her assailant wore a gold hoop earring in his left ear, had green eyes, and sported a two-inch growth of hair on his chin. In a photograph of Coates, however, taken on October 19, Coates does not have an earring in either ear, has blue eyes, and is clean-shaven. In another photograph of Coates, taken November 2, he has a beard and moustache. Finally, in a photograph of Coates, taken November 5, Coates still has a beard and moustache. The court fully acknowledges the discrepancies that Coates raises; nevertheless, for two reasons, the court does not believe that these minor discrepancies render the entire identification unreliable. First, the discrepancies pointed out by Coates can, to some extent, be explained away. For example, as the trial judge noted, it is quite possible that his facial hair had been growing in an inconsistent manner such that, on October 31, the hair on his chin was more prominent than that on his cheeks and/or upper lip. See R. 121-24 ("The [November 2] photo shows that clearly in different parts of Mr. Coates' face, hair is growing at different times and with different amounts of consistency and inconsistency. The photograph taken at the wedding clearly shows that the moustache is not as prominent as the beard and that different parts of his face show different lengths of hair and different degrees of growth and width . . . .") Nor does the earring concern this court, as it could easily have been removed for the family portrait or at the wedding.
Second, and more importantly, while discrepancies such as green versus blue eyes obviously generate concern as to the reliability of an identification, in general, "identifications are based upon the `total impression' of the witness rather than on a single distinguishing feature." Taylor, 143 Ill. App.3d at 255, 492 N.E.2d at 1013. See also Johnson v. McCaughtry, 92 F.3d 585, 596 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding the identification reliable on the whole despite witness' error in description of defendant's height); Mason v. Godinez, 47 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Except for the height discrepancies, the description of the robbery suspect by the Huertas and the victims compared favorably with Mason's general physical characteristics.") (emphasis added); People v. Mendoza, 62 Ill. App.3d 609, 616, 378 N.E.2d 1318, 1324 (1st Dist. 1978) ("[I]t has consistently been held that any discrepancies or inaccuracies or omissions as to facial hair, or some other facial characteristic, or some other physical characteristic such as height or weight, or age, are not fatal, but simply go to the weight of the identification testimony and are to be evaluated by the trier of fact.") (citations omitted). At trial, it was the similarity between Coates and the "total impression" or "general physical characteristics" represented in the composite sketch that the trial judge found so striking. See R. C11 ("When [Hughes] was asked to go to the police station and draw [the] composite . . . she didn't come up with a composite that kind of fit your description . . . she came up with a composite . . . that I tell you if I added color to it, it [sic] would be hard pressed to figure if it was a photograph of you or if it was a composite.").
While the court concludes that Hughes' in-court identification was reliable under the "totality of the circumstances," it nevertheless feels compelled to distinguish this case from the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), another habeas case. Cossel filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to testimony by the victim relating to her identification of him as her attacker. Id. at 650. On April 25, 1983, the victim had been awakened in her own house and subsequently raped. Id. at 651. The victim told the police that her attacker was no taller than six feet and weighed between 140 and 150 pounds. Id. at 656. At the time of the attack, Cossel was 6'3" tall and weighed between 215 and 220 pounds. Id. at 656. The police, who originally suspected another man of the crime, turned their attention to Cossel in or around July of 1994; however, when shown a photographic array that included Cossel, the victim was unable to identify him, even after his particular photograph was singled out by the police. Id. at 651.
Then, in May of 1986, the police brought the victim out-of-state to view a police lineup which again included Cossel. Id. This time, the victim, who was expecting the petitioner to be in the lineup, identified him, and he was charged with, among other things, rape and burglary. Id. Prior to trial, defense counsel did not move to suppress or otherwise limit trial testimony relating to the identification. Id. At trial, the victim testified that she had observed Cossel's face for approximately ten seconds when she was being turned from her stomach to her back and that, although no lights were on, she was able to see because of the light from the moon and a street light that shone into the house. Id. at 652.
The federal district court dismissed Cossel's habeas corpus petition with prejudice on the ground that the Indiana Court of Appeals did not misapply federal law. Id. at 650. Upon an application of Biggers to the facts of the case, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Id. at 654-56. The state had conceded that the identifications at issue were impermissibly suggestive; thus, the court proceeded to weigh the Biggers factors. Id. at 655-56. In doing so, it held that "[i]n light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the victim's] in-court identification of Cossel as her attacker, . . . [the victim's] in-court identification lacks sufficient independent reliability to be admissible." Id. at 656. The court recognized that the victim s identification may have satisfied the first two Biggers factors, but particularly emphasized the inaccuracy of the victim's pre-identification description and the "extraordinary long period of time" — approximately three years — that had elapsed between the attack and her lineup identification. Id.
Certain of the above facts make Cossel markedly distinguishable from this case. Primarily, while Hughes was exposed to her assailant in broad daylight for at least several minutes, the victim in Cossel viewed her assailant by the light of the moon for a period of ten seconds while being shifted from her stomach to her back. Moreover, while Hughes constructed a composite sketch that presented, according to the trial judge, an almost exact likeness of Coates, the record does not indicate that the victim in Cossel constructed a similar composite. All the record shows by way of a description was that her attacker was no taller than 6 feet and weighed between 140 and 150 pounds; in actuality, Cossel, at the time of the attack, was taller and much heavier. Finally, in Cossel, the victim could not identify Cossel in a photographic array, even after the police singled out his photograph. In sum, then, while the appellate court did not explicitly review the trial court's consideration of each of the Biggers factors, nor perform its own evaluation, this court agrees with the appellate court's conclusion — Hughes' identification of Coates is, under the totality of the circumstances, reliable.
Given this finding, the court briefly returns to its Jackson analysis, and notes that proving a claim of insufficient evidence presents
a heavy burden for a defendant to meet. The burden becomes even heavier . . . where there is a claim of insufficient evidence because of the unreliability of one or more witnesses. Matters of witness credibility, absent `extraordinary circumstances,' are solely for the jury to evaluate.United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1322 (7th Cir. 1988). Hughes' trial testimony, pointing out Coates as her assailant, has already been deemed reliable, and is sufficient identification. The trial judge found this testimony more credible than that of Coates' alibi witnesses. Coates has not established any "extraordinary circumstances" that would cause the court to disturb the trial judge's evaluation of credibility. Consequently, the court finds that viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the state court reasonably determined that sufficient evidence supported Coates' convictions for armed robbery, vehicular invasion, and aggravated unlawful restraint.
Because the state court reasonably applied the principles set forth in Jackson and Biggers, the court finds that the Illinois Appellate Court did not unreasonably apply federal law in deciding Coates' claim on direct appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court denies Coates' petition for a writ of habeas corpus.